held in Suntec City, Downtown Singapore
March 2, 10:00 am - 4:00 pm
Transcript • Audio/Video Archive
• Contact Information
Membership Advisory Committee
For the users of the Internet, while SOs for supply side of the internet
Committee membership: Twelve members chosen from eighty applicants. Six telephone meetings, three or four partial meetings in person.
Board to make decision in May 25 meeting in Berlin after period of public comment.
The MAC members (see http://www.icann.org/macbios.html for more details)
- Izumi Aizu: Secretary
General of Asia Pacific Internet Association
- Tadao Takahashi: Chair
of Brazilian chapter of the Internet Society.
- Diane Cabell: Lawyer from
- Kanchana Kanchuanasut:
Associate Professor of Computer Science at Asian Institute of Technology.
- Pavan Duggal: Founder
of Cyberlaw Association, associated with UN Development Program.
- George Conrades: Venture
capitalist in Boston.
- Greg Crew: ICANN Board,
- Oscar Robles: Vice President
of Latin American & Caribbean Netowrks Forum.
- Siegfried Langenbach:
Owner of a German ISP.
- Daniel Kaplan: Consultant
in strategic marketing, France.
- Nii Quaynor: Computer
scientist, President of Internet Society chapter in Ghana.
- Jonathan Zittrain: Executive
Director of Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard Law School.
Present in the meeting
- Chuck Gomes, NSI
- Raoul Fuentes, CIGREF,
- Bernard Randall, Singapore
Computer Society, ISOC Chapter
- Peter Valrosa,
- Frank Fitzsimmons, Dun
& Bradstreet, ICANN board
- David Lerdell, Stockholm
Center for Organizational Research, Sweden
- Ole Jacobsen, Cisco, Internet
- Teddy Purwadi, APJII,
- Masaya Toma, Embassy of
- Wolfgang Kleinwaechter,
- Michael Sondow, Chairman
- Joop Teernstra, founder
of Democratic Association of Domain Name Holders
- David Chou, Taipei Rep.
- Robert Hall, CAIP
- Van Roste, UUNET
- Rahmet M Samik-Ibrahim
- Hiro Hotta
Who can be an at-large
member? What kinds of rights does at-large membership provide?
- MAC Consensus
- At-large membership
should not be limited to IP address holders or domain name holders.
- Organizations should
be allowed to become members, but no consensus on voting rights.
- Only organizations that
are not members of SOs should be at-large members.
- Voting Rights
- No member should have
more than one vote. But perhaps some members should have no votes
- Do organizations have
one or zero votes?
- If organizations are
to be given votes, shall the representatives casting their ballots
also get individual votes? Perhaps no individual allowed to represent
more than one organization. Then no incentive to create false organizations,
only false individuals.
- How to prevent capture
- Options – could not
- Only individuals vote.
Corporations/organizations have an advisory role but no vote.
get a vote. (7 to 4 majority on the MAC)
- Audience comments
- Please identify yourself
with organizatoinal affiliation.
- Speak loudly into
the microphone: if you can’t hear yourself through the loudspeakers,
the remote participants can’t hear you!
- Can individuals who
are members of SOs also be at-large members? Problem of double-voting.
Perhaps fee will be sufficient to discourage double memberships.
- The primary point
of at-large membership is ability to elect directors. Why should
only SO members be able to propose policy? SOs aren’t reserved
for professionals, but need to have a place for the user, to cast
vote as "citizen"
- Recommend: individuals
have the same vote as organizations and corporations. No suggestion
in the bylaws that some members have no vote – all three should
have equal voting rights.
- If no vote to organizations,
they still have influence through their individual members.
- Why isn’t there a
hierarchy in the voting system? Regulation of limited resource.
It makes sense to give a larger say to those with expertise, experience
in the area.
- Expect that debate
to occur in and among SOs; most proposals from SOs ICANN board
will listen to their recommendations.
- The SOs are separate
- Simpler, perhaps,
to say at-large is just for individuals. Organization members
can vote for their organization’s interests.
- Driving force, to
ensure balance of interests on the board. Motivation
- Trying to encourage
other at-large members, beyond those active in SOs
- Considered classes
of at-large members, but committee has rejected (for the moment).
It is very difficult to classify organizations around the world.
How do you define a class, and what rights it gets?
- If organizational
members can’t vote, why are they members?
- Coming in a different
window of the same church. Organization’s representatives can
vote as individuals.
- Proof of citizenship?
- Address of incorporation?
- Consensus that lack of
criminal record should not be a qualification – for benefit of dissidents.
