Victoria F. Nourse*, "Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Acts Civil Rights Remedy," 11 Wis. Women's L.J. 1 (Summer 1996).

* Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School; J.D., University of California (Boalt Hall); B.A., Stanford University. Many thanks to
the editorial staff of the Wisconsin Women's Law Journal, and in particular for the efforts of Kimberly Epstein and Elizabeth Kessler.

[Numbers in brackets refer to page numbers.]

[*1]

The 1994 signing of the Violence Against Women Act represented the culmination of a four-year struggle of politics, law, and understanding. n1
Many stories could be written about this legislative effort: stories about political fortunes, personal perseverance, and daring backroom
maneuvering. But the legal story, one now being played out in the federal courts, is a story of the law working against its own language and
rhetoric, a law struggling to try to change its own understanding of violence against women.

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n1. The first version of the Violence Against Women Act was introduced on June 19, 1990; VAWA was signed into law on September 13, 1994
as P.L. 103-322 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).

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When the Violence Against Women Act (the "Act" or "VAWA") was first introduced, drafters wrestled with the words that could be used to
describe this violence, acknowledging openly that the standard expressions seemed not only inadequate but potentially destructive. n2 The very
categories the law directed them to use incorporated the problem that they were trying to solve. "Acquaintance rape" and "domestic violence,"
not to mention "marital rape" or "incest," all defined crime "by relationship." The crime did not exist without that relationship, and yet, it was
that relationship that had helped to make the crime something "lesser," some "inferior" kind of crime, both in the eyes of the law and popular
imagination. The legislative history of [*2] the Violence Against Women Act is a story, in the end, of using the idea of equality to challenge
the "veil of relationship" shrouding this violence. n3

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n2. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. at 37 (1991) [hereinafter "1991 S. Rep. 197"](noting that society's ambivalence toward
violence against women had led to "oxymoronic labels such as "date rape,' and "domestic violence'").

n3. For an insightful and sophisticated view of this battle, see Reva Siegal, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
Yale L. J. 2117, 2196-2206 (1996) (analyzing the discourse in which the legislation was debated). For an analysis of the "veil of relationship" in
another context, see Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress (forthcoming Yale L.J. 1996).

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Today, it may seem as if this should not have been much of a struggle. The most controversial media events of this decade - the confirmation
hearings of Justice Thomas and the trial of O.J. Simpson - have helped to change public attitudes about violence against women. At the time
the Violence Against Women Act was introduced in 1990, however, it is fair to say that battering was still considered "natural" violence by many
and, as a result, seen by mainstream politicians as a "fringe" issue trumpeted only by radical feminists. n4 Within this atmosphere, it might have
seemed downright foolhardy to challenge the power of relationship to diminish violence by invoking the idea of gender equality. And yet, that is
precisely what its sponsor, Senator Joseph Biden, did when he introduced the bill in June of 1990.

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n4. These attitudes continue to persist, of course. See Legal Times (June 20, 1994) at 16 (quoting Jack Greenberg, former Legal Director,
NAACP as describing domestic violence as natural, as "American as apple pie").

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The struggle of understanding that led to the Act's passage is important not only as history but also as prologue. Already, the Act's civil rights
remedy is being challenged in the federal courts on constitutional grounds. n5 This makes our understanding of the Act's history doubly relevant.
First, the legislative history speaks directly to the constitutional questions (at least as then understood). Second, and perhaps more
importantly, it was the organized federal judiciary, led by the Chief Justice of the United States, whose opposition to the bill's civil rights remedy
delayed its passage. That opposition hinged upon a particular understanding of the nature of that remedy as a "domestic relations" statute and,
therefore, unsuited for federal court adjudication. n6 It was precisely this understanding, however, that drafters hoped that the Violence
Against Women Act would alter - that crimes against women would no longer be lessened, diminished, and dismissed because of the
relationships that had spawned them.

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n5. Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D.Conn. 1996); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute et. al., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D.Va. 1996).

n6. See infra text accompanying note 84.

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The Violence Against Women Act aimed at comprehensiveness, covering everything from domestic violence hotlines, to evidentiary matters in
sexual harassment cases, to rape kit exams. Elsewhere, I have offered a more comprehensive history of the Act. n7 Here, I tell the history of
the Violence Against Women Act with special reference [*3] to its major attempt to change the legal terms in which we understand this
violence - the civil rights remedy. Part I summarizes the overarching debate about the remedy. In Part II, the first drafts of the bill, along with
its first hearings, are discussed. Part III tells the story of the controversy about the civil rights remedy and Congress' attempts to address the
constitutional questions in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez. n8 Part IV discusses the final changes to the
bill, including the "animus" language added to the "gender-motivation" requirement. Part V briefly describes the final passage of the Act in the
Senate and House and the Conference Committee consideration.

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n7. A fuller history of the Act appears in Violence Against Women: Law & Practice (Clark Boardman 1997, forthcoming).

n8. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).

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Part One - The Civil Rights Remedy: The Issue

Our very first civil rights laws barred the use of violence to brand some men as inferior. In 1871, the Congress opened the federal courts in cases where state laws had failed to protect against violent racial discrimination. n9 By 1990, then, it should have been well established that violence could also be discrimination. n10 It should also have been well established that, where state laws and practices failed to protect the equal rights of citizens, the federal government had the power, and the obligation, to provide an alternate forum to resolve those disputes,
even where the underlying conduct might also be barred by state law. n11

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n9. See, e.g., the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871; 42 U.S.C. 1985.

n10. Indeed, the Supreme Court had already recognized that a rape, for example, could constitute discrimination in employment. See Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (racially-discriminatory violence).

n11. For this background, see 1991 Senate Report at 53-54 supra note 2; Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing Before the
Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 369 at 84-134 (1991) [hereinafter "1991 S. Hearing 369"].

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If these were well-established principles as a matter of law, they were not principles that the bill's sponsors expected would carry the day. They acknowledged, early on, that the touchstone of a civil rights remedy is its ability to redress the failures of State law. n12 Not surprisingly,
the Committee reports and hearings focus on law as much as personal harm; they tell a story of the "puzzling persistence of public policies,
laws, and attitudes that treat some crimes against women less seriously than other violent crimes." n13 In many ways, the story told was one
of law veiled by the idea of the relationship, a law that perceived "marital disputes" where there were felonies; that refused to see force as
force as long as it was tied to an acquaintance; that believed that there was something "personal" about rape when perpetrated by a [*4]
husband; that said that violence was chosen by choosing a relationship. n14 After decades of state law reform, "it [was] still easier to convict
a car thief than a rapist [and] authorities [were] more likely to arrest a man for parking tickets than for beating his wife." n15 As Senator Biden
summed it up, the "criminal justice system had failed to do its part," n16 it had given half of our citizens only "distrust, disbelief, and
discrimination." n17

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n12. S. Rep. No. 545, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter "1990 S. Rep. 545"].

n13. 1991 S. Comm. Rep. 197 at 33.

n14. Id. at 34:

"Typically, we do not ask whether the victim of a barroom brawl is a real victim; we do not comment that the victim deserved to be hit; we do
not inquire whether there was resistance or whether the victim said "no' persistently enough; we do not believe that the crime may have been
fabricated altogether. Until the stereotypes upon which these scenarios are built seem as foreign for the victims of rape and domestic violence
as they do for the victims of barroom brawls, our criminal justice system will pose barriers for women it does not pose for others in our society."

n15. 137 Cong. Rec. S. 597 (Jan. 14, 1991) (statement of Sen. Biden upon the introduction of S. 15).

n16. 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 1 (opening statement of Sen. Biden).

n17. Id.

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Despite this foundation, the analogy to existing civil rights protections would leave many unconvinced. Unlike the racially-motivated violence
first outlawed by Congress in the Reconstruction era, violence perpetrated against women did not seem primarily conspiratorial, widely identified
with organized political movements, or the product of publicly institutionalized slavery. n18 Compared to America's shameful history of racial
discrimination, the critics urged, violence against women seemed far less political and far more personal; the product of private relationships,
not public discrimination. Indeed, its very commonness, its ubiquity, seemed to counsel against the idea that violence discriminated. n19

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n18. Political movements such as the woman's rights movement or the abortion rights movement have, of course, been the target of violence.
And certain aspects of the history of women (legal treatment, for example, as chattel) are also badges and incidents of involuntary servitude.
See id. at 89 (testimony of Prof. Burt Neuborne, New York University Law School).

n19. See infra text accompanying notes 8891 (discussing Senator Biden's testimony responding to critics).

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In a sense, these arguments might have been predicted. Once upon a time, the "whites only" sign on the door of the local diner was a private
matter; once upon a time, sexual favors were the "trivial" price to be paid for a job; once upon a time, we believed that sex and race
segregation at work and at school were part of the normal order of things. If arguments of triviality, privacy, and normalcy had proven poor
predictors of injustice in the past, they found a new resonance in these circumstances. Critics argued that gender-based violence was
"different": it wasn't employment, it wasn't race, it was "personal and private." There were, of course, counter-examples - no individual act of
lynching nor of sexual harassment may seem "political" or "organized" to its victims and each is barred by state law, however ill-en- [*5]
forced. n20 In the end, however, these examples of violent discrimination seemed more public, less emotional, and less close-to-home. What
gave force to the critics' arguments was an implicit call to relationship: these were private matters precisely because they involved personal
relationships, not public attacks by strangers. That, of course, joined the issue precisely: for it was the idea that relationship could
automatically diminish the violence that the law's advocates sought to challenge. n21

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n20. Judgments of "wrongfulness" have a habit of dispelling our sense of "privacy." We no longer call "private" that which we have decided is
wrong (e.g. racial discrimination in restaurants). This suggests, as I believe, that claims of "privacy" are really claims that we should refuse to
judge, a position that inevitably affirms the status quo and, not surprisingly, avoids the crucial normative questions.

n21. I do not mean to suggest by this that the bill covers only those cases in which there is such a relationship between the litigants; it does
not. Relationship operates as a metaphor or a screen by which we judge women's claims of autonomy, whether those claims actually arise in a
relationship or not.

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By invoking an existing civil rights tradition, drafters were not engaging in an effort of principle alone. They sought to extend the protection of
existing gender discrimination laws. Massive efforts had been made in the 1970s and 1980s to ensure equal opportunity for women: equal
opportunity in employment, in education, in the application of family and criminal law. Experience had proven, however, that these formal
advances were no match for private violence. Would a law guaranteeing equal pay mean much to a woman whose husband beat her when she
tried to leave the house for a job interview? Would a sex-neutral divorce law help a woman who, when she tried to leave her husband, was
stalked and threatened into returning? Would a gender-neutral rape law mean much to a woman, raped by a date, if the prosecutor refused to
bring her case? In a sense, violence against women was the ultimate weapon against gender equality - it could wipe out in a single blow any
and every advance in opportunity created by over twenty years of law reform. n22

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n22. See 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 2 ("In this country we already prohibit much subtler forms of discrimination against women - discrimination that
prevents promotion or a pay raise. If we do that, as we should, why do we leave unattended the far more violent discrimination of
gender-based attacks?") (statement of Sen. Biden).

