Open Greg Crew 29/1/99 (* et al.) Defense	Individual 2.0 Greg Crew 6/2/99 (* et al.) Defense	Organization Greg Crew 31/1/99 (*et al.) Defense
Characteristics	This is the simplest model possible for a world-wide organisation.  It has minimum requirements on member identification and registration. In effect, everyone and every organisation can join, and payment of fees is recommended but not mandatory. ICANN provides minimum membership services. Communications between ICANN and the members is limited to on-line communications, and members must actively access ICANN on-line announcements as no information is addressed to members.	This model is designed to favour individuals as At Large members (members who elect At Large directors to the ICANN board) but does not exclude organizations or associations.  Applicants for membership must make a declaration that they are an individual or a corporation or association, and provide some minimal proof of identity.  Membership must be renewed each year. There is no fee for membership, but voluntary contributions are invited, with the suggestion that US$500 for corporations, $50 for associations, $20 for individuals would be reasonable. DN holders will contribute via a component of their DN registration fee (if charged) collected at TLD registrar level. Communication between ICANN and the members is limited to on-line communications. ICANN will post advice of new items on its web page to a membership mailing list to prompt members to read them.	This model is designed to favour organisations (corporations and associations) as At Large members (members who elect At Large directors to the ICANN board).  While individual membership is not prohibited, the fees and voting structure make individual membership unattractive. The objective is to reduce ICANN's membership administration  expenses, and to encourage individuals to form associations which will vote in accordance with the majority wishes of their members.  Applicants for membership must make a declaration that they are a corporation or association, and provide some proof of identity. Membership must be renewed each year.  Communications between ICANN and the members is limited to on-line communications. ICANN will post advice of new items on its web page to a membership mailing list to prompt members to read them
Membership Classes	No classes; all members are equal	Nil	Individual Corporate NGO (includes associations) [Subcategories of corporate and NGO membership also possible]
Fees	Recommended, but not mandatory: US$50	Nil.  Contributions invited.	Corporations    - US$10,000 per annum Associations of individuals    - US$1,000 p.a.  Associations of corporations    - US$50,000 p.a.
Eligibility	Unique e-mail address and online access to ICANN websites.	Member identification - individual applicants to provide their legally recognised name(s), e-mail address, and quote a suitable reference applicable to their country of residence which demonstrates that they are an individual of an age recognised in their country of residence as the age of legal maturity.  Corporate applicants to provide corporate registration details. Association applicants to provide evidence of their membership requirements and numbers. Nature of identification provided to ICANN is left to applicants, and will vary according to country. ICANN will not generally seek to verify claims made by membership applicants, but may do so on receipt of an objection to a member.	Registered corporation, or an association of individuals with at least 50 members, or an association of corporations with at least 10 members.  Associations may be incorporated or not, and must satisfy ICANN that their constitution allows for open membership (not restricted), and that they will vote on ICANN matters in accordance with the wishes of the majority of their members.
Member Identification	A personal or organization name and a unique e-mail address. Name and e-mail address.	Applicants to provide their legally recognized name(s), e-mail address, and quote a suitable reference applicable to their country of residence which demonstrates that they are an individual of an age recognized in their country of residence as the age of legal maturity. Nature of identification provided to ICANN is left to applicants, and will vary according to country. ICANN will not generally seek to verify claims made by membership applicants, but may do so on receipt of an objection to a member.  Registration details held by ICANN - Name and e-mail address.	Corporations to provide proof of incorporation. Associations to provide their constitution and membership list. All applicants to provide name, address, phone number and e-mail address of representative.  Registration details held by ICANN - Name and e-mail address of member, and of member's representative.
Election of at-large directors	Each member can lodge one vote to elect At Large directors of ICANN..	Rights of members - to lodge one vote per e-mail address to elect At Large directors of ICANN, and to lodge one vote to ratify changes to Articles and By-laws.	Allocate seats among the classes of membership. For every election, each class gets one seat. (see below)
Other privileges  of membership	Each member can lodge one vote to ratify changes to Articles and By-laws. Members can propose policy.	Individual members can lodge one vote each to ratify changes to Articles and By-Laws. Members have the opportunity to propose policy; may be included in a linked member directory. All members receive regular updates on ICANN activities on website or through email (member’s choice). Corporate members are recognized/promoted on the ICANN website.	Corporations - to lodge one vote to elect At Large directors of ICANN, and to lodge one vote to ratify changes to Articles and By-laws.  Associations of individuals - to lodge 50 votes as above.  Associations of corporations - to lodge 10 votes as above. May propose policy.
