Membership Models

jimlindsay@jerel.com (Jim Lindsay)

At 06:42 PM 1/19/99 -0500, Wendy Seltzer wrote:
>The Berkman study group has assembled a chart at
>http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/models.html of some sample membership
>models for ICANN.  We describe three models representing points along a
>spectrum -- open, individual, and organizational membership -- and set them
>out as strawmen for criticism and suggestion.  Thank you in advance for
>your comments.
>
>To summarize the models:
>
>OPEN: Membership is tied only to an email address, with no further
>restrictions. Individuals and organizations can become members on equal
>footing. All have the opportunity to vote for directors, propose policy,
>and ratify changes to ICANN's structure. This model's simplicity makes its
>operation transparent. It also imposes minimal administrative burdens on
>ICANN, as it does not require registration or verification. 
>
>The model does not give ICANN regular contact with its members or a listing
>of members. They are known only through their participation in elections.
>There is no attempt to limit multiple voting through the creation of
>multiple email addresses. 
>
>
>INDIVIDUAL: The rights of Internet users are this model's first principle.
>ICANN's decisions, though technical at the basic level of domain name and
>IP allocations, will strongly affect the individual users of the Internet
>and need to be openly accountable to a wide, active, and diverse set of
>members. Membership in this model is conceived as a fundamental, worldwide
>right and individuals make up the primary membership class. 
>
>Anti-fraud measures include a prohibition against multiple registrations by
>one individual, with identifiers of name, phone number, address and email.
>Individual members have the power to vote for at-large board members
>(corporations and NGOs do not vote). Individuals vote to ratify changes to
>articles, receive regular information on ICANN activities, and may propose
>policy. 
>
>
>ORGANIZATIONAL: This membership model seeks to recognize the significance
>of, and accord proper weight to, the interests of corporations,
>associations, non-profit advocacy and membership groups, and
>non-governmental organizations. Rather than simply relegate these entities
>to indirect membership in ICANN through the SOs or through their individual
>employees, this model places them inside the membership structure on an
>even plane with individuals. 
>
>This membership model rejects the notion that ICANN should somehow be based
>on democratic representation. ICANN is not a governance institution, but a
>narrowly focused technical body charged with certain policymaking and
>coordination tasks. This model is premised on the view that if ICANN is
>invested with a worldwide democratic electorate, it will be treated by
>realspace governments and others as a legitimately elected government of
>cyberspace. 

Some sort of mixed model seems likely to be appropriate in this case.  There
could be two governing bodies, one elected via the OPEN or INDIVIDUAL model
and one elected via the ORGANIZATION model.  They would have to come to
consensus to approve decisions -- rather like the House and Senate.

Or, there could be one body, with some percentage of the seats
organizational, and some percentage based on individual voters.

As to the OPEN v.s. INDIVIDUAL modeals: I think people are overly concerned
about fraud.  One vote per email address would be *much* simpler to
administrate, and would be good enough.  If some people vote 2, or even 10
times, out of a million votes, it will be statistically insignificant.  I
don't feel *that* strongly about this particular issue, that is just my two
bits.

-- Jim Lindsay
   Chief Technical Advisor, Advisory Cmte
   Center for Voting and Democracy, Washington, DC
   jimlindsay@jerel.com

Sotiropoulos

Now you're talking politics!  Of course political parties will form, in fact they
are an unavoidable fact of human society.  In ancient Athens political affiliations
were a citizen's calling card.  The question of what types of political parties
will form is easy... "birds of a feather will flock together", it goes without
saying.  Picture a scenario where you have the People for Porn Party allied with
the Pride Is Your Right Association battling it out with the Moral Majority Front,
all three of them being in turn supported and undermined by groups ranging from the
Corporate Coalition to the Friends of the Environment.  All kidding aside, this is
what a healthy democratic process is all about.  Better such a schema than
something akin to the structure of the International Olympic Committee...