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Persuading the Congress to take the leap of imagination from existing civil rights laws to VAWA's civil rights remedy would not be legislatively or
politically easy. When drafters decided to include the remedy, they invited controversy. Much of VAWA built upon significant reform efforts of
the 1970s and 1980s: proposals for funding shelters, expanding rape shield rules, and strengthening special prosecutorial units covered familiar
legal territory. The civil rights remedy, however, was unprecedented. It not only departed from traditional approaches toward violence against
women, it also departed, in significant ways, from other civil rights remedies. As a re- [*6] sult, it became controversial among private civil
rights groups n23 as well as federal and state judges, eventually yielding the public opposition of the Chief Justice of the United States. n24 Not
surprisingly, this controversy stalled the bill at various points on the road to final passage. n25

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n23. The American Civil Liberties Union, although wary of taking a public stand against the bill, criticized the civil rights remedy during
congressional hearings. Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 51 at 17-33 (1993) [hereinafter "1993 H. Hearing 51"] (testimony of Elizabeth Symonds,
ACLU Legislative Director). Also see infra text accompanying note 184.

n24. See infra text accompanying notes 83-85. Opposition by the judiciary as a whole was never uniform. For example, as early as 1992, the
National Association of Women Judges expressed its support for the remedy. See Statement of Hon. Judith Billings, President of the Nat'l Assoc.
of Women Judges, reprinted in 1993 H. Hearing 51 at 30-32. By 1993, the Judicial Conference withdrew its objections based on jurisdictional and
other changes made in the Biden/Hatch compromise draft. See Letter of Judge Stanley Marcus, Chairman, Ad-Hoc Committee on Gender-Based
Violence, Judicial Conference, reprinted in id. at 70-73. Throughout the course of the legislative debate, the Conference of State Chief Justices
expressed their "grave concerns" about the civil rights remedy. See Letter of Hon. Lyle Reid, Chief Justice of Tennessee, Chair, Committee on
State-Federal Relations, Conf. of State Chief Justices, reprinted in id. at 77-79. Support for the civil rights remedy was eventually expressed by
the Clinton Justice Department and 41 State Attorneys General. Id. at 34-36, 96-98.

n25. See infra text accompanying notes 82-92; see also Linda Hirshman, Making Safety A Civil Right, Ms. Magazine (Sept./Oct. 1994)
(discussing controversy).

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VAWA took several different forms in both the House and the Senate: all told, there are at least fourteen versions of VAWA. n26 Each of the
three Senate bills and at least one of the three House bills were introduced in one form and then approved by committee after significant
alterations. In addition, further changes were made during consideration on the floor of the Senate, n27 and in conference commit- [*7] tee.
n28 What follows is a chronological history of the legislation with special emphasis on the history of its civil rights remedy.

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n26. The first VAWA, S. 2754, was introduced in 1990 and followed in 1991 by S. 15, the VAWA of 1991. S. 15 was then reintroduced in the
next Congress as S. 11, the VAWA of 1993. Committee modifications to these bills appear in 1990 S. Rep. 545; 1991 S. Rep. 197; S. Rep. No.
138, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. [hereinafter "1993 S. Rep. 138"] (1993). [three original Senate bills and three committee bills]. In the House,
companion bills were introduced for each of the separate Senate bills. The first such companion, H.R. 5468, was introduced in the 101st
Congress. A new House companion, H.R. 1502, was introduced in the next Congress and was significantly modified in Subcommittee hearings. A
final and third companion was introduced as H.R. 1133 and modified significantly after consideration by the House Judiciary Committee. [three
original House bills, one subcommittee bill, one full committee bill]. In the Senate, VAWA was first passed as part of S. 1607. In the House, it
was first passed as H.R. 1133 and then incorporated, with modifications, into a larger crime bill, H.R. 4092. The Senate version became the basis
for the VAWA provisions in H.R. 3355, with modifications and additions taken from the House bill. The Conference Report to H.R. 3355 became P.
L. 103-322. [Senate and House passed versions plus Conference Report].

n27. See discussion of Senate consideration of S. 1607, infra text accompanying note 181.

n28. See discussion of conference committee consideration of H.R. 3355, infra text accompanying note 191.

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Part Two: First Drafts, First Hearings

S. 2754, the first version of VAWA, was introduced in the Senate by Senator Joseph Biden on June 19, 1990. At that time, the bill included
three major titles - the first title focused on prosecution, policing and sentencing; the second title addressed battering and provided a new
federal criminal offense for interstate battering; the third title included the new civil rights remedy. Although new titles were added, these three
titles, along with provisions on judicial training added later that year, remain the common core of the bill that would ultimately become law in
P.L. 103-322.

A. S. 2754, Title III - Civil Rights

As originally drafted, Title III of S. 2754 created a new private cause of action for individual victims of gender-motivated violence. n29
Borrowing language from other civil rights remedies, the bill provided a cause of action for "any person ... who deprives another of the rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws as enumerated" in Title III, subsection (b). Subsection (b) defined those
substantive rights as the right to "be free from crimes of violence motivated by the victim's gender." n30 Finally, a "crime of violence motivated
by the victim's gender" was defined as "any rape, sexual assault, or abusive sexual contact motivated by gender-based animus." n31

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n29. The remedy as enacted appears at P.L. 103-322, Title IV, subtitle C; it is codified at 42 U.S.C. 13981.

n30. S. 2754, sec. 301(c).

n31. S. 2754, sec. 301(d).

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Title III's new cause of action was accompanied by three specific findings supporting the creation of the new substantive right. In the first,
Congress found that crimes motivated by the victim's gender violated "the victim's right to equal protection of the laws," and freedom "from
discrimination on the basis of gender." n32 In the second, Congress analogized to existing laws relating to sex discrimination, including sexual
harassment, finding that "current law provides a civil rights remedy for gender crimes committed in the workplace, but not on the street or in
the home." n33 Finally, in the third finding, Congress concluded that state laws had proven inadequate to protect against the "bias element" of
gender crimes, which "separates these crimes from acts of random violence." n34

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n32. S. 2754, sec. 301(a).

n33. Id.

n34. Id.

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Committee reports indicate that Title III was modeled on existing civil rights remedies and, in particular, 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1983, and
1985(3). n35 As originally drafted, Title III's remedy bears distinct formal similarities to these other civil rights remedies. n36 For example,
section 301(b)'s original formulation ("All Persons within the United States shall have the same rights ...") is similar to the language of section
1981 ("All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right. . .") n37 Section 301(c)'s cause of action ("Any person,
including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, who deprives another of the
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws ... shall be liable ...") is similar to the cause of action created by section
1983 ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State ... subjects ... any citizen ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable ..."). n38 Analogues to section 301's
original references to "rights, privileges or immunities" can be found in section 1983 and section 1985(3). n39

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n35. 1990 S. Rep. 545 at 51.

n36. In Title III's final version, these similarities become less obvious because a good deal of the original formal language was modified or
deleted. For example, references to "privileges and immunities" were dropped based on expert testimony that these terms were obsolete and
confusing. See, e.g., 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 122 n. * (written testimony of Prof. Cass Sunstein, Univ. of Chicago School of Law).

n37. 42 U.S.C. 1981(a).

n38. 42 U.S.C. 1983.

n39. 42 U.S.C. 1983 ("rights, privileges, or immunities"); 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) ("equal privileges and immunities under the laws").

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Although existing civil rights remedies appear to be the templates from which drafters copied the formal "cause of action" under Title III, those
remedies provide no analogue for the substantive right created by Title III "to be free" from gender-motivated violence. Section 1981 provides a
cause of action to protect the rights of nonwhites "to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence," and enjoy the equal
"benefit" of all laws. n40 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of existing federal constitutional or statutory rights. n41 Of the
Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes, section 1985(3) comes closest to the substance of Title III because it addresses violent conduct. n42
However, it differs in several important respects. n43 For example, section 1985(3) is limited to those acts perpetrated by a conspiracy whose
purpose is to deprive the plaintiff of "equal protection of the laws." n44 VAWA's cause of action does not depend upon a [*9] showing that
the defendant consciously intended to deprive another of "equal rights," but, instead, upon proof of violent acts "motivated" by gender.

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n40. 42 U.S.C. 1981.

n41. 42 U.S.C. 1983; see 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 122 n. * (discussing section 1983) (testimony of Prof. Cass Sunstein).

n42. 42 U.S.C. 1985(3).

n43. 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 42 (noting the difficulty of applying section 1985(3) to cases of sex discrimination).

n44. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).

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B. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings on S. 2754

Three hearings were held on S. 2754 during the 101st Congress, hearings that are summarized in the Committee's reports of 1990 and 1991. n45
The hearings detail the barriers to justice faced by victims of rape and domestic violence - barriers of law and practice that fall
disproportionately on women. n46 Survivors testified of indifference and disbelief - of repeated calls for help from police, of flimsy relief offered
by protection orders, of a society that asked what the victim "had done" to inspire the violence. n47 Experts provided studies produced by
State Supreme Courts in which judges, prosecutors, and lawyers all emphasized the differential burdens borne by victims of rape and battering,
burdens that in many cases arose because the victim had a prior relationship with her attacker. n48

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n45. 1990 S. Rep. 545 at 31-34; 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 33-48, summarizing Women and Violence: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 939, Pts. 1 & 2 (1990) [hereinafter "1990 S. Hearing 939"]; 1991 S. Hearing 369.

n46. See 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 34, 43-48.

n47. See, e.g., 1990 S. Hearing 939 Pt. 2 (testimony of Nicole Snow, Tracy Motuzick, and Sarah M. Buel).

n48. See, e.g., id. (testimony of Helen Neuborne, testimony of Gill Freeman, testimony of Sarah M. Buel), and 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 43 & n. 40
("Study after study commissioned by the highest courts of the States - from Florida to New York, California to New Jersey, Nevada to
Minnesota - has concluded that crimes disproportionately affecting women are often treated less seriously than comparable crimes against
men.") (citing gender bias studies conducted by State Supreme Courts).

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The hearings also illuminated specific legal barriers to protection. The Committee's reports retold, at length, a history of formal differences: of
corroboration and utmost resistance rules in rape cases, of spousal immunities from rape and battery charges, of special jury instructions
casting doubts upon rape victims' credibility, of legal treatises openly recommending that all rape victims be examined by a psychiatrist. n49
Witnesses offered testimony showing that, despite reform, formal legal differences remain. Interspousal tort immunities in several states bar
married persons from bringing civil suits for assault; in other states, voluntary social companion rules limit punishment in rape cases. n50
Although many states have revoked explicit marital rape immunities, new barriers have been created by procedural and other rules limiting the
new "marital rape" crimes. n51 In a [*10] number of States, statutes of limitation effectively bar suits for incest by young women against their
fathers; n52 and evidentiary rules deter the filing of civil suits in rape cases. n53

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n49. 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 44-45 and accompanying notes 45-58.

n50. See 1990 S. Hearing 939 (testimony of Helen Neuborne); see also 1993 H. Hearing 51 at 8-9 (testimony of Sally Goldfarb, Senior Staff
Attorney, NOW Legal Defense & Educ. Fund)(detailing state laws and practices that pose barriers in cases of violence against women).

n51. 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 45 & n. 50 (citing R. West, Marital Rape and the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 45 (1990)).

n52. Id.; see also 1993 H. Hearing 51 at 9 (testimony of Sally Goldfarb, Senior Staff Attorney, NOW Legal Defense & Educ. Fund) ("A teenage
girl is subjected to incestuous sexual abuse by her father. In some states, strict statutes of limitations require her to bring suit within a few
years - which is virtually impossible for an emotionally and economically dependent young person - or else lose forever the chance to pursue a
civil legal remedy.").

n53. 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 46 (citing Sindelar v. Weiner, Civ. No. 89-1177 (Iowa), a civil case where the rape shield rule did not apply and the
"trial judge authorized the defense lawyer to ask the victim about her sex life after the rape and whether she "enjoyed' those experiences,
about her "illegitimate' relationship to her boyfriend and use of birth control, and about her reputation of having "wild parties' with a host of men
"coming and going.'").

