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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
DEPARTMENT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND ENERGY
CABLE TELEVISION DIVISION
MediaOne of Massachusetts, Inc.,
MediaOne Group, Inc., and AT&T Corp.,
Appellants,
v.
Board of Selectmen of the City of Quincy,
Appellee. |
CTV 99-3;
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OPPOSITION OF CITY OF QUINCY
TO MOTION FOR EXPEDITED PROCESSING OF APPEAL
The City of Quincy ("Quincy") opposes the motion of MediaOne of Massachusetts,
Inc, MediaOne Group, Inc., and AT&T Corp. (collectively, "Appellants")
to expedite the hearing or processing of this matter. For the reasons set
forth below, the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunication and Energy,
Cable Television Division (the "Division"), should deny the Appellants’
motion to expedite this proceeding and should schedule this matter for
a full evidentiary hearing, giving appropriate consideration to the complex
legal and factual matters at issue in the case.
I. Introduction
Quincy has moved that the Division consolidate any and all hearings
with respect to the review of decisions by North Andover (CTV 99-2), Cambridge
(CTV 99-4), Quincy (CTV 99-3) and Somerville (CTV 99-5) to deny or to conditionally
approve the transfer of cable licenses from MediaOne Group, Inc. ("MediaOne")
to AT&T Corp. ("AT&T") pursuant to M.G.L. c. 166A §7 and applicable
regulations. Each of the decisions has as a common requirement that AT&T
provide open or nondiscriminatory access to cable broadband for Internet
and on-line services. The open access requirement, which preserves consumer
choice and competition among Internet and on-line service providers, should
be reviewed by the Division in a consolidated evidentiary hearing that
will allow for a complete and efficient presentation of this critical public
policy question.
Deciding this important public policy issue in a fair and impartial
manner after developing a full administrative record is essential if due
process requirements are to be met. Contrary to the thrust of Appellants’
motion, the Division should not put the business interests of the Appellants
to consummate quickly the pending merger between MediaOne and AT&T
before the interests of the Issuing Authorities and their communities and
tens of thousands of subscribers. There are substantial disputed issues
of fact and law with respect to the "open access" issue and the propriety
of the Issuing Authorities' decisions. These disputed issues involve complex
questions of fact and law that merit detailed and deliberate consideration
by the Division in evidentiary hearings. The proposed merger between AT&T
and MediaOne is not scheduled for regulatory review until the middle of
the year 2000. Accordingly, this appeal and the related appeals that AT&T
filed can be heard with full evidentiary hearings in an orderly manner
well in advance of any events substantially effecting the AT&T/MediaOne
merger.
The complexity of the disputed issues of fact and law involved in this
case is amplified by AT&T's recent commitment to the FCC to provide
some level of "open access" to independent Internet service providers on
AT&T's nationwide broadband network in or about mid-2002. AT&T
essentially concedes in a December 6, 1999 filing with the FCC that "open
access" is (a) financial feasible; (b) technical feasible;
(c) beneficial to consumers; (d) pro-competitive and (e) will have no
adverse effect on product innovation. This is directly contrary to the
position that AT&T takes in this proceeding and demonstrates that virtually
every representation that AT&T and MediaOne made to the Issuing Authorities
at the public hearings at the core of this case was misleading and inaccurate.
Accordingly, the Division should deny the Appellants’ request for "expedited
processing" of this matter.
II. The Applicable Regulation
The Appellants purport to move pursuant to 801 CMR 1.01(7)(a)(1) for
an expedited hearing of this matter. However, that regulation deals only
with the presentation of motions to Agencies or Presiding Officers and
permits parties to submit motions for relief that are not inconsistent
with law or 801 CMR 1.00. The regulation contains no specific provision
authorizing or describing the relief that the Appellants seek.
To the extent that the Appellants seek a speedy hearing under 801 CMR
1.01(f), the Division should deny the request. 801 CMR 1.01(f) provides
that "[u]pon motion of any Party and upon good cause shown, the Presiding
Officer may advance a case for hearing." This regulation does not require
the Division to move a complex case involving substantial public policy
issues through the administrative process without proper evidentiary hearings
and due consideration and deliberation of the issues of fact and law that
govern the case. In support of their position, the Appellants cite two
instances in which the Division has rendered final decisions on appeals
within several weeks' time. However, the fact that the Division was able
to hear and consider evidence in those cases and reach a conclusion rapidly
as to the merits of those appeals has nothing whatsoever to do with this
case. In neither case cited by the Appellants did the Division issue any
mandate with respect to the parameters of 801 CMR 1.01(f) that applies
here to the unique facts of this case.
