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Re: [projectvrm] Minimum viable VRM web site or service


Chronological Thread 
  • From: Brian Behlendorf < >
  • To: Andy Jennings < >
  • Cc: ProjectVRM list < >
  • Subject: Re: [projectvrm] Minimum viable VRM web site or service
  • Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2015 13:23:39 -0800 (PST)

On Thu, 15 Jan 2015, Andy Jennings wrote:
On Thu, Jan 15, 2015 at 12:30 PM, Brian Behlendorf
< >
wrote:
On Thu, 15 Jan 2015, Andy Jennings wrote:
Since Verizon sells me the phone and sends me numerous "security
updates" which I install unquestioningly, what's to prevent them from installing a
"Verizon
MITM" certificate authority and MITM'ing all of my SSL
connections, too?  How would I ever know?


They don't even need to do that.  The default list of CAs in both Firefox and
Chrome, as well as in the default list of CAs trusted by Android (see Settings
-> Security ->
Trusted Credentials), and presumably in the list of CAs for Firefox on
Android.... all of those places have multiple CA certificates from Verisign,
which VZ can use to
issue bogus certificates for HTTPS.

I know their names are similar, but I was not aware of a relationship between
Verizon and Verisign.  Is there one?

Gah. You're right. Total mistake on my part. I see no Verizon CAs in these browsers.

Brian


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