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Perhaps more importantly, testimony revealed how practice could undermine the law's protection: even where specific legal barriers had been
eliminated, practice often reinvented a gap between the law as written and the law as enforced, a gap that often depended upon seeing the
crime as a matter of the "relationship." Witnesses told of counties in which no rape prosecutions had been brought where the parties knew each
other and of prosecutors who openly acknowledged that convictions in such cases were "virtually impossible" to obtain. n54 They brought the
Committee evidence of judges who believed that women "precipitated" rape prosecutions "sometimes" or "frequently" because of what they were
wearing or their actions preceding the incidents. n55 They quoted from Justice Department studies showing that most domestic violence cases
caused injuries as serious as most felonies, and yet, experience demonstrated that most domestic violence crimes were charged as
misdemeanors because of the parties' prior relationship. n56 They testified about threats to witnesses routinely prosecuted in drug cases but
ignored in domestic abuse cases, again because of the parties' relationship. n57 As one prosecutor summed it up:

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n54. 1990 S. Hearing 939 Pt. 1 (testimony of Linda Fairstein); id. at Pt. 2 (testimony of Gill Freeman); 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 47 & n. 66 (quoting
Report of the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Committee (1990)).

n55. 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 47 n.63 (citing "Report of the Washington State Task Force on Gender and Justice in the Courts," reporting that nearly
one "quarter of the [state] judges believed that rape victims "sometimes' or "frequently' precipitate their sexual assaults because of what they
wear and/or actions preceding the incidents.")

n56. The Justice Department report states that: "one-third of all such incidents [domestic violence], if reported, would be classified as felony
rape, robbery or aggravated assault; the remaining two-thirds involve bodily injury at least as serious as the injury inflicted in 90 percent of all
robberies and aggravated assaults." 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 38 (citing National Institute of Justice report).

n57. See 1990 S. Hearing 939 Pt.2 at 161 (testimony of Sarah M. Buel, Assistant District Attorney, Massachusetts) ("if you tamper with a
witness in a drug case, automatically the police will arrest." But if an abuser goes "to the house and threatens the woman" that he will kill her if
she goes to court, that is "never charged as an added offense.")

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The assault is the same when it is in the home as on Main Street. It is just not treated that way in a vast majority of our courts.... I can try
two cases back-to-back. If it is a stranger assault, I have no trouble getting the maximum, absolutely none. I get the married couple in there
and the judge wants to talk about, "Now, are you sure you don't want to go to marriage counseling, and how can you do this after 30 years,'
and just complete denial about her danger. I am terrified for her life, and the judge wants to talk about this illusion of mom, pop, bud, sis, and
dog Spot .... n58

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n58. Id. at 163-64.

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Much of the evidence detailed at the hearings, and repeated in the Committee's reports, sought to explain the ways in which state justice
systems had seen the relationship as justifying unlawful force. The bill's civil rights remedy, of course, does not directly attack these practices;
no civil rights remedy directly mandates that a state change its legal rules or practices. Indeed, all civil rights laws proceed by a kind of
indirection, allowing individuals to bring to light the prejudice that has left them unprotected by official sources. VAWA's remedy is, in this
sense, a traditional civil rights remedy: it does not directly punish the State that has failed to prosecute acquaintance rape cases or to arrest
spouse abusers. n59 Instead, it seeks to force courts to address the reasons "why" those practices exist by exposing the very same prejudices
in the conduct subject to suit. n60 By granting civil remedies in these cases, courts not only provide damages, they shine a spotlight on the
"reason" one was fired or the "reason" one was evicted or the "reason," in Title III's case, that one was beaten or raped or robbed. In that
moment, these individual cases help to illuminate and rectify the stereotypes and prejudices that both caused the violence and blunted the
sanction of state law.

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n59. Of course, existing remedies do allow suits against state officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Nothing in Title III prohibits claims that 42 U.S.C.
1983 permits a cause of action against a state official for the failure to provide equal protection or the deprivation of rights secured by other
federal laws, including rights secured by VAWA.

n60. Compare, for example, the rationales courts have used in the past to conduct inquiries about rape complainants' sex lives with the
rationales sometimes used to justify date rape. For example, courts have typically allowed inquiry into rape complainants' sex life on the theory
that women who "sleep around" are less credible. The theory is presumably that, having violated one societal norm (sex), women are more likely
to violate other norms (telling the truth). This "line of reasoning" mirrors the same kind of stereotypes that may lead to the violence itself (i.e.
"easy women" are not credible when they say "no"; "easy women" have already violated society's norms so they have nothing to lose if forced).

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C. S. 2754 - The Committee Version

On October 4, 1990, the Judiciary Committee held an executive committee meeting to consider VAWA. Senator Biden offered a new version of
VAWA as a substitute amendment to the bill. The substitute amendment included many important changes, including changes to [*12] Title
III, that would become a permanent part of the legislation as it proceeded through the House and Senate toward final passage.

As originally drafted, Title III covered only sex-related crimes. n61 New language incorporated before markup expanded the remedy to include all
crimes of violence motivated by gender, not simply sex-related violence. n62 This change raised new concerns, however. The Justice
Department had complained that the bill did "not define" the violence covered nor the source of law (state or federal) that would provide such a
definition. n63 In response, the Committee added explicit reference to the federal criminal code's primary definition of "crime of violence,"
section 16 of title 18. n64

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n61. S. 2754, as introduced, defined these crimes as motivated by a gender-based animus. S. 2754, sec. 301 (d) ("For purposes of this section,
a "crime of violence motivated by the victim's gender' means any rape, sexual assault, or abusive sexual contact motivated by gender-based
animus.")

n62. The new definitional section included "any crime of violence" (as that term is defined in section 16 of title 18, United States Code),
"including any rape, sexual assault, or abusive contact, motivated by gender." S. 2754, sec. 301(d), reprinted in 1990 S. Rep. 545 at 23
(emphasis added).

n63. Letter from Dep't of Justice to Chairman Biden at 7 (on file with the Senate Judiciary Committee) (Oct. 9, 1990).

n64. S. 2754, sec. 301(D). This section, which is incorporated throughout other provisions in Title 18, defines a crime of violence as: "(a) an
offense that has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any
other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another
may be used in the course of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. 16.

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Another significant amendment to Title III was added at the request of Senator Thurmond, the ranking minority member of the Judiciary
Committee. Senator Thurmond had voiced support for the bill as a whole but had publicly raised concerns about the civil rights remedy. n65 To
gain a unanimous Committee recommendation, Senator Biden agreed to make provisional changes in the bill that were ultimately discarded in
later Congresses. The most significant of these changes was new language requiring that the acts covered by the new civil rights action must
be "overwhelmingly" motivated by gender. Based on testimony at hearings during the 102nd Congress, this change was deleted as creating a
unique and unnecessary burden inconsistent with other civil rights laws. n66

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n65. 1990 S. Hearing 939 Pt. 2 at 158 (indicating that Sen. Thurmond would join Sen. Biden as a sponsor of the bill if the "few provisions there
about civil rights" could "get ... straightened up.")

n66. This change is discussed in 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 51 (referring to testimony before the committee that this language would "feed" the very
"biases" the law was intended to "eliminate.")

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D. Final Action in the 101st Congress

On October 4, 1990, the first version of VAWA, S. 2754, was reported favorably out of the Judiciary Committee. The Committee [*13] took up
Senator Biden's substitute bill which was adopted by voice vote. No further action was taken either on the Senate bill, or its House companion,
in the 101st Congress.

Part Three: Controversy - Civil Rights & The Constitution

On the first day of the 102nd Congress, January 14, 1991, Senator Biden reintroduced VAWA as S. 15; a companion bill sponsored by Barbara
Boxer was soon introduced in the House. Within a month, the Biden-Boxer bills would garner political opposition from a variety of fronts. The
Bush Administration, an early opponent of the civil rights remedy, stepped up its efforts, urging Senators to conclude that the bill was
unconstitutional. Meanwhile, state and federal judges mounted a campaign to warn that the bill would "flood the federal courts" and deprive
state courts of their traditional jurisdiction. Finally, on the very day S. 15 was introduced, Senator Dole introduced the Women's Equal
Opportunity Act, a bill intended to be a political alternative to the Biden-Boxer bill but one that omitted the controversial civil rights remedy. n67

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n67. 137 Cong. Rec. S2189 (1991).

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A. S. 15's Civil Rights Remedy

Between the 1990 markup and the reintroduction of VAWA in 1991, Senator Biden made several changes to the bill, the most significant of
these in Title III. In large part, these changes were intended to respond to questions about scope and definition raised by Senators on the
Judiciary Committee and by the Bush Justice Department. n68

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n68. The Justice Department had specifically noted in its 1990 letter that S. 2754 did not clearly differentiate between crimes based on gender
and those not based on gender. Letter from Dep't of Justice to Chairman Biden at 7 (on file with the Senate Judiciary Committee) (Oct. 9,
1990).

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i. Gender-Motivation. In the 1991 VAWA, sponsors sought to clarify the meaning of the phrase "motivated by gender." S. 2754, as approved by
the Committee, provided no further definition of this phrase. S. 15, as introduced, added the terms "because of gender or on the basis of
gender." n69 This language was taken from the closest analogous language in an existing civil rights statute - Title VII. Rather than sections
1981, 1983, or 1985(3), whose rough outlines had been copied in creating the cause of action, it was to sex discrimination laws, specifically
Title VII law, that the Committee looked to define the substantive rights protected under Title III. The Committee Report on S. 15 specifically
notes that the new "definition of gen- [*14] der-motivated crime is based on title VII which prohibits discrimination in employment "because ...
of sex.'" n70

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n69. "(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender' means any crime of violence, as defined in this section, including rape, sexual
assault, sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact, or any other crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender." S. 15,
sec. 301(d)(1) reprinted in 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 399.

n70. 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 50 (citing 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2).

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ii. Scope. The second significant change in Title III addressed the scope of the new civil rights remedy. As the 1991 Committee Report notes,
"one of the most serious misunderstandings of title III has concerned its scope." n71 Repeated questions were raised about whether Title III
would cover minor or trivial incidents; whether it covered "domestic relations" actions such as divorce or separation; or whether it would cover
"most" if not "all" crimes in which women happened to be victims. n72 Earlier drafts sought to respond to these concerns by incorporating the
term "crime of violence" as defined elsewhere in the federal criminal code. By specifically enumerating the "crime of violence" language in a
separate section, S. 15 sought to emphasize that the acts covered were not defined by family law. n73 Coupled with this change, drafters
added a special "limitation" section specifically excluding "random" acts not motivated by gender. n74

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n71. Id. at 48.

n72. See, e.g., 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 57 (Senator Thurmond questioning witnesses about "whether most crimes of violence committed against
women" would be covered and "how you differentiate between crimes which are fundamentally based on gender and those which are not.");
1991 S. Rep. 197 at 69 (questions of Senator Grassley); see generally id. at 42-54 (responding to questions raised about the purpose, scope,
and application of Title III's civil rights remedy).

n73. S. 15, sec. 301(d)(2) reprinted in 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 399-400 ("the term "crime of violence' means an act or series of acts that would
come within the meaning of State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of title 18, United States Code ...").

n74. S. 15, as introduced, sec. 301(e)(1), reprinted in 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 400 (Limitation. - Nothing in this section entitles a person to a
cause of action under subsection (c) for random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a
preponderance of the evidence, to be "motivated by gender" ...").

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iii. Crime of Violence. Before reintroducing VAWA as S. 15, sponsors also sought to clarify the meaning of the language "crime of violence." The
term "crime" implied that a plaintiff would be required to show, in her civil case, that there had been a prior criminal complaint or prosecution. To
clarify that neither was required, S. 15 added new language, defining a "crime of violence" as "an act or series of acts," that "would come within
the meaning of State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of title 18." n75 The new emphasis was on the "acts" at issue - i.e. the actus
reus associated with a criminal offense. The question was categorical: whether the acts alleged fit within the category of offenses enumerated
in section 16. n76

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n75. S. 15, as introduced, section 301(d)(2), reprinted in 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 399-400.

n76. See also section 301(e)(1), reprinted in 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 400 (also added before the introduction of S. 15) (excluding random "acts
of violence unrelated to gender," not random "crimes" of violence unrelated to gender).