III. Lack Of Good Cause For An Expedited Proceeding
The Appellants state that "[e]xpeditious processing will permit the
parties to this Appeal to present their arguments, and the Division to
render a decision, as soon as possible, without causing delay in the
closing of the merger" (emphasis added). Expediting the
merger of MediaOne and AT&T – more accurately the takeover of MediaOne
by AT&T – seems to be the sole motivation for this motion. The Appellants
have implied, but failed to show, that absent the extraordinary relief
they now seek, their merger will be unduly delayed. Quincy submits that
in deciding this motion the public policy interests of the Issuing Authorities
and the communities and subscribers that AT&T seeks to serve are at
least as important as the business interests of the Appellants. The Division
must proceed with the best interests of all parties in mind.
AT&T's emerging cable television and Internet services empire will
not rise or fall with the fate of the Issuing Authorities' decisions with
respect to AT&T's FCC Form 394 requests. Notably, the Appellants do
not indicate in their motion when the contemplated merger is scheduled
to close and how, if at all, the filing of this appeal has any impact on
the merger. On information and belief, the FCC is not expected to make
any finding, recommendations or rulings with respect to the contemplated
AT&T/MediaOne merger until the second fiscal quarter of 2000. Accordingly,
there is no need to rush this proceeding to conclusion in any manner that
precludes interested parties from developing a full evidentiary record.
Given the scope of its acquisition of 175 cable franchises in Massachusetts,
it is evident that the disposition of this appeal in the ordinary course
of the Division’s administrative process is not a "deal breaker" for AT&T.
Rather, the Appellants seek to prevent altogether the Division from hearing
or considering evidence on the "open access" issue by seeking an expedited
review of the subject appeals within a narrow channel that does not include
this important public policy issue. The Appellants state in their memorandum
supporting their motion for summary disposition, that the "open access"
issue is not relevant here but then devote one-half of the narrative portion
of their brief to arguments suggesting that "open access" is not in the
public interest. Given the obvious significance of "open access" in this
proceeding and the fact that AT&T's refusal to unbundle its independent
Internet service provider's services from its broadband cable service was
a factor in each Issuing Authority's decision, the Division should hear
evidence on this important public policy issue in a full evidentiary hearing.
As set forth in the Issuing Authorities' Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Consolidate Hearings, each of the Issuing Authorities considered AT&T's
refusal to permit nondiscriminatory access to cable lines for unaffiliated
Internet service providers as an important issue, among others, in either
denying or conditionally approving AT&T's transfer requests. Magistrate
Charles Beard in his non-binding recommendations issued in connection with
the regional public hearings that the Division held around the Commonwealth
on AT&T's transfer requests found that the "open access" was an extremely
important public policy issue, regardless whether it was within the specific
parameters of 207 CMR 4.04. (See Summary of Proceedings and Magistrate's
Report dated September 24, 1999). Magistrate Beard also noted:
[i]t is clear from the record in this proceeding that the transfer
of MediaOne's licenses to AT&T is an event far different from the hundreds,
if not thousands, of license transfers that have taken place to date in
the Commonwealth. Never before has a company as large and as diversified
as AT&T, and with so many plans for transforming the delivery of cable
services, sought to enter the Massachusetts cable market.
(See id.)
There can be no doubt that the transfer of MediaOne's cable licenses
to AT&T will truly transform the cable industry in Massachusetts. As
Magistrate Beard recognized, the landscape of cable services in the Commonwealth
will be forever altered as a result of the MediaOne/AT&T merger (id.).
The Appellants cannot seriously contend that this is a simple case and
that ". . . the legal issues raised in the Appeal are neither novel or
complex." (See Appellants’ Motion, para. 3). Indeed, the issues are
complex because, as Magistrate Beard noted, AT&T intends to transform
the delivery of cable services in Massachusetts by, inter alia,
bundling telephone, Internet and other on-line and data transmission services
with the delivery of the one service that the Division is mandated to oversee,
cable television service.
To suggest that this fundamental transformation of cable service in
Massachusetts does not present novel and complex issues of fact and law
is to view AT&T's vision of this new landscape with blinders on. AT&T's
stonewall defense against open access to its high speed cable modem Internet
platform is central to this transformation. AT&T should not be permitted
to undertake this effort without a full evidentiary hearing before the
Division on the merits of the Issuing Authorities' decisions.
IV. A Full Evidentiary Hearing Is Required
The hearing to which the parties are entitled is broadly described in
207 CMR 4.06. More particularly, the regulation states, in pertinent part,
that "[a]ppeals to the [Division] by aggrieved parties seeking a transfer
. . . shall be initiated in accordance with . . . M.G.L. c. 166A, §14."