Esther Dyson wrote:

> This issue of a flat individual membership raises an interesting
> sociological question:
>
> Should we assume political parties will form?  Surely there are some
> historical experts/research about how people group into coalitions when
> someone doesn't come along and predefine classes or interest groups or
> whatever.  WHat kinds of voting systems produce what kinds of parties?  Are
> two parties better? Or eighteen?  Hope someone talks about this this weekend.
>
> What kind of parties are likely? geographical? commercial vs. noncommercial?
> Will they follow the splits we see in these discussions? Are these groups in
> fact the parties of the future? Is that good or bad?  (guess I hit my limit
> of 3. Good night!)
>
> Esther
>
> At 08:43 PM 20/01/99 -0500, Michael Sondow wrote:
> >George Conrades a écrit:
> >>
> >> Michael, don't be so hard on presuming anyone's bias.
> >
> >Sorry. I didn't mean to accuse anyone of bias, only to suggest that the
> >differences between the models be described in a more rigorous way. As you
> >say, a lot more work needs to be done to refine them.
> >
> >> Please pick the one you prefer and
> >> give us your ideas how to make it better.
> >
> >I'm having trouble deciding. After reading very recently all the refined and
> >detailed membership proposals for the DNSO, it's actually rather difficult
> >to choose any one of the three models proposed for ICANN. They all seem too
> >rigid, too exclusive. But I'll do what you suggest.
> >
> >> Revealing my personal
> >> preference,at this point, is the "individual" model, which, I agree, needs
> >> work.
> >
> >I have always liked an individual model a la Karl Auerbach, but it needs to
> >be very carefully detailed and restricted in its functioning in order to
> >make it workable, otherwise the membership is going to become silent and
> >just accessory. The nice thing about classes or constituencies is that they
> >can elect representatives, who in turn form smaller and more utilitarian
> >bodies within the membership. A dispersed membership of individuals might
> >not be able to form any really useful deliberative bodies. And how will they
> >vote or choose Board members? You might get elections between hundreds or
> >thousands of nominees, with the winner getting only a small fraction of the
> >vote and just as small a fraction of support.
> >
> >And then there are the myriad and so-far unsolved problems of
> >identification, vote-taking, dues-collection, et cetera...
> >
> >Which isn't to say that all this can't be worked out. But it hasn't been
> >and, until it is, individual membership will remain an ideal but not a
> >practical arrangement, IMHO.
> >
> >Geo.
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Michael Sondow [mailto:msondow@iciiu.org]
> >> Sent: Wednesday, January 20, 1999 12:37 AM
> >> To: Wendy Seltzer
> >> Cc: membership@icann.org; study@cyber.law.harvard.edu
> >> Subject: Re: [Membership] Berkman study: Sample membership models
> >>
> >> Rather than trying immediately to comment on the proposed models, I have
> >> some queries about their presentation:
> >>
> >> 1) In your third model - corporations - you list individuals, corporate, and
> >> NGO (associations included). However, in some of the topics for comparison
> >> on the website you ignore the NGO. For example, under "Member
> >> Identification" you say that individuals must prove a physical address for
> >> registration and corporations must show proof of incorporation; but what
> >> about the NGO?
> >>
> >> 2) On the website chart, for "Other Privileges of Membership", you say for
> >> model two that "Corporate members are recognized/promoted on the ICANN
> >> website". What does this mean? Why should corporate members be promoted, if
> >> this is the Individual Membership category? (In your summary in the e-mail
> >> message, you say that this is the model that primes the rights of
> >> individuals, not corporations.)
> >>
> >> 3) In the e-mail message, you say that in the first model "Individuals and
> >> organizations can become members on equal footing". Then, for the third
> >> model, you say "this model places them [organizations] inside the membership
> >> structure on an even plane with individuals". What is the difference between