Duties of membership	Register as a member each year and advise ICANN of changes to e-mail address.  Failure to re-register will result in deletion from the membership list.	To register as a member each year, and advise ICANN of changes to name and e-mail address. Failure to re-register will result in deletion from the membership list.	Register as a member each year, pay the appropriate membership fee, and advise ICANN of changes to name and e-mail address. Failure to re-register will result in deletion from the membership list.
Other		Regular census of membership conducted by board to aid understanding and openness about composition of ICANN and its membership. Between an election and certification of its results, possible audit for fraud.	Regular census of membership conducted by board to aid understanding and openness about composition of ICANN and its membership. Between an election and certification of its results, possible audit for fraud.
Nominations	No restriction on nominations. Candidates would have to provide ICANN with proof of country (and thus region) of citizenship. At elections, ICANN would merely list the candidates by name with a (limited) statement provided by the candidates supporting their claims.	Any member can propose nominee for at-large board. Nominees must be members, willing to develop a platform, serve, travel. Number of nominees will be limited. Nominees may be restricted by geographic criteria of bylaws. Membership subcommittee of board will apply membership criteria.
Advantages	Minimumal membership administrative expenses incurred by ICANN.  Minimal requirement to identify and verify members.  Any individual or organisation with on-line access can participate in ICANN AL elections.  No complication of setting fees for different economic circumstances. Large membership possible; individuals and organizations participate as equals; both individuals and organizations vote. (Quaynor)	Offline Internet users may participate Individuals vote for at-large and policy; organizations have no vote (Quaynor) Anti-fraud measures include a prohibition against multiple registrations by one individual, with identifiers of name, phone number, address and email. Membership will generate funds for ICANN at least sufficient to cover membership expenses.	Membership administration expenses incurred by ICANN will be reasonable.  Membership will generate funds for ICANN.  Possible smaller membership; potential for large fees and more revenue. (Quaynor) No single class has absolute power; individuals can still participate; organizations that do not fall into SOs can particpate (Langenbach)
Disadvantages	Membership would not likely generate significant funds for ICANN.  Insufficient interaction with membership* Lack of member obligation  may lead to irresponsible constituency. (Quaynor) Disenfranchises regions where individuals must share e-mail access (Robles) Easy to commit registration fraud.(Quaynor)	Individuals should be more important than organizations (Quaynor) Lower revenue from direct membership fees; physical identity must allow not-internet details eg. phone number address etc.; exercising rights require internet access;          possible fraud (Quaynor)	Individuals may only participate through associations. Discriminates against weaker individual members; constituency based allocation of seats;  complex class structure;  2/3 requirement for ratification of articles will not work; individual members are usually not very active; organizations are capturing ICANN since they already dominate the SOs and will also dominate the At-Large( 2 additional seats);  possible fraud. (Quaynor)
Variations	1. DONORS      The open model does not distinguish between individuals and organisations. Organisations are not likely to be attracted to participating in a structure giving them no rights additional to any individual. To counter this, the model could allow organisations (and individuals if they wish) to make a donation (minimum $1,000 say), for which they would be invited to an annual ICANN forum at which SOs and donors would discuss the next year's program of work and ICANN objectives.  2. VOLUNTARY RULES OF CONDUCT      The "pure" open model has no rules, which avoids the difficulties of enforcing them. However, ICANN could publish acceptable codes of conduct for participating in AL elections, leaving it to participants to comply voluntarily. (I believe most participants would comply).     Accusations of violations of the code made to ICANN  could be investigated (by asking the accused to  plead.       Further investigation would normally be beyond ICANN resources and capability). Admitted violations would result in the relevant votes being discarded.	1. REGIONAL CONSTITUENCIES       Members could be grouped according to region of residence, and voting for AL directors limited to candidates for the member's region. This might allow member administration to be delegated to regional bodies. Election of directors could then be along the following lines;       The top polling candidate in each region would be elected (giving 5 AL directors), the 6th   position would go to the next highest scoring candidate,  the 7th position would go to the next highest scoring candidate in a region other than that of the 6th director, and the 2 remaining positions would go to the next highest polling candidates overall.       While ensuring each region was represented, this system would also give most board positions to regions participating most strongly in AL membership.	1A. MEMBERSHIP CLASSES       Members could be classed as associations (of individuals), or as corporations (single corps. or associations of corps.). Director positions could be allocated to ensure each class was appropriately represented. E.g.;  Association directors - 5 Corporate directors - 4
Recommendations		Quaynor (Jan.30): 1.Require internet access  2.Don't take any census  3.Make fees cover costs of voting and communications.	Langenbach (Feb. 2): Other privileges: 1. Changes to Articles/By-laws (need rules defined) 3. Possibility for call-back of director ? 4  Access to information 5. Access to discussions

