Findings of Fact: Index

I. BACKGROUND

II. THE RELEVANT MARKET

A. Demand Substitutability

1. Server Operating Systems

2. Non-Intel-Compatible PC Operating Systems

3. Information Appliances

4. Network Computers

5. Server-Based Computing Generally

6. Middleware

B. The Possibility of Supply Responses

III. MICROSOFT'S POWER IN THE RELEVANT MARKET

A. Market Share

B. The Applications Barrier to Entry

1. Description of the Applications Barrier to Entry

2. Empirical Evidence of the Applications Barrier to Entry

a. OS/2 Warp

b. The Mac OS

c. Fringe Operating Systems

3. Open-Source Applications Development

4. Cloning the 32-Bit Windows APIs

C. Viable Alternatives to Windows

D. Price Restraint Posed by Microsoft's Installed Base

E. Price Restraint Posed by Piracy

F. Price Restraint Posed by Long-Term Threats

G. Significance of Microsoft's Innovation

H. Microsoft's Pricing Behavior

I. Microsoft's Actions Toward Other Firms

IV. THE MIDDLEWARE THREATS

A. The Netscape Web browser

B. Sun's Implementation of the Java Technologies

C. Other Middleware Threats

V. MICROSOFT'S RESPONSE TO THE BROWSER THREAT

A. Microsoft's Attempt to Dissuade Netscape from Developing Navigator as a Platform

B. Withholding Crucial Technical Information

C. The Similar Experiences of Other Firms in Dealing with Microsoft

1. Intel

2. Apple

3. RealNetworks

4. IBM

D. Developing Competitive Web Browsing Software

E. Giving Internet Explorer Away and Rewarding Firms that Helped Build Its Usage Share

F. Excluding Navigator from Important Distribution Channels

1. The Importance of the OEM and IAP Channels

2. Excluding Navigator from the OEM Channel

a. Binding Internet Explorer to Windows

i. The Status of Web Browsers as Separate Products

ii. Microsoft's Actions

iii. Lack of Justification

iv. The Market for Web Browsing Functionality

b. Preventing OEMs from Removing the Ready Means of Accessing Internet Explorer and from Promoting Navigator in the Boot Sequence

c. Pressuring OEMs to Promote Internet Explorer and to not Pre-Install or Promote Navigator

d. Effect of Microsoft's Actions in the OEM Channel

3. Excluding Navigator from the IAP Channel

a. The Internet Explorer Access Kit Agreements

b. The Referral Server Agreements

c. The Online Services Folder Agreements

i. AOL

ii. Other Online Services

d. Effect of Microsoft's Actions in the IAP Channel

4. Inducing ICPs to Enhance Internet Explorer's Usage Share at Navigator's Expense

5. Directly Inducing ISVs to Rely on Microsoft's Browsing Technologies Rather than APIs Exposed by Navigator

6. Foreclosing Apple as a Distribution Channel for Navigator

G. Microsoft's Success in Excluding Navigator from the Channels that Lead Most Efficiently to Browser Usage

H. The Success of Microsoft's Effort to Maximize Internet Explorer's Usage Share at Navigator's Expense

1. The Change in the Usage Shares of Internet Explorer and Navigator

2. The Cause of the Change in Usage Shares

I. The Success of Microsoft's Effort to Protect the Applications Barrier to Entry from the Threat Posed by Navigator

VI. MICROSOFT'S RESPONSE TO THE THREAT POSED BY SUN'S IMPLEMENTATION OF JAVA

A. Creating a Java Implementation for Windows that Undermined Portability and Was Incompatible with Other Implementations

B. Inducing Developers to Use the Microsoft Implementation of Java Rather than Sun-Compliant Implementations

C. Thwarting the Expansion of the Java Class Libraries

D. The Effect of Microsoft's Efforts to Prevent Java from Diminishing the Applications Barrier to Entry

VII. THE EFFECT ON CONSUMERS OF MICROSOFT'S EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE APPLICATIONS BARRIER TO ENTRY

Last modified 11/6/99 by Wendy Seltzer.