> >> these?
> >>
> >> 4) The preference, one might say prejudice, of the Berkman Center is evident
> >> because you have built in defects in the first model (no contact with
> >> members, no limitation on multiple voting), and define the third model with
> >> negatives about the first two (ICANN not a governance body, will be treated
> >> as a government of cyberspace, etc). Obviously, you favor the third model.
> >> In the sake of fairness, wouldn't it have been better to summarize (define)
> >> each model with the same methods?
> >>
> >> Wendy Seltzer wrote:
> >>
> >> > OPEN: Membership is tied only to an email address, with no further
> >> > restrictions. Individuals and organizations can become members on equal
> >> > footing. All have the opportunity to vote for directors, propose policy,
> >> > and ratify changes to ICANN's structure. This model's simplicity makes its
> >> > operation transparent. It also imposes minimal administrative burdens on
> >> > ICANN, as it does not require registration or verification.
> >> >
> >> > The model does not give ICANN regular contact with its members or a
> >> listing
> >> > of members. They are known only through their participation in elections.
> >> > There is no attempt to limit multiple voting through the creation of
> >> > multiple email addresses.
> >> >
> >> > INDIVIDUAL: The rights of Internet users are this model's first principle.
> >> > ICANN's decisions, though technical at the basic level of domain name and
> >> > IP allocations, will strongly affect the individual users of the Internet
> >> > and need to be openly accountable to a wide, active, and diverse set of
> >> > members. Membership in this model is conceived as a fundamental, worldwide
> >> > right and individuals make up the primary membership class.
> >> >
> >> > Anti-fraud measures include a prohibition against multiple registrations
> >> by
> >> > one individual, with identifiers of name, phone number, address and email.
> >> > Individual members have the power to vote for at-large board members
> >> > (corporations and NGOs do not vote). Individuals vote to ratify changes to
> >> > articles, receive regular information on ICANN activities, and may propose
> >> > policy.
> >> >
> >> > ORGANIZATIONAL: This membership model seeks to recognize the significance
> >> > of, and accord proper weight to, the interests of corporations,
> >> > associations, non-profit advocacy and membership groups, and
> >> > non-governmental organizations. Rather than simply relegate these entities
> >> > to indirect membership in ICANN through the SOs or through their
> >> individual
> >> > employees, this model places them inside the membership structure on an
> >> > even plane with individuals.
> >> >
> >> > This membership model rejects the notion that ICANN should somehow be
> >> based
> >> > on democratic representation. ICANN is not a governance institution, but a
> >> > narrowly focused technical body charged with certain policymaking and
> >> > coordination tasks. This model is premised on the view that if ICANN is
> >> > invested with a worldwide democratic electorate, it will be treated by
> >> > realspace governments and others as a legitimately elected government of
> >> > cyberspace.
> >> >
> >> > If you would like your comments archived on the Berkman Center site,
> >> please
> >> > cc: study@cyber.law.harvard.edu (and be patient).
> >> >
> >> > --Wendy Seltzer
> >> >
> >> > Wendy Seltzer
> >> > Berkman Center for Internet & Society           617-496-0089
> >> > Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138
> >> > wseltzer@law.harvard.edu || wendy@seltzer.com
> >> > Representation in Cyberspace: http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/
> >
>
> Esther Dyson                    Always make new mistakes!
> chairman, EDventure Holdings
> interim chairman, Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Numbers
> edyson@edventure.com
> 1 (212) 924-8800
> 1 (212) 924-0240 fax
> 104 Fifth Avenue (between 15th and 16th Streets; 20th floor)
> New York, NY 10011 USA
> http://www.edventure.com
>
> High-Tech Forum in Europe:  October 1999, Budapest
> PC Forum: 21 to 24  March 1999, Scottsdale (Phoenix), Arizona
> Book:  "Release 2.0: A design for living in the digital age"