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To reinforce this point, several other amendments were made. The term "crime of violence" was modified by language specifically stating that
the acts would give rise to a cause of action "whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction
..." In addition, two new special provisions were added declaring: (1) that the burden of proof was "by a preponderance of the evidence," n77
and (2) that "nothing in this section requires a prior criminal complaint, prosecution, or conviction, to establish" a cause of action under Title III.
n78 These changes were intended to clarify that a civil proceeding under Title III was, like other civil rights actions, to be governed by civil, not
criminal, law n79 and that the term "crime of violence" was intended to limit the kind of acts necessary to give rise to a cause of action, n80
not to create a mini-criminal trial within a civil case. n81

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n77. "Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under subsection (c) for ... acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a
preponderance of the evidence, to be "motivated by gender' as defined in subsection (d)." S. 15, sec. 301(e)(1), reprinted in 1991 S. Hearing
369 at 400.

n78. S. 15, sec. 301(e)(2), reprinted in 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 400.

n79. Senate committee reports indicate that the cause of action as a whole was to be governed by a "preponderance" standard, 1991 S. Rep.
197 at 51. And, indeed, this is how the bill was interpreted by commentators, including the Conference on Chief Justices of the State Supreme
Courts. See, e.g., 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 315 (Letter of Chief Justices states that the Title III "crime of violence' would be provable not by an
evidentiary standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt,' but rather by a mere preponderance.") However, testimony later suggested that the
"preponderance" burden might cover only part of the cause of action, the "gender-motivation" element. 1993 H. Hearing 51 at 97. The
Conference Committee report states unequivocally that "the Conferees note that the applicable standard of proof in a civil rights cause of
action under this section is preponderance of the evidence." Conference Report, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 711, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. at 385 (1994) [hereinafter "1994 Conf. Rep. 711"].

n80. A relevant analogy here is to current Title VII sexual harassment law: "for sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive." Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). At a minimum, the Supreme Court has said that "criminal
conduct" satisfies the need for sufficiently severe conduct. The Court's reference to "criminal conduct" does not mean that one must prove the
elements of a particular crime to establish sexual harassment; it means that the kind of conduct is severe enough to meet the threshold
showing sufficient to justify a sexual harassment claim. Similarly, under VAWA, the question whether alleged conduct is sufficiently severe does
not require proof of the elements of a crime but is to be measured by the scale of those acts listed in section 16, Title 18.

n81. To incorporate the criminal law into Title III's civil action would have run directly contrary to the drafters' purposes to remedy deficiencies
in the criminal justice system's response to rape and domestic violence. Moreover, there is evidence that the lead sponsor of the bill, and the
rest of the Judiciary Committee, were well aware of the difference between a civil claim and a civil claim that required a mini-criminal trial.
Indeed, Senator Biden sponsored amendments to other legislation then pending in committee that would have accomplished just that - required
proof of a prior criminal conviction to establish a civil cause of action. See S. Rep. No. 372, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) the Pornography
Victims' Compensation Act, S. 1521).

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B. The Civil Rights Controversy

Despite these changes, incorporated before the bill was even introduced in the 102nd Congress, criticism of the bill's civil rights remedy began
to mount. Beleaguered by an increasing criminal case load, federal and state judges had, for some time, raised concerns that Congress was
federalizing too many actions that should be covered by state law. On January 31, 1991, two weeks after the bill was introduced in the 102nd
Congress, the Conference of Chief Justices of State Supreme Courts voted to oppose S. 15's civil rights remedy, urging that the bill would cause
major dislocations in the processing of "domestic relations" cases because it would be used "as a bargaining tool within the context of divorce
negotiations." n82

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n82. The official position of the Conference of Chief Justices is reprinted in 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 314-317. This document urges that S. 15 will
"throw great confusion into state laws and decisions affecting hundreds of thousands of litigants." Id. at 317 (emphasis in original). At the date
of this writing, I am aware of fewer than a handful of cases asserting VAWA Title III claims.

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The federal judiciary soon echoed the state judges. Chief Justice Rehnquist gave a widely publicized 1991 year-end report, in which he urged
"self-restraint in adding new federal causes of action." n83 This speech specifically identified S. 15 as an unnecessary additional burden on the
federal judiciary. Although supporting VAWA's overall goals, Justice Rehnquist stated quite clearly that he opposed VAWA's new criminal and civil
rights provisions, stating that the Act's "definition of a new crime is so open-ended and the new private right of action so sweeping, that the
legislation could involve the federal courts in a whole host of domestic relations disputes." n84 Later speeches would delete reference to the
new criminal offenses, but repeat opposition to Title III's civil rights remedy. n85

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n83. This speech is reprinted at 138 Cong. Rec. S443-444 (Jan. 27, 1992).

n84. Id.

n85. In a speech on the future of the federal judiciary, the Chief Justice limited his criticism of VAWA to "the bill's new private right of action" as
so sweeping that it "could involve the federal courts in a whole host of domestic relations disputes." 138 Cong. Rec. E746, 747 (Mar. 19, 1992).

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The bill's principal Senate sponsor responded to these claims at a hearing held in the House of Representatives on February 6, 1992. n86
Senator Biden, who testified at the House hearings, acknowledged that criticism of the bill was mounting; that, indeed, the Chief Justice of the
United States had publicly urged that the Act violated sound principles of federalism. However, he disagreed strongly with the idea that either
the remedies in Title II or in Title III were inconsistent with the proper scope of federal jurisdiction. n87

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n86. Violence Against Women: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Criminal Justice, Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 42
(1992) [hereinafter "1992 H. Hearing 42"] (the hearing was sponsored by a leading House proponent of VAWA, Rep. Charles Schumer).

n87. Id. at 8-11.

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First, Senator Biden sought to distinguish the civil rights remedy from the bill's provisions incorporating new federal criminal offenses, provisions
that had been merged in the debate about the bill's "federalization" potential. Senator Biden acknowledged that the federal government
generally "does not have ... the power of enforcement of laws relating to the criminal justice system that do not have some nexus to interstate
commerce." n88 However, Biden pointed out that the criminal offenses in the act were quite clearly tied to interstate travel, indeed that they
were premised on the idea that interstate travel was being used to evade state criminal and civil proceedings. This was not only a very
traditional basis for federal criminal relief but it also covered conduct far more serious than a variety of other matters that were then on the
books as "federal" offenses. Responding vigorously to charges that the bill covered "trivial" matters, Biden chided its critics for failing to
appreciate that a violent attack upon a spouse was a far more serious offense than was the unlawful transportation of dentures or cattle, then
subject to special federal criminal provisions. n89

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n88. Id. at 31.

n89. Id. at 8 (referring to 18 U.S.C. 1821, barring the transportation of dentures made by unlicensed personnel; 18 U.S.C. 2317, receiving stolen
cattle).

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Having distinguished the criminal provisions, Biden went on to defend the civil rights remedy as consistent with existing jurisdictional bases for
other civil rights remedies. Just as existing civil rights laws did not "federalize" every violent act against an African-American, neither did Title III
"federalize" every violent act against a woman. Quoting from the Committee's report, Senator Biden emphasized that "Title III [did] not cover
random beatings in the home or elsewhere. The only remedy title III provides is for violent crimes motivated by gender discrimination." n90 Given
the necessity to show discrimination, Senator Biden asked how VAWA differed from existing remedies:

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n90. Id. at 11 (quoting 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 48).

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No one would say today that laws barring violent attacks motivated by race or ethnicity fall outside the Federal courts' jurisdiction. Then why
are they saying that violent discrimination motivated by gender is not a traditional civil rights violation? n91

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n91. Id.

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For over a century, he told the Committee, the courts and Congress have accepted the idea that federal courts' jurisdiction over civil rights
claims is consistent with sound federalism because these remedies fill gaps where state laws or practices have failed to protect federal
interests. n92

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n92. Id. at 11, 31.

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C. The Constitutional Questions

As the remedy became increasingly controversial, the political battle threatened to become a constitutional battle. n93 In 1990 and later in
1991, the Bush Justice Department had opined that the bill was unconstitutional for a variety of reasons. This view was briefly echoed by
Senators Thurmond and Hatch but was dropped after a hearing at which the constitutional questions were addressed. Experts testifying at the
hearing affirmed Congress' power to enact a civil rights remedy such as Title III, based on a variety of constitutional provisions, but primarily
focusing on section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause of Article I. n94

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n93. The Bush Justice Department had argued that Title III was unconstitutional. Letter from Dep't of Justice to Chairman Biden at 8 (on file
with Senate Judiciary Comm.) (Oct. 9, 1990); see 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 103, 125-26 (referring to this controversy). The Clinton Justice
Department later took the opposite position. See 1993 H. Hearing 51 at 96 (testimony of James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Rights Division) ("The first point I want to make ... is that Congress has the authority under the Constitution to enact this legislation.").

n94. 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 105 (testimony of Prof. Cass Sunstein, University of Chicago Law School); 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 95 (written
statement of Prof. Burt Neuborne, New York University School of Law). Prof. Neuborne also invoked the Thirteenth Amendment (arguing that the
Amendment has been held to cover whites and therefore should also include gender discrimination where that discrimination takes the form of
the "badges and incidents" of servitude); and the privileges and immunities clause (arguing that gender-motivated violence which threatens to
inhibit the right to travel or the right to enjoy the statutory benefits of federal law is analogous to cases in which the court has barred the use
of race-based violence). See id. at 99-102 (written statement of Prof. Neuborne). Although the Committee Reports do not emphasize these
rationales (in part, because the Commerce Clause seemed the most obvious approach), they were not rejected.

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i. The Commerce Clause. At the time of this hearing, the Supreme Court had repeatedly upheld Congress' power to enact civil rights remedies on
the basis of the Commerce power. n95 Based on that practice, experts testified that Title III would easily pass constitutional scrutiny. n96
Testimony explained that, under that Clause, Congress has "exceptionally broad" n97 power to regulate any activity exerting a "substantial
economic effect" on interstate commerce. n98 This power extended to the "class of activities" regulated: what mattered was the "aggregate
effect" of all similar cases, not the effect of the particular act in the case before the court (for example, in VAWA's case, a single [*19]
assault). n99 Based on that standard, witnesses urged that "Congress might reasonably find that sex-related violence affects interstate
commerce not simply by deterring women from engaging in certain interstate commercial activities, but also by producing large losses in
interstate productivity after the violent acts have occurred." n100

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n95. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).

n96. See, e.g., 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 105 ("the constitutional objections to the bill are quite weak") (testimony of Prof. Cass Sunstein).

n97. 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 113 (written statement of Prof. Cass Sunstein); 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 52; 1993 S. Rep. 138 at 54.

n98. 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 96 (written statement of Prof. Burt Neuborne)(citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1937)).

n99. 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 115-116 (written statement of Prof. Cass Sunstein); see also id. at 113 (discussing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942)).

n100. 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 116-117 (written statement of Prof. Cass Sunstein).