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The key distinctive features of the Open Model are its simplicity, flexibility and ease of administration.  With a free, one person-one vote structure, administrative costs are minimal.  Identity and authentication will remain concerns regardless of the nature of the entities that are permitted to vote; doubling the kinds of verification data required is a wasteful complication.  As hard as it will be to police the fraud committed by a single individual enrolling in the User class under multiple identities, it will be even more burdensome determining which spontaneous “associations” are legitimately entitled to admission in the Organizational class.

The simpler the classification and the fewer pre-determined categorizations, the easier it is to respond to changing and emerging interests and this responsiveness is a key element required by the White Paper.   Ease of registration permits quick participation on matters of short-term or heightened interest.

Absence of fees ensures the broadest possible participation and the widest buy-in for consensus. The broadest consensus produces the greatest stability. The presence of low scaled fees only prevents the wealthier nations with higher dues from committing enrollment fraud. Fees encourage vote-buying in regions of low income, may necessitate great expense in collection and do nothing to prevent easily committed technical frauds.

The Open Model is the only mechanism that will ensure universal suffrage.  It is the only method by which a truly representative At Large board of directors can be elected.
 

The Open Membership Model fulfills the primary purpose for which the At Large membership was established: the election of at least half of the ICANN board of directors through an open, democratic process that most accurately reflects the consensus of the full Internet community, unfiltered and undiluted by special interests of any kind.

This model recognizes that ICANN has been, from its origin, a government-funded operation ultimately answerable to a democratically elected body.  This oversight may well have been both seed and nourishment for its enormously successful, open and transparent decision-making procedures (as embodied in the IETF RFC process).  Any transfer of administration of the Internet “commons” (procedures, services and assets) to a private organization is extremely troubling in this context.  It is a serious loss of a broad schema of legal protections heretofore afforded all users, whether individual or corporate. Such checks and balances are few and far between in cyberspace.

While organizations (corporate and other) clearly have interests which are different from the individual user, they also vary so widely in needs and purposes that one suspects an organizational class would largely mirror the range of variations found in the user class.  The duplication seems a burdensome redundancy.  Furthermore, most organizations are solely owned, thereby giving individual entrepreneurs a disproportional voice.  Organizations can and should rely on the self-interest of their individual employees and stakeholders to vote, as At Large Members, for those proposals that favor their own stake in the organizational enterprise.  This motivation will provide the necessary stability for the Internet.