edyson@edventure.com (Esther Dyson)

This issue of a flat individual membership raises an interesting
sociological question:

Should we assume political parties will form?  Surely there are some
historical experts/research about how people group into coalitions when
someone doesn't come along and predefine classes or interest groups or
whatever.  WHat kinds of voting systems produce what kinds of parties?  Are
two parties better? Or eighteen?  Hope someone talks about this this weekend.

What kind of parties are likely? geographical? commercial vs. noncommercial?
Will they follow the splits we see in these discussions? Are these groups in
fact the parties of the future? Is that good or bad?  (guess I hit my limit
of 3. Good night!) 

Esther


At 08:43 PM 20/01/99 -0500, Michael Sondow wrote:
>George Conrades a écrit:
>> 
>> Michael, don't be so hard on presuming anyone's bias. 
>
>Sorry. I didn't mean to accuse anyone of bias, only to suggest that the
>differences between the models be described in a more rigorous way. As you
>say, a lot more work needs to be done to refine them.
>
>> Please pick the one you prefer and
>> give us your ideas how to make it better. 
>
>I'm having trouble deciding. After reading very recently all the refined and
>detailed membership proposals for the DNSO, it's actually rather difficult
>to choose any one of the three models proposed for ICANN. They all seem too
>rigid, too exclusive. But I'll do what you suggest.
>
>> Revealing my personal
>> preference,at this point, is the "individual" model, which, I agree, needs
>> work. 
>
>I have always liked an individual model a la Karl Auerbach, but it needs to
>be very carefully detailed and restricted in its functioning in order to
>make it workable, otherwise the membership is going to become silent and
>just accessory. The nice thing about classes or constituencies is that they
>can elect representatives, who in turn form smaller and more utilitarian
>bodies within the membership. A dispersed membership of individuals might
>not be able to form any really useful deliberative bodies. And how will they
>vote or choose Board members? You might get elections between hundreds or
>thousands of nominees, with the winner getting only a small fraction of the
>vote and just as small a fraction of support.
>
>And then there are the myriad and so-far unsolved problems of
>identification, vote-taking, dues-collection, et cetera...
>
>Which isn't to say that all this can't be worked out. But it hasn't been
>and, until it is, individual membership will remain an ideal but not a
>practical arrangement, IMHO.
>
>Geo.
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Michael Sondow [mailto:msondow@iciiu.org]
>> Sent: Wednesday, January 20, 1999 12:37 AM
>> To: Wendy Seltzer
>> Cc: membership@icann.org; study@cyber.law.harvard.edu
>> Subject: Re: [Membership] Berkman study: Sample membership models
>> 
>> Rather than trying immediately to comment on the proposed models, I have
>> some queries about their presentation:
>> 
>> 1) In your third model - corporations - you list individuals, corporate, and
>> NGO (associations included). However, in some of the topics for comparison
>> on the website you ignore the NGO. For example, under "Member
>> Identification" you say that individuals must prove a physical address for
>> registration and corporations must show proof of incorporation; but what
>> about the NGO?
>> 
>> 2) On the website chart, for "Other Privileges of Membership", you say for
>> model two that "Corporate members are recognized/promoted on the ICANN
>> website". What does this mean? Why should corporate members be promoted, if
>> this is the Individual Membership category? (In your summary in the e-mail
>> message, you say that this is the model that primes the rights of
>> individuals, not corporations.)
>> 
>> 3) In the e-mail message, you say that in the first model "Individuals and
>> organizations can become members on equal footing". Then, for the third
>> model, you say "this model places them [organizations] inside the membership
>> structure on an even plane with individuals". What is the difference between
>> these?
>> 
>> 4) The preference, one might say prejudice, of the Berkman Center is evident
>> because you have built in defects in the first model (no contact with
>> members, no limitation on multiple voting), and define the third model with
>> negatives about the first two (ICANN not a governance body, will be treated
>> as a government of cyberspace, etc). Obviously, you favor the third model.
>> In the sake of fairness, wouldn't it have been better to summarize (define)
>> each model with the same methods?
>> 
>> Wendy Seltzer wrote:
>> 
>> > OPEN: Membership is tied only to an email address, with no further
>> > restrictions. Individuals and organizations can become members on equal
>> > footing. All have the opportunity to vote for directors, propose policy,
>> > and ratify changes to ICANN's structure. This model's simplicity makes its
>> > operation transparent. It also imposes minimal administrative burdens on
>> > ICANN, as it does not require registration or verification.
>> >
>> > The model does not give ICANN regular contact with its members or a
>> listing
>> > of members. They are known only through their participation in elections.
>> > There is no attempt to limit multiple voting through the creation of
>> > multiple email addresses.
>> >
>> > INDIVIDUAL: The rights of Internet users are this model's first principle.
>> > ICANN's decisions, though technical at the basic level of domain name and
>> > IP allocations, will strongly affect the individual users of the Internet
>> > and need to be openly accountable to a wide, active, and diverse set of
>> > members. Membership in this model is conceived as a fundamental, worldwide
>> > right and individuals make up the primary membership class.
>> >
>> > Anti-fraud measures include a prohibition against multiple registrations
>> by
>> > one individual, with identifiers of name, phone number, address and email.
>> > Individual members have the power to vote for at-large board members
>> > (corporations and NGOs do not vote). Individuals vote to ratify changes to
>> > articles, receive regular information on ICANN activities, and may propose
>> > policy.
>> >
>> > ORGANIZATIONAL: This membership model seeks to recognize the significance
>> > of, and accord proper weight to, the interests of corporations,
>> > associations, non-profit advocacy and membership groups, and
>> > non-governmental organizations. Rather than simply relegate these entities
>> > to indirect membership in ICANN through the SOs or through their
>> individual
>> > employees, this model places them inside the membership structure on an
>> > even plane with individuals.
>> >
>> > This membership model rejects the notion that ICANN should somehow be
>> based
>> > on democratic representation. ICANN is not a governance institution, but a
>> > narrowly focused technical body charged with certain policymaking and
>> > coordination tasks. This model is premised on the view that if ICANN is
>> > invested with a worldwide democratic electorate, it will be treated by
>> > realspace governments and others as a legitimately elected government of
>> > cyberspace.
>> >
>> > If you would like your comments archived on the Berkman Center site,
>> please
>> > cc: study@cyber.law.harvard.edu (and be patient).
>> >
>> > --Wendy Seltzer
>> >
>> > Wendy Seltzer
>> > Berkman Center for Internet & Society           617-496-0089
>> > Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138
>> > wseltzer@law.harvard.edu || wendy@seltzer.com
>> > Representation in Cyberspace: http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/
>