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This understanding of Congress' commerce power, widely accepted at the time, has recently been challenged by the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Lopez. n101 Lopez refused to apply the "aggregate effects" principle in a case where Congress sought to use the Commerce
power to support a criminal statute banning the possession of a gun within 1000 feet from a school. n102 In several respects, the Gun Free
School Zones Act struck down in Lopez differs from VAWA. n103 Most importantly, VAWA's Title III is a civil rights remedy, not a criminal law.
n104 The Court in Lopez never indicated, for example, that it had any intention of overruling its prior decisions upholding the use of the
commerce power to reach discriminatory state laws and practices. n105 Moreover, precisely because it is a civil rights statute, VAWA does not
provide the state law "replica" presented in Lopez. By definition, if VAWA exists because state laws are inadequate, it must supplement rather
than supplant state law. The plain meaning of the statute itself makes this clear by requiring gender-motivation, an element not present in state
criminal or civil laws covering battering or rape. n106 As the Court has ruled elsewhere, for constitutional purposes, such an intent requirement
necessarily distinguishes a federal statute from state tort or criminal laws. n107

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n101. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).

n102. The principal change made by Lopez is not in the substantive legal standard applicable to commerce clause challenges, but in how it is
applied. In Lopez, the court refused to apply the "aggregate effects" rationale to a criminal statute, finding that to do so would permit the
federal government to reach almost any conduct. Id. at 1631.

n103. Congress both considered and made findings about the impact of sex-related violence on interstate commerce. Cf. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at
1632 (noting Congress' failure to make findings concerning the commercial impact of gun possession outside schools).

n104. See, e.g., 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 48 ("this is a discrimination statute, not a felony protection bill.").

n105. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).

n106. See, e.g, 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 48 ("the cause of action provided under Title III is strictly limited to violent felonies "motivated by
gender.'").

n107. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). VAWA also differs from state law in that the statute bars courts from effectively
"downgrading" the offense because of the parties' relationship.

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Challengers will no doubt argue that Lopez limits Congress' power to act outside the "commercial or economic" arena and that rape or [*20]
battering are hardly "commercial" or "economic" activities. n108 This argument seriously misconstrues Lopez, n109 but, even taken at face
value, it should do little to bar many claims brought under VAWA. Consider a case in which a woman is beaten by her husband because she
wanted to get a job. Or consider a woman fired from her job because she was harassed by her ex-husband. Consider a woman stalked by an
amorous co-worker outside the workplace. Consider a woman who is raped by a client and, because of the rape, can no longer return to work
for fear of another attack by another client. n110 One need not aggregate the "effects" of violence against women on the national economy to
see that each of these cases involves an express link to commerce and employment. n111 None would have occurred without a job or a desire
for a job. Indeed, the links to commerce here are precisely the same ones present in cases brought under sexual harassment and race
discrimination statutes. n112

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n108. 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (noting that the Gun Free School Zones Act "has nothing to do with "commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise";
id. at 1634 (the possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere,
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce").

n109. For example, if this were true, then anything dubbed "criminal" would give rise to a Commerce Clause challenge. The court itself foreclosed
this understanding when it affirmed the right of Congress to reach non-commercial "possessory" offenses. See, e.g., Lopez, 155 S. Ct. at 1631,
(discussing, with approval, the Court's earlier decision in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971), upholding a statute that bars the
possession of guns that have traveled in interstate commerce as long as the federal government proves the interstate nexus).

n110. No current federal law bars gender-based violence used to deprive women of otherwise protected rights. Title VII does not apply in the
home, to independent contractors, or to activities not known to or sponsored by an employer. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e. No state criminal law
vindicates anything more than the right to bodily integrity in these circumstances and may, because of the relationship of the victim to her
attacker, classify these cases as ones of "domestic violence" or "acquaintance rape."

n111. As the court noted, an express link to commerce proved in an individual case satisfies the commerce clause inquiry. See infra note 109
(discussing United States v. Bass).

n112. For example, the Supreme Court has held that one who is raped by a supervisor may sue under Title VII. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986). The Court has never indicated that Congress has no power to enact Title VII because it provides a cause of action for a
"rape." If Title VII can withstand commerce clause scrutiny for the case before the court in Meritor, then it must follow that the cases
enumerated in this paragraph fall within the commerce power under VAWA. The "effect" of the "sexual violence" on commerce is the same in
each - loss of job or productivity.

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Reading Lopez to limit Congress' power to cover only those cases with an obvious commercial link, however, would misinterpret the decision.
The Court has never held that the precise activity in question must itself be commercial or economic in nature. If that were the case, the
Congress would have no power to bar racially discriminatory violence because beating someone up is not "commercial"; nor would it have power
to bar sexual harassment because sexual remarks are not themselves "commercial." Indeed, if that were true, the Lopez [*21] opinion would
commit the Court to concluding that Congress could not use the Commerce Clause to bar racial discrimination in restaurants or hotels because
all the victim wanted to do was to "eat" or "sleep." The error of this argument is in its premise - if one describes conduct so narrowly that it
describes nothing but itself one has, by definition, made the conduct unconnected to anything, including commerce. Through such a narrow
lens, many of the acts the Court has upheld as within Congress' power do not look at all "commercial." n113

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n113. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 128-29 (growing wheat for personal consumption is an activity that may be reached under the
Commerce Clause); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)(beating someone up to recover a debt is an activity that may be reached
under the Commerce Clause).

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In the end, Lopez stands for the rather modest principle that the Court will not apply the aggregate effects principle in cases where the statute
provides no way of distinguishing between federal and state spheres of action. Where federal law directly replicates state law, a direct link to
commerce will save a statute (even a criminal statute) because that link provides a stopping point for the federal sphere of action. n114 Where,
however, there is no direct overlap, and there is a way to distinguish between federal and state spheres, a direct commercial link may be helpful
but is not necessary. In cases where state and federal statutes do not directly overlap, the proper Commerce Clause standard should be the
"aggregate effects" test.

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n114. See supra discussion of United States v. Bass in Lopez.

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This should be particularly true in cases involving civil rights statutes, statutes that are premised on the failures of state law. By definition, such
statutes create a separate sphere of state and federal activity because one - and only one - requires a finding of discrimination. This does not
mean there is no overlap, but it does mean that the overlap is far from complete. A rape is a rape covered by state law, but when it is the price
of a job, it is sex discrimination covered by Title VII; a murder is a murder covered by state law but if committed to intimidate a race, it is a
lynching covered by civil rights laws; a beating is a beating covered by state law, but when committed by a police officer shouting racial
epithets, it is a violation of our criminal civil rights provisions. Similarly, here, a violent attack committed because of gender may be an
attempted murder under state law, but if committed with discriminatory motive, it is also a civil rights violation. Because the federal and state
rules are distinct, there is no need to worry that affirming Congress' power will mean that there is no "activity ... that Congress is without power
to regulate." n115

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n115. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632. To find in this case that the "overlap" between the civil rights remedy and state law requires a direct
commercial link would raise substantial questions about the viability, under the commerce clause, of statutes barring sexual harassment or
racially-motivated violence.

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Where discrimination and commerce meet, the court has traditionally granted great deference to Congress' determinations that there is a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. n116 In VAWA, Congress made express findings that discriminatory state laws and practices had a
"substantial effect" upon commerce by excluding women from the workforce, by reducing productivity, and by burdening women's exercise of
rights to travel and enjoy employment opportunities. It does not heap "inference upon inference," nor require the invocation of a "costs of
crime" rationale n117 to see that women who are deprived of the opportunity to leave their homes to get jobs, whose jobs are used as the
means for harassing them, or who must "hide out" in the wilderness to avoid a battering ex-husband have been denied their right to participate
in the commercial life of the nation. n118

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n116. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).

n117. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632. Gender-motivated crime should not be confused with "crime in general." Any violent crime is likely to make
travel or working more difficult for anyone in the country. Gender-motivated crime, however, makes it harder for some persons and only because
it seeks to brand some persons as inferior citizens. For example, when a batterer punishes his wife for getting a job, he not only makes it more
difficult for her to enter the workforce, he uses violence to enforce discriminatory norms (e.g. women must stay at home). That case is no
different from the kind of case in which a white man beats a African-American to prevent him from entering the workforce because the white
man believes African-Americans are "inferior." Crime may make it harder for some to enter the workforce; violence used to enforce racial and
sexual discrimination makes it harder for a particular reason - and it is that reason (some people are inferior, some people should not work, some
people deserve to be hit) that permits Congress to reach activities that are not themselves commercial but that perpetuate artificial restrictions
on the market.

n118. Compare Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). In McClung, one might have characterized the activity as one that seemed quite
"local," e.g. eating in a restaurant. Instead, the court asked about the "aggregate effects" of the discrimination on commerce. The Court looked
to a legislative record which showed both that discrimination was an "artificial restriction on the market," and that it had restrictive effects upon
travel in interstate commerce. Similarly, here, gender-motivated violence artificially restricts women from full participation in the employment
market (keeping battered and raped women out of the workforce, reducing their productivity on the job, or making it difficult to work in
particular jobs). No individual restaurant owner, Ollie's Barbecue included, sustained racial discrimination in eating establishments, but all
together, they helped to support a worldview in which African-Americans were seen as undeserving of equal treatment. Similarly, no individual
batterer or rapist is likely to keep all women off the employment market, but all together, battering represents a worldview in which women in
relationships prompt, deserve, and inspire violence; in short, a worldview that keeps women in "their place" (at home, not at work).

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There is no question, of course, that Congress was aiming at discriminatory violence rather than the commerce itself. That, however, is no bar
to the exercise of the commerce power. When Congress passed New Deal legislation regulating hours and wages for manufacturing workers, the
end it sought was not to control the flow of com- [*23] merce; n119 when Congress sought to end racial discrimination in private restaurants
and hotels, the end it sought was not to regulate the flow of commerce. n120 But where Congress' judgment is that commerce is "substantially
affected," such motives are no bar to the exercise of Commerce Clause power. If there is one lesson most believed that the Court had learned
during the New Deal, it is that greater danger may lie in the rejection of democratic ends than in a system of imperfect boundaries between
federal and state spheres. n121

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n119. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).

n120. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).

n121. See, e.g, Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy 1933-46, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 645, 681-82 (1946)(arguing that
the court's New Deal deference to Congress' regulation of commerce was brought about by the belief that the court's "continued nullification of
the legislative program demanded by the people and their representatives ... would lead to acceptance of the President's Court plan, and ...
seriously undermine the independence and prestige of the federal judiciary ...").

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ii. Fourteenth Amendment. Committee reports issued since the very first VAWA indicate that Congress sought to rely not only on the Commerce
Clause but also on its power under the Fourteenth Amendment. n122 Section 5 of that Amendment allows Congress to provide remedies for
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. As witnesses before the Committee testified, there is some uncertainty about whether the Court will
defer to Congress' substantive constitutional judgments. n123 However, it is clear that Congress may remedy "uncontroversial" violations of the
Amendment and that its remedial choices are quite broad. n124 In short, in seeking to remedy an uncontroversial violation, Congress may act
"prophylactically" to reach "practices that do not themselves violate the constitution." n125

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n122. 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 53; 1993 S. Rep. 138 at 55.

n123. 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 118 (written testimony of Prof. Cass Sunstein) (discussing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)).

n124. Id. at 119 (written testimony of Prof. Cass Sunstein).

n125. Id.

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VAWA, the Committee Reports urged, was intended to address a "classic" violation of the Fourteenth amendment - the failure of state criminal
justice systems to treat all citizens equally. n126 "In its core meaning," Professor Sunstein testified, "the equal "protection' of the laws was
designed to ensure that the criminal justice system would protect black people, no less than whites, against crimes." n127 VAWA, the
Committee reports state, was based on a similar premise, albeit one expressed in different terms. The bill was intended to respond to state laws
and practices that protected women less than men - not because women were not covered by general criminal provisions but [*24] because
those criminal provisions were understood and applied differently to the most common crimes against women. n128 Rape was not just rape when
it was by a husband or a date, it was a lesser crime by statute; battering was not an assault or even a felony - in practice, it was a civil
proceeding. n129 And it was these discriminations, whether apparent on the face of the particular statutes or in the ways in which they were
applied in practice, that were at the core of the State discrimination VAWA sought to rectify.

