Module 9: Activism: Difference between revisions
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=== Local Factors === | === Local Factors === | ||
The new anti-downloading regime was particularly vulnerable to Swedish counter-mobilization. Neither U.S. business interests nor the supranational body they pressured into tightening copyright law accounted for Sweden’s | The new anti-downloading regime was particularly vulnerable to Swedish counter-mobilization. Neither U.S. business interests nor the supranational body they pressured into tightening copyright law accounted for Sweden’s culture or legal norms. | ||
The new law lacked local legitimacy, and Swedes were encouraged to organize against it because (1) the Swedish government was an early adopter of public high speed broadband, (2) Swedes were culturally predisposed to understand the property right as a dispensable tool for public good rather than a natural right of the holder, and (3) an “ad hoc” public think tank named Piratebyran (or “Piracy Bureau”) had been publicly contesting copyright protection in Sweden since 2003. | |||
=== The Process === | === The Process === | ||
On New Years Day of 2006, just months after the first | On New Years Day of 2006, just months after the first file-sharing prosecution, an IT entrepreneur named Rickard Falkvinge formed Piratpartiet, the Swedish Pirate Party. | ||
Neither Falkvinge nor his co-founders had any formal political experience when they made the decision to start the party. They did know that the party needed 2,000 signatures to formally register with the Swedish Election Authority, Valmyndigheten, so they hosted a website for citizens to publicly declare their membership and then reached out in person to collect physical signatures. | |||
Once formally registered, the party recruited candidates for the Riksdag elections in September, drafted a party platform, fundraised, and built local organizations in both urban and rural areas throughout Sweden. The Pirate Party now has 49,000 members. | |||
=== The Message === | === The Message === | ||
The Pirate Party articulated its copyright policy goals | The Pirate Party articulated its copyright policy goals as part of a larger effort to expand freedom of access to culture and protect fundamental rights. | ||
=== The Pushback === | === The Pushback === | ||
The United States and the Motion Picture Association of America were undeterred. Both had spent considerable resources shutting down U.S. filesharing services Napster, Grokster, TorrentSpy, and eDonkey. The Pirate Bay (designed by a former member of the Piratbyran) was the last globally conspicuous symbol of | The United States and the Motion Picture Association of America were undeterred. Both had spent considerable resources shutting down U.S. filesharing services Napster, Grokster, TorrentSpy, and eDonkey. The Pirate Bay (designed by a former member of the Piratbyran) was the last globally conspicuous symbol of copyright defiance, and it was headquartered in Sweden. Recent commentary posited that “the Pirate Bay isnot only an institutional, collective actor of the pro-file-sharing copyleft; it is as tangible and visible as such an actor can currently become.” | ||
The MPAA’s work was rather uncomplicated, as the July 1, 2005 EU Directive was already on the books, and the Riksdag’s implementing legislation was as well. To trigger enforcement, the U.S. threatened international economic sanctions against Sweden if the Pirate Bay maintained de facto immunity. On May 31, 2006, Swedish police therefore raided the Pirate Bay and seized its servers. | |||
=== Mobilization === | === Mobilization === | ||
The clampdown provoked domestic street protests and international media attention, and the Pirate Party’s membership spiked. The evidence suggests that the underage, non-voting population represented the primary constituency of | The clampdown provoked domestic street protests and international media attention, and the Pirate Party’s membership spiked. | ||
The evidence suggests that the underage, non-voting population represented the primary constituency of this meteoric rise. Swedish schools regularly hold mock elections, and the Pirate Party took approximately 40 percent of the student mock vote. The Pirate Party decided to invest its resources and political capital in the votes these members would eventually represent. The party organized “Young Pirates” student groups. The boost has given the Pirate Party the third largest membership in the country. | |||
Unfortunately, the voting age population in 2006 was less inclined to support the Pirate Party than raw membership numbers suggest. All Swedish citizens can be party members, though they cannot vote until they are 18 years old. Most Swedes were hesitant to support the Pirate Party at the cost of prioritizing one of their two biggest parties. Piratpartiet therefore earned less than one percent of the vote and failed to qualify for a seat in the Riksdag in 2006. | |||
=== Present Day === | === Present Day === | ||
Revision as of 18:39, 14 January 2010
Learning objective
Case Study #1: The Swedish Pirate Party
Challenged Law
On July 1, 2005, Swedish Parliament, the Riksdag, amended its copyright law to comply with a 2004 European Union directive requiring all member nations to ban downloads of copyrighted material absent the rights-holder’s consent. Before the end of the year, a Swedish court had already doled out the country’s first conviction and fine for an illegal download.