Esther Dyson			Always make new mistakes!
chairman, EDventure Holdings
interim chairman, Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Numbers
edyson@edventure.com
1 (212) 924-8800
1 (212) 924-0240 fax
104 Fifth Avenue (between 15th and 16th Streets; 20th floor)
New York, NY 10011 USA
http://www.edventure.com

High-Tech Forum in Europe:  October 1999, Budapest
PC Forum: 21 to 24  March 1999, Scottsdale (Phoenix), Arizona 
Book:  "Release 2.0: A design for living in the digital age" 

Michael Sondow

George Conrades a écrit:
> 
> Michael, don't be so hard on presuming anyone's bias. 

Sorry. I didn't mean to accuse anyone of bias, only to suggest that the
differences between the models be described in a more rigorous way. As you
say, a lot more work needs to be done to refine them.

> Please pick the one you prefer and
> give us your ideas how to make it better. 

I'm having trouble deciding. After reading very recently all the refined and
detailed membership proposals for the DNSO, it's actually rather difficult
to choose any one of the three models proposed for ICANN. They all seem too
rigid, too exclusive. But I'll do what you suggest.

> Revealing my personal
> preference,at this point, is the "individual" model, which, I agree, needs
> work. 

I have always liked an individual model a la Karl Auerbach, but it needs to
be very carefully detailed and restricted in its functioning in order to
make it workable, otherwise the membership is going to become silent and
just accessory. The nice thing about classes or constituencies is that they
can elect representatives, who in turn form smaller and more utilitarian
bodies within the membership. A dispersed membership of individuals might
not be able to form any really useful deliberative bodies. And how will they
vote or choose Board members? You might get elections between hundreds or
thousands of nominees, with the winner getting only a small fraction of the
vote and just as small a fraction of support.

And then there are the myriad and so-far unsolved problems of
identification, vote-taking, dues-collection, et cetera...

Which isn't to say that all this can't be worked out. But it hasn't been
and, until it is, individual membership will remain an ideal but not a
practical arrangement, IMHO.

Geo.
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Michael Sondow [mailto:msondow@iciiu.org]
> Sent: Wednesday, January 20, 1999 12:37 AM
> To: Wendy Seltzer
> Cc: membership@icann.org; study@cyber.law.harvard.edu
> Subject: Re: [Membership] Berkman study: Sample membership models
> 
> Rather than trying immediately to comment on the proposed models, I have
> some queries about their presentation:
> 
> 1) In your third model - corporations - you list individuals, corporate, and
> NGO (associations included). However, in some of the topics for comparison
> on the website you ignore the NGO. For example, under "Member
> Identification" you say that individuals must prove a physical address for
> registration and corporations must show proof of incorporation; but what
> about the NGO?
> 
> 2) On the website chart, for "Other Privileges of Membership", you say for
> model two that "Corporate members are recognized/promoted on the ICANN
> website". What does this mean? Why should corporate members be promoted, if
> this is the Individual Membership category? (In your summary in the e-mail
> message, you say that this is the model that primes the rights of
> individuals, not corporations.)
> 
> 3) In the e-mail message, you say that in the first model "Individuals and
> organizations can become members on equal footing". Then, for the third
> model, you say "this model places them [organizations] inside the membership
> structure on an even plane with individuals". What is the difference between
> these?
> 
> 4) The preference, one might say prejudice, of the Berkman Center is evident
> because you have built in defects in the first model (no contact with
> members, no limitation on multiple voting), and define the third model with
> negatives about the first two (ICANN not a governance body, will be treated
> as a government of cyberspace, etc). Obviously, you favor the third model.
> In the sake of fairness, wouldn't it have been better to summarize (define)
> each model with the same methods?
> 
> Wendy Seltzer wrote:
> 
> > OPEN: Membership is tied only to an email address, with no further
> > restrictions. Individuals and organizations can become members on equal
> > footing. All have the opportunity to vote for directors, propose policy,
> > and ratify changes to ICANN's structure. This model's simplicity makes its
> > operation transparent. It also imposes minimal administrative burdens on
> > ICANN, as it does not require registration or verification.
> >
> > The model does not give ICANN regular contact with its members or a
> listing
> > of members. They are known only through their participation in elections.
> > There is no attempt to limit multiple voting through the creation of
> > multiple email addresses.
> >
> > INDIVIDUAL: The rights of Internet users are this model's first principle.
> > ICANN's decisions, though technical at the basic level of domain name and
> > IP allocations, will strongly affect the individual users of the Internet
> > and need to be openly accountable to a wide, active, and diverse set of
> > members. Membership in this model is conceived as a fundamental, worldwide
> > right and individuals make up the primary membership class.
> >
> > Anti-fraud measures include a prohibition against multiple registrations
> by
> > one individual, with identifiers of name, phone number, address and email.
> > Individual members have the power to vote for at-large board members
> > (corporations and NGOs do not vote). Individuals vote to ratify changes to
> > articles, receive regular information on ICANN activities, and may propose
> > policy.
> >
> > ORGANIZATIONAL: This membership model seeks to recognize the significance
> > of, and accord proper weight to, the interests of corporations,
> > associations, non-profit advocacy and membership groups, and
> > non-governmental organizations. Rather than simply relegate these entities
> > to indirect membership in ICANN through the SOs or through their
> individual
> > employees, this model places them inside the membership structure on an
> > even plane with individuals.
> >
> > This membership model rejects the notion that ICANN should somehow be
> based
> > on democratic representation. ICANN is not a governance institution, but a
> > narrowly focused technical body charged with certain policymaking and
> > coordination tasks. This model is premised on the view that if ICANN is
> > invested with a worldwide democratic electorate, it will be treated by
> > realspace governments and others as a legitimately elected government of
> > cyberspace.
> >
> > If you would like your comments archived on the Berkman Center site,
> please
> > cc: study@cyber.law.harvard.edu (and be patient).
> >
> > --Wendy Seltzer
> >
> > Wendy Seltzer
> > Berkman Center for Internet & Society           617-496-0089
> > Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138
> > wseltzer@law.harvard.edu || wendy@seltzer.com
> > Representation in Cyberspace: http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/