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n126. 1991 S. Rep. 97 at 53; 1993 S. Rep. 138 at 55. Evidence of discrimination in the criminal and civil law systems, both as to law and
practice, appears throughout the Senate committee's reports. See also 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 41-48; 1993 S. Rep. 138 at 44-46, 49-50.

n127. 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 118 (written statement of Prof. Cass Sunstein).

n128. Laws that treat violence differently based on gender violate the equal protection clause. For example, over a decade ago, courts held
that states barring the prosecution of marital rape violated equal protection. State of New York v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152 (1984). Similarly, it
was over a decade ago that courts held that police department policies treating domestic violence as a less serious crime also violate equal
protection. See, e.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (1984); see also Pindar v. Comm. Of Cambridge, 821 F. Supp. 376 (D.
Md. 1993); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696 (1990); Amy Eppler, Note, Battered Women & the Equal Protection Clause, 95 Yale L.
J. 788 (1986).

n129. See, e.g., Del. Stat. 11 Del. C. 775 (1996) (exempting social companions from first degree rape unless the rape was accompanied by an
additional serious injury); Del. Code 774 (1996) (exempting social companions from second degree rape unless the rape was accompanied by an
additional injury). On the equal protection question, see 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 45 & n. 50 (citing R. West, Marital Rape and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 45 (1990) (The majority [of States] continue to permit rape or sexual assault within marriage by according it a
lower level of criminality than extramarital rape .... by criminalizing only certain kinds of marital rape, or by criminalizing only first-degree rape.")
(citing statutes, id. at 46 n. 6) Moreover, some States have made this situation worse by extending special marital rape rules to "cohabitants
and formerly married persons." Id. at 48 n. 11 (citing cases)).

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Although, by its terms, the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to actions perpetrated by States, section 5 permits Congress to enforce the
amendment by creating appropriate private remedies. n130 Traditionally, one way that Congress has provided such relief is by creating a
supplementary federal remedy, a day in court outside the state system, one controlled by a private citizen rather than the offending State.
n131 Indeed, since Congress may not overrule state statutes or force States to make policy, n132 it seems difficult to see how they could pass
any civil rights remedy that did not proceed by some kind of indirection. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court itself has acknowledged Congress'
power to reach private discriminatory conduct as long as there is a showing of discriminatory motivation, a clear requirement under VAWA's civil
rights remedy. n133

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n130. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423, 424 n. 8 (1973) (that "the Fourteenth
Amendment itself erects no shield against merely private conduct ... is not to say that Congress may not proscribe purely private conduct under
sec. 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."); 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 53 n. 80.

n131. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 1983; 42 U.S.C. 1985(3).

n132. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).

n133. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100 (1971).

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Finally, in assessing the constitutionality of Title III, Congress noted that it was creating a new substantive federal right of action [*25] under
Title III. Many other civil rights statutes provide vehicles by which private parties may pursue federal remedies, but these statutes create no
substantive right other than the rights already created in the constitution or other federal laws. n134 Not surprisingly, some plaintiffs who
operate under these statutes must find a constitutional right to assert that operates against private parties. n135 By contrast, under VAWA's
remedy, there is no requirement that the plaintiff prove an independent violation of the constitution. All he or she must prove is the deprivation
of the substantive right provided by VAWA - the right to be free from gender-based violence.

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n134. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 1983; 42 U.S.C. sec. 1985(3).

n135. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 1985(3); see Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993) (discussing this aspect of section
1985(3)).

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D. Final Action in the 102nd Congress

On July 18, 1991, a modified version of S. 15 was offered by Senator Biden at a Judiciary Committee executive committee meeting. The 1991
VAWA, as approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee, was very similar to the bill as introduced but made two changes to the civil rights
remedy. Responding to suggestions made at the April 9, 1991 hearing, Senator Biden added a number of "findings" relating to the constitutional
basis for the remedy. n136 In addition, the Title III remedy was amended to delete references to particular sexual crimes in the definition of
"gender-motivated." n137 In other words, the presumption that sexual crimes were gender-motivated was deleted from the bill. S. 15, as
reported by the Judiciary Committee, was received on the floor of the Senate but moved no further that year. n138

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n136. In these "findings," Congress determines that "existing bias ... in the criminal justice system often deprives victims of gender-motivated
crimes of equal protection of the laws" and that the civil rights action in the bill is "necessary to guarantee equal protection of the laws." S. 15,
sec. 301(a), (findings 4, 7 & 8). Other findings focused on the "substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce" and the need to reduce
those effects. Id. (findings 5, 6 & 7). These findings appear in 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 27-28 and appear in S. 11, introduced in the next Congress.

n137. As introduced, S. 15 appeared to define certain sex offenses as gender-motivated. The bill approved by the Judiciary Committee in 1991
removed those references leaving the "crime of violence motivated by gender" to be defined by the terms of Title VII's more-inclusive language,
"because of .. or on the basis of gender." S. 15, sec. 301(d)(1), reprinted in 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 28.

n138. On September 25, 1992, Senator Dole introduced the Sexual Assault Prevention Act of 1992, a bill introduced in the House by Reps. Kyl
and Molinari. See 138 Cong. Rec. S15160. Neither bill received further consideration in the 102nd Congress.

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Meanwhile, in the House, concerted efforts were being made by its principal sponsor, then-Representative Boxer, to gain the attention of
members of the House Judiciary Committee. After the hearing on February 6, Representative Schumer moved the bill steadily upward on his
subcommittee's agenda. On September 22, 1992, the bill was marked up and reported out of the Subcommittee on Crime and [*26] Criminal
Justice. As expected, however, the bill was reported out with a variety of controversial amendments. Despite the concerted efforts of Reps.
Schroeder, Slaughter, and Morella, the resulting subcommittee bill languished in the full Committee. Chairman Brooks continued to voice
concerns about the judicial impact of the legislation and Rep. Edwards quietly opposed its civil rights remedy. No further action, however, was
taken on the bill in either the House or the Senate during the 102nd Congress.

Part Four - Final Changes: the "Animus" Requirement

On the first day of the legislative session of the 103rd Congress, January 21, 1993, Senators Biden and Boxer reintroduced VAWA as S. 11. n139
Senator Hatch was now ranking minority member of the Judiciary Committee and, on the first day of the session, he also introduced legislation,
S.6, addressing sexual violence, child abuse and victims' rights. n140 The Hatch bill expanded upon the provisions of S. 6, Senator Dole's Sexual
Assault Violence Prevention Act, which addressed related issues. n141 In the House, Rep. Pat Schroeder, along with Reps. Slaughter, Schumer,
and Morella, introduced a companion bill to the Biden-Boxer Senate bill, H.R. 1133. Other bills on related topics were also introduced in the
House, some of which included provisions paralleled in the Hatch bill. n142

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n139. Since the 102nd Congress, the Judiciary Committee's composition had changed. Its two newest members - Senator Dianne Feinstein and
Senator Carol Moseley-Braun - were the first women to sit on that committee. Both became strong VAWA supporters.

n140. There were significant similarities between the Hatch bill, S. 8, and earlier bills introduced by Senator Dole. See S. 472, 101st Congress (a
section-by-section analysis of S. 472 appears in 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 415-442).

n141. See 139 Cong. Rec. S269 (1993).

n142. The Sexual Assault Prevention Act was introduced by Rep. Molinari in the House as a companion to Senator Dole's bill. See 139 Cong. Rec.
S288 (1993). Other related bills, later incorporated into the House VAWA, included H. Concurrent Res. 20 (urging state courts to consider
testimony relating to battered women) (introduced by Rep. Morella) and The National Domestic Violence Hotline Act, H.R. 522 (introduced by
Rep. Morella).

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A. The 1993 House VAWA

The 1993 House VAWA was quite similar in structure to the Senate bill, including provisions corresponding to each of S. 11's major titles. The
House bill, however, differed in certain respects from the Senate bill. Most importantly, for our purposes here, Title III's substantive right was
defined differently than in the Senate bill: like the original VAWA, the House bill retained a presumption that all sex-related crimes were
gender-based. n143 Several procedural limitations [*27] were also included in H.R. 1133's civil rights remedy that would later be incorporated,
in different form, in the Senate bill. n144

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n143. H.R. 1133 defined a "crime of violence motivated by the victim's gender" as a "crime of violence that is rape ... sexual assault, sexual
abuse, or abusive sexual contact" or "any other crime of violence" committed "because of the gender, or on the basis of gender," of the victim.
H.R. 1133, sec. 301(e).

n144. H.R. 1133, sec. 301(d)(3) (clarifying no federal jurisdiction over divorce, alimony or child custody); sec. 301(f) (limiting removal of actions
to federal courts).

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B. The Senate Judiciary Committee Compromise

In April of 1993, Senator Hatch held a field hearing on domestic violence in Salt Lake City, Utah. Shortly thereafter, in May of 1993, Senators
Biden and Hatch agreed to negotiate a mutually acceptable bill. By this time, VAWA had garnered substantial support within the Senate and the
House, but there remained a significant risk that the bill would be stalled if brought to the Senate floor for debate. Supporters feared that VAWA
would become a vehicle for unrelated, and extremely controversial, crime amendments such as the federal death penalty, habeas corpus reform,
or gun control legislation. n145 In the hopes that bipartisan support would prevent hostile floor amendments, Senators Biden and Hatch agreed
to draft a new VAWA based on the original Biden bill but incorporating several provisions from the Hatch bill, S. 8.

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n145. Senate rules authorize unlimited amendment of pending legislation without regard to the germaneness of the subject matter. References
to such "hot-button" issues as the Miranda exclusionary rule and the death penalty during VAWA hearings or in VAWA committee reports reflect
members' understanding that VAWA could be held hostage to other issues. See, e.g., 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 71 (additional views of Sen. Hatch
discussing Miranda rules as deterring punishment of violence against women); see 1991 S. Hearing 369 at 83 (Sen. Thurmond questioning
witnesses on the death penalty). In the event such measures were added to S. 15 during floor consideration, the bill would have spawned a
filibuster and died during floor debate.

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With one significant exception, the amendments to Title III made by the Senate Judiciary Committee as a result of the Biden/Hatch compromise
were the last significant changes made to the civil rights remedy before it became law in 1994. No substantive changes were made to this
provision when it was adopted by the Senate in November of 1993 or during Conference Committee consideration in the summer of 1994. n146

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n146. The only change of note made after this date was to move Title III's "findings" from the text of the statute to the conference committee
report and to include, in the statute, a summary of the constitutional bases for the remedy. See infra text accompanying note 191 (explaining
this change).

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i. Procedural Changes. First, the Committee version of Title III clarified several procedural and jurisdictional issues raised by federal and state
judges. The concurrent jurisdiction of federal and state courts was specifically set forth in the statute's text. n147 At the same time, removal
jurisdiction was limited: no actions would be removable from state court to federal court on the basis of section 301. n148 Fi- [*28] nally, in
response to concerns that the federal courts would be embroiled in domestic relations suits, the statute now barred the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction over state law claims "seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody
decree." n149 These procedural changes incorporated provisions that were very similar, although not identical, to those that had been included
in H.R. 1133. n150

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n147. S. 11, sec. 301(e)(3), reprinted in 1990 S. Rep. 138 at 30.

n148. Id. sec. 301(e)(5).

n149. Id. sec. 301(e)(4).

n150. H.R. 1133, sec. 301(d)(3) (jurisdictional limitation); sec. 301(f)(removal limitation).