Local Factors
The new anti-downloading regime was particularly vulnerable to Swedish counter-mobilization. Neither U.S. business interests nor the supranational body they pressured into tightening copyright law accounted for Sweden’s culture or legal norms.
The new law lacked local legitimacy, and Swedes were encouraged to organize against it because (1) the Swedish government was an early adopter of public high speed broadband, (2) Swedes were culturally predisposed to understand the property right as a dispensable tool for public good rather than a natural right of the holder, and (3) an “ad hoc” public think tank named Piratebyran (or “Piracy Bureau”) had been publicly contesting copyright protection in Sweden since 2003.
The Process
On New Years Day of 2006, just months after the first file-sharing prosecution, an IT entrepreneur named Rickard Falkvinge formed Piratpartiet, the Swedish Pirate Party.
Neither Falkvinge nor his co-founders had any formal political experience when they made the decision to start the party. They did know that the party needed 2,000 signatures to formally register with the Swedish Election Authority, Valmyndigheten, so they hosted a website for citizens to publicly declare their membership and then reached out in person to collect physical signatures.
Once formally registered, the party recruited candidates for the Riksdag elections in September, drafted a party platform, fundraised, and built local organizations in both urban and rural areas throughout Sweden. The Pirate Party now has 49,000 members.
The Message
The Pirate Party articulated its copyright policy goals as part of a larger effort to expand freedom of access to culture and protect fundamental rights.
The Pushback
The United States and the Motion Picture Association of America were undeterred. Both had spent considerable resources shutting down U.S. filesharing services Napster, Grokster, TorrentSpy, and eDonkey. The Pirate Bay (designed by a former member of the Piratbyran) was the last globally conspicuous symbol of copyright defiance, and it was headquartered in Sweden. Recent commentary posited that “the Pirate Bay isnot only an institutional, collective actor of the pro-file-sharing copyleft; it is as tangible and visible as such an actor can currently become.”
The MPAA’s work was rather uncomplicated, as the July 1, 2005 EU Directive was already on the books, and the Riksdag’s implementing legislation was as well. To trigger enforcement, the U.S. threatened international economic sanctions against Sweden if the Pirate Bay maintained de facto immunity. On May 31, 2006, Swedish police therefore raided the Pirate Bay and seized its servers.
Mobilization
The clampdown provoked domestic street protests and international media attention, and the Pirate Party’s membership spiked.
The evidence suggests that the underage, non-voting population represented the primary constituency of this meteoric rise. Swedish schools regularly hold mock elections, and the Pirate Party took approximately 40 percent of the student mock vote. The Pirate Party decided to invest its resources and political capital in the votes these members would eventually represent. The party organized “Young Pirates” student groups. The boost has given the Pirate Party the third largest membership in the country.
Unfortunately, the voting age population in 2006 was less inclined to support the Pirate Party than raw membership numbers suggest. All Swedish citizens can be party members, though they cannot vote until they are 18 years old. Most Swedes were hesitant to support the Pirate Party at the cost of prioritizing one of their two biggest parties. Piratpartiet therefore earned less than one percent of the vote and failed to qualify for a seat in the Riksdag in 2006.
Present Day
Case Study #2: "Click Wrap" Licenses and the Uniform Commercial Code
Challenged Law
Local Factors
The Process
The Tipping Point
Mobilization
Present Day
Lessons
Contributors
This module was created by Dmitriy Tishyevich. It was then edited by a team including Sebastian Diaz, William Fisher, Urs Gasser, Adam Holland, Kimberley Isbell, Colin Maclay, Andrew Moshirnia, and Chris Peterson.
Course Materials:
- Module 1: Copyright and the Public Domain
- Module 2: The International Framework
- Module 3: The Scope of Copyright Law
- Module 4: Rights, Exceptions, and Limitations
- Module 5: Managing Rights
- Module 6: Creative Approaches and Alternatives
- Module 7: Enforcement
- Module 8: Traditional Knowledge
- Module 9: Activism
- Glossary