The regulation further states that "[t]he [Division] may, after a hearing
conducted pursuant to M.G.L. c. 166A, §14, issue such order as it
deems appropriate to carry out the purpose of 207 CMR 4.00."
M.G.L. c. 166A, §14 does not contain specific guidelines with respect
to the parameters of the hearing that is required. The statute simply states
"[t]he division shall hold a hearing upon each such appeal, requiring due
notice to be given to all interested parties." Clearly, the Division has
discretion to conduct as comprehensive a hearing as the facts and law of
each appeal may dictate.
The provisions of 801 CMR 1.01, et. seq. provide guidance here.
The Appellants have acknowledged that the provisions of 801 CMR 1.01 apply
by their own citation to these regulations in the context of this proceeding.
These regulations contemplate a full evidentiary hearing with pre-hearing
procedures and discovery, the presentation of documentary and testimonial
evidence, post-hearing briefs and argument. In pertinent part, the regulations
provide for:
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party representation by counsel or other authorized representatives provided
that such counsel file an appearance in the proceeding (See 801 CMR 1.01(3)).
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the filing of pleadings, claims for adjudicatory proceedings and responsive
pleadings (See 801 CMR 1.01(6)(a)(e)).
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the joinder and/or intervention of necessary or other interested parties
and the amendment of pleadings prior to hearings (See 801 CMR 1.01(6)(f),
101(9)).
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dispositive pre-hearing motions and other motions for general relief (See
801 CMR 1.01(a)-(l)).
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extensive discovery via written discovery requests and depositions including
mechanisms to compel discovery from a non-responsive Party (See 801 CMR
1.01(8)(a)-(i)).
The regulations contain detailed provisions regarding the scope and parameters
of formal hearings in 801 CMR 1.01(10). Notably, the regulations provide
for:
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pre-hearing conferences to consider the resolution of any undisputed issues
and the conduct of the hearing generally (See 801 CMR 1.01(10)(a)).
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provisions for the waiver of the party's right to hearing by submitting
its case to the Presiding Officer upon written submissions (See 801 CMR
1.01(10)(c)).
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the subpoenaing of witnesses in accordance with M.G.L. c. 30A §12
(See 801 CMR 1.01(10)(g)).
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the completion of post-hearing briefs after the Agency or Presiding Officer
has heard testimony and considered documentary evidence (See 801 CMR 1.01(10)(j)).
The regulations contain specific provisions governing the introduction
of evidence in testimonial and documentary form. Paragraph (f) of the regulation
provides:
Presentation of Evidence. All Parties shall have the right
to present documentary and oral evidence, to cross-examine adverse or hostile
witnesses, to interpose objections, to make motions and oral arguments.
Cross-examination is to follow the direct testimony of a witness. Whenever
appropriate, the Presiding Officer shall permit reasonable redirect and
recross-examination and allow a Party an adequate opportunity to submit
rebuttal evidence. Except as otherwise provided, evidence of the Respondent
shall be presented after the presentation of the Petitioner's case in chief.
The Respondent shall first argue in summation.
A full evidentiary hearing is made available to any interested party in
all adjudicatory agency proceedings. See 801 CMR 1.01(1) and (2)(a),
which make the so-called formal rules generally applicable in any hearing.
As the regulations state, "801 CMR 1.00 governs the conduct of formal Adjudicatory
Proceedings of all Commonwealth agencies governed by M.G.L. c.30A." Here,
the Division cannot rush these proceedings to accommodate the Appellants'
unsubstantiated representation that they need a quick decision to accommodate
their merger schedule without running afoul of the rights of the Issuing
Authorities and any other interested parties who may seek to intervene
in the case to a full evidentiary hearing on the merits.
As set forth above, the issues of fact and law in this case are at once
complex and novel. Moreover, although feigning that the "open access" issue
is not relevant, the Appellants, by asking the Division to consider the
merits of their narrative summary of purported evidence that "open access"
is not in the public interest, have opened the door for interested parties
to present opposing evidence that would support a Division finding that
the Issuing Authorities' insistence on "open access’ as a condition of
license transfer was proper. Although the Issuing Authorities respond to
the Appellants' factual claims in their own responsive filing, the Issuing
Authorities must be permitted to challenge further in a full evidentiary
hearing the Appellants' false and misleading representations about the
merits of "open access" set forth in their brief and elsewhere in the record
before the Division. The applicable regulations and the requirements of
due process require that the Division conduct a full evidentiary hearing
in the manner prescribed in 801 CMR. 1.00, et. seq.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Division should deny the Appellants'
request for expedited processing of this matter and should convene a full
evidentiary hearing in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
City of Quincy,
by its counsel,
Charles Nesson
1575 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
(617) 495-4609
nesson@Law.harvard.edu
Dated: December ___, 1999
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