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ii. Crime of Violence. Second, the Committee substitute narrowed the kinds of violent acts that would give rise to a cause of action. New
language was added limiting VAWA civil rights claims to those violent acts serious enough to warrant classification as felonies. n151 Since 1990,
the civil rights remedy had referred to 18 U.S.C. sec. 16(a); that section covers acts that may be charged either as misdemeanors or felonies.
New VAWA language inserted at this time clarified that the acts covered by Title III had to rise to the level of a felony and that the felony had
to include a risk of personal injury. The "act or series of acts" covered by the legislation "would constitute a felony against the person or ...
would constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another ..." n152

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n151. S. 11, sec. 301(d)(2)(A), reprinted in 1993 S. Rep. 138 at 30. A felony is generally defined as an offense that carries a potential sentence
of one year or more. The committee report reiterates this requirement but does not indicate how the assessment of "felony" status should be
undertaken. 1993 S. Rep. 138 at 64.

n152. S. 11, sec. 301(d)(2)(A), reprinted in 1993 S. Rep. 138 at 30.

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This change created other potential interpretive problems, however. Drafting the statute so that section 301 would be limited to felonies alone
would bar a remedy in many cases the act was intended to cover - cases in which state and local laws effectively "downgraded" a crime (to a
misdemeanor) because of the relationship of the parties. To make clear their intention that state and local applications of the term "felony"
would not govern Title III, the compromise drafters added language explicitly stating that the "acts" giving rise to the cause of action must be
considered separate and apart from the relationship of the victim and perpetrator. n153 In other words, whether the "act" is sufficiently severe
to give rise to a VAWA civil rights claim is determined by federal law (section 16 of title 18) and, as a federal matter, should be determined
without regard to whether the incident was one [*29] of "domestic violence" or the nature of the parties' relationship at the time of the
incident. n154

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n153. S. 11, sec. 301(d)(2)(B) (the "term "crime of violence' includes" an "act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described in
subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the person who takes such action and the individual against whom such action is taken.")
(emphasis added).

n154. The plain text of this provision makes clear that the statute covers domestic violence cases. At various points in the legislative history,
Senator Biden responded to the argument that the bill would bring every domestic relations case into the federal courts by emphasizing that the
bill's text would not cover "all" or "everyday" or "random" domestic violence. See, e.g., 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 48. This should not be taken as a
statement that Congress intended to create a blanket "domestic violence" exclusion. Title III covers no case simply because the attacker is a
man and the victim a woman or vice-versa; there must be proof of gender-motivation. A judicial interpretation that Title III barred cases
involving domestic violence would violate the plain meaning of the statute, recreate the very disparities the bill was intended to discredit, and
raise serious equal protection issues.

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iii. Gender-Motivation. The third Committee amendment to Title III was intended to clarify the meaning of the statutory term, "motivated by
gender." As drafted in S. 11 and S. 15, "gender-motivation" had been defined in terms borrowed from Title VII law - "because of or on the basis
of gender." Committee Reports specifically indicated that courts should look to judicial interpretations of these terms in employment
discrimination and sexual harassment suits. n155 Nevertheless, questions continued to be raised. Attempting to address this problem, Senators
Biden and Hatch agreed upon language that would both clarify the kind of proof required and address arguments that "every crime against a
woman" would now be a "civil rights violation." n156 The new language required that the acts be "committed because of gender or on the basis
of gender," but added that the acts must be "due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender." n157

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n155. 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 51 (Title VII "caselaw will provide substantial guidance to the trier of fact in assessing whether the requisite
discrimination was present." (citing cases)).

n156. See infra note 164 (discussing Bush Justice Department position).

n157. S. 11, sec. 301(d)(1), reprinted in 1993 S. Rep. 138 at 30.

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This new language reflected an intermediate position between those previously advocated. At one end of the spectrum was a "malice" or
"animosity" standard. n158 Such a standard could have required proof that the defendant, in effect, hated all members of the opposite sex or
consciously intended to use violence as a message of gender hatred. Such a showing would, in effect, place burdens on VAWA litigants not
shared by other plaintiffs seeking "civil rights" or "hate crime" protection. For example, under Title VII, one need not show that a defendant
harbored malice toward all women to show that the defendant sexually harassed a particular woman. n159 Similarly, a cause of action under
section 1985(3) does not require a showing of "malicious" as opposed to "benign" discrimination. n160 Finally, even so- [*30] called "hate
crimes" laws do not require a showing of hatred of all members of the victim class. n161

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n158. The term "animosity" was raised as a possible amendment in 1990 and 1993. See discussion infra note 175.

n159. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).

n160. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269 (1993) ("We do not think that the animus requirement [under section
1985(3)] can be met only by maliciously motivated ... discrimination against women.").

n161. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). For example, it is no defense in a cross-burning case for the defendant to claim that he
had African-American friends and therefore did not intend to victimize the particular African-Americans targeted with the cross.

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On the other side of the spectrum was a "disparate impact" standard. n162 Under that standard, statistical evidence demonstrating the
disparate impact of a particular kind of violence would have been sufficient to make out a cause of action without regard to the particular
motivation or purpose of the defendant. Proof would have been complete, for example, when a plaintiff offered statistics to show that a
particular violent act disproportionately affected either men or women. n163 This kind of standard appears to have been the basis for
allegations that the bill would include all crimes against women or all crimes that disproportionately affected women. n164 As the Committee
Reports emphasized, however, Title III had always required a motivational component, and that component was inconsistent with a statistical
impact standard. n165

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n162. The Committee reports had consistently referred to Title VII law without distinguishing claims brought on a disparate impact theory. See,
e.g., 1993 S. Rep. 138 at 52-53.

n163. Although most of the examples used in the legislative history refer to women, the statute itself is gender-neutral and thus applies both to
men and women. This tends to highlight the inappropriateness of a theory based on "impact" alone. It is unlikely that the drafters sought to
create a cause of action for male victims based on the theory that a greater number of men than women are hurt in barroom brawls. A
disparate impact standard applied this way would undercut the drafters' purpose to focus on violence as a means of enforcing social inferiority.

n164. For example, consider the arguments of the Bush Justice Department, opposing Title III. In a letter to Chairman Biden at 14, (on file with
the Senate Judiciary Committee)(April 9, 1991) they urged that "whenever a woman is a victim of any crime a case can be made that the
criminal preyed on her thinking she would be an easier target than a man." (emphasis in original). If this example were accurate, Title III would
require the introduction of statistical evidence to show a disparate "impact." The argument would be that since statistics can show that women
tend to be of smaller stature, crimes affecting women "because of stature" are crimes that have a disproportionate impact based on gender.
That interpretation, however, is inconsistent with the statute's "gender-motivation" requirement. Although conduct may be sufficient to show
"gender-motivation," see infra notes 167-170 (discussing inference of "purpose" from conduct), statistical impact is not alone sufficient.

n165. 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 49 ("discriminatory motivation is clearly required"); 1993 S. Rep. 138 at 50-52.

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Marking the middle ground between malice and impact was not easy; ultimately drafters chose the term "animus" in its original sense as
"purpose" or "an animating force." n166 Animus, like motivation, fo- [*31] cuses on the defendant's choice to commit certain acts. It excludes
an interpretation of the term "because of gender" based on "impact" alone but does not rule out an inference of purpose from conduct or
effects. n167 Consciousness of bias is not required: a plaintiff states a claim under Title III if he or she can show that the crime or victim was
purposefully chosen because of "the victim's gender." n168 That includes acts used to enforce, by violence, stereotypical gender-roles, to
punish the victim for the exercise of rights guaranteed to all citizens, or to use forced sex as a weapon of intimidation or degradation. n169
Proof may be established by the conduct itself, patterns of prior conduct, statements made at the time of the conduct, or other factors bearing
on the reasons for the attack. n170

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n166. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100 (1971) (section 1985(3) is limited to "any violation of the right, the animus and effect of
which is to strike down the citizen")(quoting Rep. Shellabarger); Webster's Third New International Dictionary provides several definitions of the
term "animus": 1a: "intention, objective" (the - is not to overlook the progress made); b: "effort or tendency as directed toward a definite,
often inevitable, but not always clearly or consciously recognized end (the - of war is to enforce uniformity); c: "pervading and characteristic
approach or treatment ... dominant tone;" 2: "live-giving spirit...;" and 3: "ill will, antagonism..." p. 86 (1986).

n167. For example, attacks that focus on the "unique features" of gender may show that the reasons for the attack are in fact gender-based.
Compare Bray, supra, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993)(attacks against Yarmulkes are attacks likely to be motivated by bias against Jews). The
Committee Report makes clear that an inference of purpose may be made from the conduct itself. See 1993 S. Rep. 138 at 51 (describing an
example in which an attacker segregated the women and then shot only the women and stating that this conduct "might be evidence enough of
gender-based motivation").

n168. In this sense, VAWA does not require a conscious "intent to discriminate." Indeed, the term "animus" suggests just the opposite, covering
efforts directed toward a definite "but not always clearly or consciously recognized" end [emphasis added]. Webster's Third New International
Dictionary (definition of "animus," 1b). See supra note 166. For example, the defendant who threatens his wife with a beating if she tries to get
a job may not be acting with a consciousness that his act is one of bias, but the "animus" or "purpose" of this conduct is to prevent the
exercise of rights guaranteed to women. Similarly, the defendant who beats his wife "because she burned the toast" may not be conscious of
bias but acts in a way that only makes sense in a world of biased norms - in a world where women must meet the stereotypical ideal of a
perfect homemaker. Private violence, in such a case, is used to enforce a world view about the social roles of women that the law may not
enforce.

n169. Each of these kinds of claims has "bias-analogues" in existing civil rights laws: acts used to enforce, by violence, "racial" inferiority or
subordination (42 U.S.C. 1985(3), 18 U.S.C. 241, 245); violence used to deprive individuals of federal rights "because of" race or national origin
(18 U.S.C. 245); sexual intimidation or harassment in the workplace (Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e).

n170. See 1993 S. Rep. 138 at 52 (indicating that proof depends upon a "totality" of the circumstances). The Committee Reports cite "generally
accepted guidelines for identifying hate crimes" as "useful" in assessing whether the circumstances show gender motivation, including "language
used by the perpetrator; the severity of the attack (including mutilation); the lack of provocation; previous history of similar incidents; absence
of any other apparent motive (battery without robbery, for example); and common sense." Id. at n. 61.

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In its discussion of the term "animus," the Committee Report makes clear that something more than impact is required but does not describe
that "something more" in terms of malice or hatred. The report refers to gender-based "purpose," or "specific intent" to injure based on gender
and specifically includes actions "targeting" victims based on gender: [*32]

This new language [referring to term "animus"] elucidates the committee's intent that a victim alleging a violation under this section must have
been targeted on the basis of his or her gender. The defendant must have had a specific intent or purpose, based on the victim's gender, to
injure the victim. n171

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n171. Id. at 64.