George Conrades

Michael, don't be so hard on presuming anyone's bias. I was part of the
effort on Monday to put the models together for the sake of
discussion...molding clay, so to speak...and we wanted to get them out with
lead time for the Berkman session this Sat. Each has a lot of issues, and as
you point out, some inconsistencies. Please pick the one you prefer and
give us your ideas how to make it better. Revealing my personal
preference,at this point, is the "individual" model, which, I agree, needs
work. Geo.
-----Original Message-----
From: Michael Sondow [mailto:msondow@iciiu.org]
Sent: Wednesday, January 20, 1999 12:37 AM
To: Wendy Seltzer
Cc: membership@icann.org; study@cyber.law.harvard.edu
Subject: Re: Sample Membership Models


Rather than trying immediately to comment on the proposed models, I have
some queries about their presentation:

1) In your third model - corporations - you list individuals, corporate, and
NGO (associations included). However, in some of the topics for comparison
on the website you ignore the NGO. For example, under "Member
Identification" you say that individuals must prove a physical address for
registration and corporations must show proof of incorporation; but what
about the NGO?

2) On the website chart, for "Other Privileges of Membership", you say for
model two that "Corporate members are recognized/promoted on the ICANN
website". What does this mean? Why should corporate members be promoted, if
this is the Individual Membership category? (In your summary in the e-mail
message, you say that this is the model that primes the rights of
individuals, not corporations.)

3) In the e-mail message, you say that in the first model "Individuals and
organizations can become members on equal footing". Then, for the third
model, you say "this model places them [organizations] inside the membership
structure on an even plane with individuals". What is the difference between
these?

4) The preference, one might say prejudice, of the Berkman Center is evident
because you have built in defects in the first model (no contact with
members, no limitation on multiple voting), and define the third model with
negatives about the first two (ICANN not a governance body, will be treated
as a government of cyberspace, etc). Obviously, you favor the third model.
In the sake of fairness, wouldn't it have been better to summarize (define)
each model with the same methods?

Wendy Seltzer wrote:

> OPEN: Membership is tied only to an email address, with no further
> restrictions. Individuals and organizations can become members on equal
> footing. All have the opportunity to vote for directors, propose policy,
> and ratify changes to ICANN's structure. This model's simplicity makes its
> operation transparent. It also imposes minimal administrative burdens on
> ICANN, as it does not require registration or verification.
> 
> The model does not give ICANN regular contact with its members or a
listing
> of members. They are known only through their participation in elections.
> There is no attempt to limit multiple voting through the creation of
> multiple email addresses.
> 
> INDIVIDUAL: The rights of Internet users are this model's first principle.
> ICANN's decisions, though technical at the basic level of domain name and
> IP allocations, will strongly affect the individual users of the Internet
> and need to be openly accountable to a wide, active, and diverse set of
> members. Membership in this model is conceived as a fundamental, worldwide
> right and individuals make up the primary membership class.
> 
> Anti-fraud measures include a prohibition against multiple registrations
by
> one individual, with identifiers of name, phone number, address and email.
> Individual members have the power to vote for at-large board members
> (corporations and NGOs do not vote). Individuals vote to ratify changes to
> articles, receive regular information on ICANN activities, and may propose
> policy.
> 
> ORGANIZATIONAL: This membership model seeks to recognize the significance
> of, and accord proper weight to, the interests of corporations,
> associations, non-profit advocacy and membership groups, and
> non-governmental organizations. Rather than simply relegate these entities
> to indirect membership in ICANN through the SOs or through their
individual
> employees, this model places them inside the membership structure on an
> even plane with individuals.
> 
> This membership model rejects the notion that ICANN should somehow be
based
> on democratic representation. ICANN is not a governance institution, but a
> narrowly focused technical body charged with certain policymaking and
> coordination tasks. This model is premised on the view that if ICANN is
> invested with a worldwide democratic electorate, it will be treated by
> realspace governments and others as a legitimately elected government of
> cyberspace.
> 
> If you would like your comments archived on the Berkman Center site,
please
> cc: study@cyber.law.harvard.edu (and be patient).
> 
> --Wendy Seltzer
> 
> Wendy Seltzer
> Berkman Center for Internet & Society           617-496-0089
> Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138
> wseltzer@law.harvard.edu || wendy@seltzer.com
> Representation in Cyberspace: http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/

jorgensenj@who.ch

Wendy,

A few comments on the three models (your e-mail of 19 January 1999 -  I presume
you wanted comments returned to this address):

-  At first, I found the Organization model best -  comprehensive, structured,
the kind of 'machine' we are used to.  However, the more I looked at the Open
model, the more it seems to reflect the spirit of the Internet.  Could an
approach not be to START with the Open model, see how it goes, get some fresh
input not burdened by bureaucratic procedures that would take the eye off the
ball?  One could later, if necessary, move towards some kind of an Indivudual or
Organization model.  It would be difficult to start with the Organization model
and later back down to a more simple model such as the Open one.

- This approach, starting with the Open model, would probably require ICANN to
sift through many direct inputs by the membership (whereas a heavy input might
more easily be delegated to committees through the Organization model). 
However, I suppose ICANN is there to work on substance rather than bureaucratic
procedures -  at least in the early days until the precise or evolving role of
ICANN has been better defined and tested.

Jens A. Jorgensen

Michael Sondow

Rather than trying immediately to comment on the proposed models, I have
some queries about their presentation:

1) In your third model - corporations - you list individuals, corporate, and
NGO (associations included). However, in some of the topics for comparison
on the website you ignore the NGO. For example, under "Member
Identification" you say that individuals must prove a physical address for
registration and corporations must show proof of incorporation; but what
about the NGO?

2) On the website chart, for "Other Privileges of Membership", you say for
model two that "Corporate members are recognized/promoted on the ICANN
website". What does this mean? Why should corporate members be promoted, if
this is the Individual Membership category? (In your summary in the e-mail
message, you say that this is the model that primes the rights of
individuals, not corporations.)

3) In the e-mail message, you say that in the first model "Individuals and
organizations can become members on equal footing". Then, for the third
model, you say "this model places them [organizations] inside the membership
structure on an even plane with individuals". What is the difference between
these?

4) The preference, one might say prejudice, of the Berkman Center is evident
because you have built in defects in the first model (no contact with
members, no limitation on multiple voting), and define the third model with
negatives about the first two (ICANN not a governance body, will be treated
as a government of cyberspace, etc). Obviously, you favor the third model.
In the sake of fairness, wouldn't it have been better to summarize (define)
each model with the same methods?

Wendy Seltzer wrote:

> OPEN: Membership is tied only to an email address, with no further
> restrictions. Individuals and organizations can become members on equal
> footing. All have the opportunity to vote for directors, propose policy,
> and ratify changes to ICANN's structure. This model's simplicity makes its
> operation transparent. It also imposes minimal administrative burdens on
> ICANN, as it does not require registration or verification.
> 
> The model does not give ICANN regular contact with its members or a listing
> of members. They are known only through their participation in elections.
> There is no attempt to limit multiple voting through the creation of
> multiple email addresses.
> 
> INDIVIDUAL: The rights of Internet users are this model's first principle.
> ICANN's decisions, though technical at the basic level of domain name and
> IP allocations, will strongly affect the individual users of the Internet
> and need to be openly accountable to a wide, active, and diverse set of
> members. Membership in this model is conceived as a fundamental, worldwide
> right and individuals make up the primary membership class.
> 
> Anti-fraud measures include a prohibition against multiple registrations by
> one individual, with identifiers of name, phone number, address and email.
> Individual members have the power to vote for at-large board members
> (corporations and NGOs do not vote). Individuals vote to ratify changes to
> articles, receive regular information on ICANN activities, and may propose
> policy.
> 
> ORGANIZATIONAL: This membership model seeks to recognize the significance
> of, and accord proper weight to, the interests of corporations,
> associations, non-profit advocacy and membership groups, and
> non-governmental organizations. Rather than simply relegate these entities
> to indirect membership in ICANN through the SOs or through their individual
> employees, this model places them inside the membership structure on an
> even plane with individuals.
> 
> This membership model rejects the notion that ICANN should somehow be based
> on democratic representation. ICANN is not a governance institution, but a
> narrowly focused technical body charged with certain policymaking and
> coordination tasks. This model is premised on the view that if ICANN is
> invested with a worldwide democratic electorate, it will be treated by
> realspace governments and others as a legitimately elected government of
> cyberspace.
> 
> If you would like your comments archived on the Berkman Center site, please
> cc: study@cyber.law.harvard.edu (and be patient).
> 
> --Wendy Seltzer
> 
> Wendy Seltzer
> Berkman Center for Internet & Society           617-496-0089
> Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138
> wseltzer@law.harvard.edu || wendy@seltzer.com
> Representation in Cyberspace: http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/

Wendy Seltzer

The Berkman study group has assembled a chart at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/models.html of some sample membership
models for ICANN.  We describe three models representing points along a
spectrum -- open, individual, and organizational membership -- and set them
out as strawmen for criticism and suggestion.  Thank you in advance for
your comments.

To summarize the models:

OPEN: Membership is tied only to an email address, with no further
restrictions. Individuals and organizations can become members on equal
footing. All have the opportunity to vote for directors, propose policy,
and ratify changes to ICANN's structure. This model's simplicity makes its
operation transparent. It also imposes minimal administrative burdens on
ICANN, as it does not require registration or verification. 

The model does not give ICANN regular contact with its members or a listing
of members. They are known only through their participation in elections.
There is no attempt to limit multiple voting through the creation of
multiple email addresses. 


INDIVIDUAL: The rights of Internet users are this model's first principle.
ICANN's decisions, though technical at the basic level of domain name and
IP allocations, will strongly affect the individual users of the Internet
and need to be openly accountable to a wide, active, and diverse set of
members. Membership in this model is conceived as a fundamental, worldwide
right and individuals make up the primary membership class. 

Anti-fraud measures include a prohibition against multiple registrations by
one individual, with identifiers of name, phone number, address and email.
Individual members have the power to vote for at-large board members
(corporations and NGOs do not vote). Individuals vote to ratify changes to
articles, receive regular information on ICANN activities, and may propose
policy. 


ORGANIZATIONAL: This membership model seeks to recognize the significance
of, and accord proper weight to, the interests of corporations,
associations, non-profit advocacy and membership groups, and
non-governmental organizations. Rather than simply relegate these entities
to indirect membership in ICANN through the SOs or through their individual
employees, this model places them inside the membership structure on an
even plane with individuals. 

This membership model rejects the notion that ICANN should somehow be based
on democratic representation. ICANN is not a governance institution, but a
narrowly focused technical body charged with certain policymaking and
coordination tasks. This model is premised on the view that if ICANN is
invested with a worldwide democratic electorate, it will be treated by
realspace governments and others as a legitimately elected government of
cyberspace. 

If you would like your comments archived on the Berkman Center site, please
cc: study@cyber.law.harvard.edu.
Thanks again.
--Wendy Seltzer

Wendy Seltzer
Berkman Center for Internet & Society 		617-496-0089
Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138
wseltzer@law.harvard.edu || wendy@seltzer.com
Representation in Cyberspace: http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/

erony@marin.k12.ca.us (Ellen Rony)

Wendy Seltzer wrote:

>The Berkman study group has assembled a chart at
>http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/models.html of some sample membership
>models for ICANN.  We describe three models representing points along a
>spectrum -- open, individual, and organizational membership -- and set them
>out as strawmen for criticism and suggestion.

Perhaps two other models can be added to the chart:
 * representational (geographic)
 * bi-cameral (e.g., representational+individual or
organizational+representational, or ??)



Ellen Rony                                                     Co-author
The Domain Name Handbook                   http://www.domainhandbook.com
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