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[dvd-discuss] Eldred Amicus
- To: dvd-discuss(at)cyber.law.harvard.edu
- Subject: [dvd-discuss] Eldred Amicus
- From: "Michael A Rolenz" <Michael.A.Rolenz(at)aero.org>
- Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 13:27:03 -0700
- Reply-to: dvd-discuss(at)cyber.law.harvard.edu
- Sender: owner-dvd-discuss(at)cyber.law.harvard.edu
As I suspected, someone would notice that the USSC can duck part of the
issue by not allowing retroactive extensions of copyrights but still evade
the larger issue of deciding what are "limited times". What is interesting
is that they actually come out and accuse Disney of "mischief"
From:
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/amici/pipla-upd.pdf
Progressive Intellectual Property Law Association and Union for the Public
Domain(in partial support), Michael H.Davis
"Prospective copyright term extensions are reviewable only with great
difficulty. Fortunately, however, the primary reason Congress has been
urged to extend
copyright terms is to obtain retrospective, not prospective, extension. By
seizing this
opportunity to declare only retrospective copyright extensions
unconstitutional, this
Court can remedy the distortion of the political process effected by its
proponents.
Congress will then be free to balance the competing concerns of incentives
for authorship
and a rich public domain, unburdened from constitutionally suspect demands
that are
inconsistent with the design of the Copyright Clause."
<snip>
The Bono Act's legislative history reveals the unarguable truth that, were
it not
for retrospective extension, no extension would have been enacted at
all.10 That is,
although the resulting extension was for both retrospective and
prospective terms, only
retrospective extension motivated those supporting the Bono Act. And this
makes
economic, although certainly not constitutional, sense.
Economic realities explain that there is simply not enough present value
in any
prospective extension to justify serious interest in such extensions and,
indeed, that is
why those benefiting from retrospective extension were the chief
proponents of extension
in the first place. The present value of the additional twenty years of
copyright
exclusivity granted by prospective extension adds less than a microscopic
one-tenth of
one per cent to the expected cash flow during an initial fifty year
term.11 It defies logic to
conclude that any sound business practice would include deploying
substantial resources
to secure such a poor investment. Compare this, however, to the immediate
returns of
billions of dollars of profit guaranteed by retrospective extension12 and
it becomes
obvious how the failure to impose constitutional limits upon retrospective
extensions
distorts the democratic process.
<snip>
It is difficult to exaggerate the mischief caused by those seeking
retroactive
extension. One of the most influential supporters of the Bono Act was the
Walt Disney
Corp., which had acquired the rights to the "Winnie the Pooh"
characters.15 In its
purchase agreement, Disney made its obligations contingent upon the
successful passage
of the Bono Act retrospective extension, much like a potential home buyer
who includes a
mortgage financing contingency clause. Treating Congress as if it were
one's private
banker vividly demonstrates the growing hazards of allowing copyright
terms to escape
their constitutional bounds. This potential mischief was illustrated in
its most extreme
form when Sonny Bono's widow (while serving the remainder of his term),
stated upon
presentation of the bill:
Actually, Sonny wanted copyright to last forever. I
I am informed by staff that such a change would
violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work
with me to strengthen our copyright laws in all ways
available to us. As you know, there is also Jack
Valenti's proposal to last forever less one day.
Perhaps the committee may look at that next
Congress.16