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There is nothing in this language suggesting that when they adopted the term "animus," Senators Biden and Hatch meant to require animosity or
hatred, a standard higher than that required under any comparable civil rights law. n172 However, judges are likely to be faced with this
question because modern usage tends to conflate the terms "animus" and "animosity." n173 The better interpretation is that the statute does
not require the "extreme hostility" suggested by the term "animosity." The plain text is inconsistent with such a reading: the term "an" animus is
consistent with the idea of "a purpose," but fits poorly with the idea of "an animosity" or "a hatred." n174 Moreover, the Committee reports'
discussion of the meaning of animus does not refer to hatred or animosity. Finally, if there remain doubts, judges should consider the fact that
the term "animosity" was specifically suggested to House and Senate drafters at various points, but was never adopted in any of the many
VAWA drafts. n175

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n172. Indeed, the Committee considered, and rejected, similar language ("overwhelmingly motivated by gender") on the grounds that it created
too high a standard. 1991 S. Rep. 197 at 62 ("the term "overwhelmingly' has been omitted as unnecessarily restrictive"). Presumably, an
"overwhelmingly motivated" standard would have been less restrictive than one based on "malice" or "hatred" since the latter implies universal
ill-will, rather than a predominantly biased, motivation.

n173. The term "animosity" is typically defined in dictionaries as "ill will or resentment tending toward hostile action: smoldering enmity."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (definition of "animosity"). In connection with this, it should be noted, that even before the animus
language was added to the bill, sponsors often used examples of a crime "motivated by hate" to counter the idea that plaintiffs could establish a
cause of action "by saying that, I am a woman; I have a bruise; ergo, I have a civil rights claim." 1992 H. Hearing 42 at 10 (statement of Sen.
Biden); see also id. at 25 (using an example "to overstate the case" in which a husband battered his wife "saying "I hate all women; any woman
that gets in my way, I'm going to move out of my way.'") (statement of Sen. Biden). Of course, "hate crimes laws" do not require proof that the
defendant hated all members of the victim class.

n174. The new language specifically states "due, at least in part to an animus," indicating that the presence of other purposes - e.g. to gain
money or other gratification - does not eliminate potential for VAWA relief.

n175. For example, Senator Dole suggested an "animosity" standard as early as 1991, and filed it as an amendment to the then-pending crime
bill. Dole Amendment No. 559 to S. 1241, 137 Cong. Rec. S9400 (July 9, 1991) (proposing a damage remedy for crimes of violence "committed
because of animosity or bias based on gender"). This suggestion was also raised in 1993 by a judge who provided technical advice to the House
and Senate. See, e.g., Memorandum to Rep. Pat Schroeder (proposing as a vehicle for discussion, but not endorsing, addition of Title III
language "due to animosity to the gender as a class") (on file with the Senate Judiciary Committee) (Jan. 13, 1993).

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The term "animus" has arisen in a variety of contexts in civil rights laws but is frequently associated with 42 U.S.C. sec. 1985(3). Section
1985(3) case law indicates that "animus" in fact is synonymous with "purpose." n176 To this extent, Title III is consistent with, and should be
read in harmony with, section 1985(3) precedent. At the same time, there are important differences in the causes of action: to say that both
causes of action require a "purpose" does not say what that "purpose" must be. In the case of 1985(3), the purpose must be to deprive a
person of "equal" rights; in VAWA, the purpose must be "based on the victim's gender." Section 1985(3)'s reference to "equality" has caused the
Supreme Court to read the statute narrowly and to require that the plaintiff show an "invidiously discriminating," "class-based" animus or
purpose. n177 By contrast, there is no textual language in VAWA, nor are there references in any of the many Committee reports, to the terms
"invidious" or "class-based animus." n178

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n176. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100 (1971) (section 1985(3) is limited to "any violation of the right, the animus and effect of which is
to strike down the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights.'")(quoting Rep. Shellabarger); Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (the animus requirement under 1985(3) "does demand ... at least a purpose that focuses upon women by reason of
their sex").

n177. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268.

n178. See, e.g., 1993 S. Rep. 138 at 64 (section-by-section analysis). Indeed, even after the term "animus" was included, the Committee
Reports continue to refer to Title VII case law as the appropriate reference-point for assessing "discrimination" under Title III. Id. at 53.

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Finally, it is worth noting that the term "animus" was included in VAWA's earliest 1990 Senate draft, S. 2754. There is nothing to indicate that,
at that time, the drafters, or even the remedy's critics, believed that the term "animus" meant hatred or animosity. Indeed, had the bill been
universally interpreted as requiring "animosity" in 1990, it is difficult to see how it could have been "opposed" on the basis that it covered
"every" crime against a woman. Nor is it clear why those who were critics of the remedy, such as Senator Dole, would have suggested that the
bill be amended with the term "animosity," if the bill's original reference to "animus" meant just that. n179

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n179. See the 1991 Dole amendment, cited supra note 175.

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Part Five - Final Passage in the Senate and the House

On November 1, 1993, Senator Biden introduced S. 1607, an omnibus crime measure. Before the Senate could move to the bill, however, several
Senators lodged objections. n180 The dispute centered around the funds available to support the bill's authorization levels for new prisons,
police, and other matters. To resolve this dispute, Senator Byrd, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, proposed that the bill be
funded by a "trust fund" created by the savings accrued by reductions in the federal workforce. On November 4, [*34] 1994, Senator Biden,
Senator Byrd, Senator Hatch and Senator Gramm agreed to apportion these funds to various crime programs; at Senator Biden's request, VAWA
was added to this list and Senator Hatch agreed. When Democratic and Republican leaders reached this compromise, the text of the Violence
Against Women Act, in slightly modified form, n181 was added as a part of the Byrd amendment and passed by a vote of 94 to 4. n182

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n180. 139 Cong. Rec. S14903 (Nov. 3, 1993).

n181. At the insistence of Senator Dole, a substantially different HIV-testing provision was added to the bill before passage; this provision
authorized testing of rape defendants for HIV antibodies at the request of the victim and pursuant to court order. See P.L. 102-322, Title IV,
sec. 40503 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 14011).

n182. 139 Cong. Rec. D1247 (Nov. 4, 1993); 139 Cong. Rec. S15019 at 15030-70. On November 19, 1993, the Senate passed S. 1607, including
VAWA. The House had, by this time, already passed a crime bill, H.R. 3355, and sent that bill to the Senate. Upon passage of S. 1607, the
Senate received H.R. 3355, amended it by striking all of its language, inserted the text of S. 1607, and requested a conference with the House.
139 Cong. Rec. S16288 (Nov. 19, 1993). The text of the bill as transmitted to the House appears at 139 Cong. Rec. S17095 (Nov. 24, 1993).

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A. House Committee Consideration of H.R. 1133

Three days before the Senate finally passed its version of VAWA, on November 16, 1993, the House Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice
met to consider H.R. 1133, VAWA's House counterpart. The subcommittee's Chairman, Representative Schumer, offered a substitute which
omitted important provisions in the bill, including its civil rights title. Schumer offered the substitute without Title III to avoid potential
opposition by the Subcommittee on the Constitution, and its Chairman, Rep. Edwards. Also controversial, and ultimately deleted, from the
subcommittee's bill were VAWA's judicial education provisions and its evidentiary rules, matters opposed by some House members as
impermissibly interfering with judicial prerogative. To allow the bill to move to the full Committee, Rep. Schumer decided to assent to this
substitute, hoping that these provisions might be reattached at the full Committee level. Representatives Schroeder, Schumer and others vowed
to try to put the bill together when it reached the full Judiciary Committee.

That same day, on November 16, 1993, Rep. Edwards held a hearing in the subcommittee on civil and constitutional rights in Title III. n183 At
that hearing, testimony was presented by supporters and critics of the bill. In the course of this testimony, critics suggested that the bill's civil
rights provision remained too vague, despite the various amendments that had been made over the course of the bill's consideration, including
the additions made in the Senate Committee substitute. n184 Advocates argued that the bill's provisions were no vaguer than existing civil
rights remedies and that amendments in the Senate [*35] had resulted in the withdrawal of organized opposition by the federal judiciary. n185

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n183. 1993 H. Hearing 51.

n184. Id. at 17-25 (testimony of Elizabeth Symonds, ACLU Legislative Director).

n185. Id. at 2-16 (testimony of Sally Goldfarb, senior staff attorney, NOW Legal Defense & Educ. Fund).

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On November 17, 1993, the full House Judiciary Committee sat to consider VAWA for the first time. The Committee had before it the Schumer
subcommittee substitute for H.R. 1133. Representative Schroeder moved to amend the bill to add Title III. When it became clear that there
were insufficient votes to add the civil rights provision, Schroeder withdrew the amendment, expressed her disappointment, and vowed to take
the issue to the House floor. Ultimately, H.R. 1133 was reported by the House Judiciary Committee favorably, but without its most controversial
provisions.

B. House Passage of the Violence Against Women Act

On Saturday, Nov. 20, 1993, Rep. Brooks, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, moved to suspend the rules and seek passage of H.R. 1133, as
amended in committee. With its controversial provisions deleted, the House passed VAWA by a lopsided vote of 421-0. n186 The bill was
subsequently sent to the Senate and referred to the Judiciary Committee, where it died in Committee. Five months later, the House again
turned its attention to VAWA as part of an omnibus crime measure, H.R. 4092. The provisions of VAWA included in H.R. 4092 were similar to
those passed by the House in 1993. n187 On April 19, 1994, the House passed H.R. 4092, took up H.R. 3355 (a new version of an omnibus crime
bill), as it had been amended by the Senate, and substituted the provisions of H.R. 4092. n188 The new bill was returned to the Senate, with a
request for a conference. n189

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n186. The bill only reaches a "suspense" calendar if it is noncontroversial. See 139 Cong. Rec. 10404 (Nov. 20, 1993).

n187. The text of H.R. 4092 debated by the House appears at 19 Cong. Rec. H2260; VAWA provisions begin at H2290 (April 14, 1994).

n188. This procedure is laid out in the rule (H. Res. 401) for H.R. 4092, see 140 Cong. Rec. H2233 (April 13, 1994).

n189. The text of H.R. 4092, as passed, appears at 140 Cong. Rec. H2645 (April 25, 1994).

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C. The Conference Committee

In the summer of 1994, conferees met to address the House and Senate versions of H.R. 3355, an omnibus crime measure that now included
VAWA. n190 The principal difference in the House and Senate VAWAs was the civil rights remedy. Before the conference, Senator Biden and
Representative Schroeder indicated that the civil rights remedy would be a priority consideration. At the conference, both Senator Biden and
Senator Hatch expressed their support for the bill [*36] as a whole, including Title III. Concerns were raised by House conferees, however,
that the remedy was unnecessary and would undercut existing civil rights laws. Reps. Schroeder and Schumer, who had sponsored H.R. 1133,
disagreed. Ultimately, the conference voted to include the Senate version of Title III.

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n190. The Senate had amended H.R. 3355 by adding S. 1607, which included VAWA. The House had amended that amendment by inserting H.R.
4092, which included a different version of VAWA (excluding the civil rights remedy).

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The civil rights remedy agreed to by the Conference Committee was in all respects but one the remedy passed by the Senate. The one
difference of significance involved the "congressional findings" that had been passed in the Senate bill. Those findings were moved by the
conferees from the statutory language itself to the Conference Report, where they are repeated with minor modifications. In place of the
findings, the conferees added a new "purpose" section to the civil rights remedy, clarifying that the Congress was acting under both the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. n191 According to Senate staff who worked on the bill, this transfer of findings from
statutory text to conference report was not intended to make a substantive change in Congress' judgments of constitutionality but to
accommodate the objections of House staff who argued that the U.S. Code should be not littered with "congressional findings" that had no
force of law. n192 As a result, a number of findings - not simply those relating to the civil rights remedy or VAWA - were transferred from the
text of H.R. 3355 to the legislative history. n193

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n191. The new "purpose" section provides as follows: "Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this subtitle under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose of this subtitle to
protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting interstate
commerce ...." Title IV, Subtitle C, sec. 40302(a), reprinted in 1994 Conf. Rep. 711 at 151.

n192. Interview with Demetra Lambros, Minority General Counsel, Senate Judiciary Committee (June 24, 1995).

n193. See, e.g., 1994 Conf. Rep. 711 at 383 (findings re: national domestic violence hotline); id. at 386 (findings re: sense of senate resolution
concerning the protection of privacy for rape victims' names); id. at 390 (findings re: youth handgun safety).

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On August 21, 1994, the House passed the Conference Report by a vote of 235-195. The next day, the Senate began consideration of the
Conference Report and three days later agreed to it by a vote of 61-38. On September 13, 1994, VAWA was signed into law by President
Clinton as Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.