The largest constituent of the organizational class is the for-profit corporation.  Most of them will focus through the lens of a single value judgment: the financial success of the enterprise.  This is an inappropriate prism for making many decisions concerning the Internet, such as access of opportunity for non-profitable entities.  On the other hand, it is extremely unlikely that, given staggered elections, the At Large membership will elect a full set of spendthrift candidates.

Limiting membership to individuals prevents capture by undemocratic governmental regimes seeking to vote on behalf of their entire populations.  Should the individual membership class prove small, capture by a vocal minority can be prevented if more stable entities, such as corporations, provide incentives for their own constituencies to become active.

While there are many drawbacks to pushing ICANN into a quasi-governmental role, there are many advantages as well.  There is no equivalent body to make determinations across the boundaries of this brave new world, although many of the best solutions to its problems may require just such a uber-jurisdictional reach.
 
 

This membership model seeks to recognize the significance of, and accord proper weight to, the interests of corporations, associations, non-profit advocacy and membership groups, and non-governmental organizations. Rather than simply relegate these entities to indirect membership in ICANN through the SOs or through their individual employees, this model places them inside the membership structure on an even plane with individuals.

To start with first principles, this membership model constitutes a rejection of the notion that ICANN should somehow be based on democratic representation. Such a notion misconceives of ICANN a *governance* institution; instead, under this model, ICANN is understood as a narrowly focused technical body charged with certain policymaking and coordination tasks. This model is premised on the view that if ICANN is invested with a worldwide democratic electorate, it will be treated by realspace governments and others as a legitimately elected government of cyberspace. The danger of designing ICANN with a democratic architecture is that ICANN will begin to act like a government, with all of the predictable pressures to exceed its narrow mandate and expand its jurisdiction into the regulation of non-technical areas -- an outcome few seem to desire.

This model conceives of the at-large membership as a simple mechanism to restrain (via the scrutiny enforced by periodic elections) the power of individual Board members, not as the worldwide electorate of a cybercongress. Rather than attempt to vindicate a one-person-one-vote principle, this model utilizes two devices -- membership classes and the imposition of non-trivial membership dues -- to minimize the risk of fraud and capture by special interests, and indirectly to promote the election of highly qualified and committed directors.

The key distinctive feature of this model is a three-tiered system of membership classes, with each class entitled to elect one At-Large Director in each round of At-Large elections. The three classes envisioned are (i) individual members, (ii) for-profit corporations, and (iii) the non-profit sector, including associations, non-profit advocacy and membership groups, and non-governmental organizations. At each periodic election for At-Large Directors, each class will elect one Director [n.b. --
under the Bylaws, At-Large Directors will serve staggered terms, so that three At-Large spots are filled at each election]. For changes to the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation, which must be ratified by a 2/3 vote of the membership, this model contemplates that a 2/3 vote of each class will be required to approve the proposed amendment -- thus ensuring that Bylaws changes are overwhelmingly supported by each class of members. [Note, however, that this requirement permits 34% of any one class to block any change to the Bylaws or Articles. An alternative provision might require a 2/3 vote in 2 out of the 3 classes, with a majority in the remaining class.]

A second distinctive feature of this model is its imposition of non-trivial membership dues, providing for a $50/year fee for individuals; $5,000 for corporations; and $500 for non-profits. [Two possible refinements: dues might be scaled based on the average annual per capita income of the member's home country; and corporate dues might be scaled to the gross revenues of the corporate member]. The purpose of relatively high membership dues is not to raise money for ICANN (though it's certainly a secondary benefit), but (i) to discourage fraud (by making prohibitive the cost of multiple, fraudulent memberships by the same mischievous person or entity) and (ii) to discourage individuals who are not serious about the technical coordination of the Internet from joining ICANN. Again, because ICANN is not a government, the focus of the membership structure should be on those individuals and entities with a real stake in, and commitment to, the technical stability and development of the Internet.