- Consensus that communal
email address the minimal connectivity requirement, private email
- Audience comments (membership
- What would be the procedure
to become a member? How to apply? Is there a right to be a member,
or could applicants be rejected?
- Quaynor: Applicants
who satisfy the objective criteria can be members.
- Duggal: Should be
concerned about cyber-crime.
- Kaplan: Qualifications
are objective, so no need for a review committee beyond verification
that the necessary documentation has been received.
- Crew: Need a simple
membership system – easy to understand and administer. Perhaps
one member has one unique email address. Consider the difficulty
of validating information sent in.
- Gomes: Need to plan
for changes of email address. Consider NSI’s problem – this would
- Crew: Agreed – need
a system to deal with this.
- Quaynor: Requirements
should be minimal so as to encourage membership.
- How to lose membership?
Does it last forever?
- Cabell: As long as
a member continues to pay the fee (if any), can remain indefinitely.
- Kaplan: The fee might
be recurring; committee didn’t discuss this specifically but it
was understood that renewal would be necessary and that there
would be an accompanying renewal charge.
- Need to adjust fee according
to ability to pay.
- Conrades: Time to
- Reasons for fees
Grace period – since want
a large membership as soon as possible, perhaps waive fees initially
How to accept payments
– mail requires processing staff, perhaps some people can’t pay via
credit card over the net (no browser or inadequate security, no credit
Possible fee structures
- Recover costs of having
a membership (or of running ICANN)
- But hard to imagine
collecting more than a minimal amount of ICANN’s budget this way.
- Help reduce fraud
Audience comments (fees)
- $35 for members, scaled
to $12 in developing countries. ISOC spends $10 to register and
service each member.
- Kanchuanasut: Individual
members shouldn’t have to pay anything at all.
- Aizu: Flexible fee scheme:
pay what you think it’s worth, ie contributions.
- Kaplan: Don’t want
sponsorships to unduly influence ICANN.
- Duggal: No fee at all
– why should people have to pay at all for the privilege of joining,
at least during an initial experimental period?
- Perhaps ICANN could
sell address space.
- Sondow: ICANN needs
to be self-funding, else it will continue to take large amounts
of corporate sponsorship. If ICANN to be a membership organization,
it needs to be supported by its membership.
- Teernstra: A good idea
to start ICANN without a membership fee – will help ICANN gain a
large membership. Perhaps can continue without a fee forever.
- Fee should depend on
economic prosperity of countries.
- Some people are already
paying their share of ICANN’s expenses through domain names – shouldn’t
have to pay again through at-large membership.
- Random process of verification
before or after the election
- Would like to use completely
online registration system. But verification might require some real
- No election will be fraud-free.
To what lengths and expense should ICANN go to minimize fraud?
- A particular election
might have little enough at stake (in proportion to the power exercised
by the remainder of the board) that no one would go to such great
length to steal it, or it wouldn’t devastate the organization if
- Too much validation
could paralyze the organization as it deals with challenges to authenticity
of an election.
Criteria for selection
- Article V section 9c
- Nomination by others
- Nominations require
accompanying petition of support
- Nominating committee
Campaign activities to
- Proof of identify /
- Proof of citizenship
- Brief statement of position
- Disclose sources of
income to avoid conflict of interest
- Agree to spend sufficient
time completing duties of the office
- Bear own burden of translation
- Kaplan: ICANN should,
perhaps not immediately, provide translators as necessary
- Must not be a government
- Perhaps require (or
at least offer) participation in an online discussion forum
- Teernstra: Should require
a minimum amount of support for nomination, perhaps five supporters.
- But what about people
who don’t know enough other interested people, or who are in geographic
regions without many other ICANN members (potential nominators)?
- Perhaps not so hard
to find supporters by using Internet discussion space.
Questions from audience
- Required by article V,
section 6. 3 of the Bylaws conditions for diversity
- At least one citizen
from each of 5 geog. regions on the board at all times
- No more than ˝ of the
total number of directors shall be from one geog region
- No more than half of
total at large directors nominated after choice of SOs shall be
from one geog region.
- Propose that the SOs also
be required to meet regional representation requirements.
- Bylaws: at-large membership
required to have regional rep, while SOs are not.
- Should members from a
region be allowed only to vote for candidates from that region? Minority
of a global vote might not produce a representative board.
- Problem of maintaining
geographic diversity while electing only three directors each year.
- Sondow: Concern that half
of directors might be from a single geographic region. Should cap
North America at less than a half, perhaps a third or a quarter.
- Is the MAC proposing to
the board that they change the bylaws?
- Apparent inconsistency
between "one vote per individual" and voting for multiple
- Perhaps instead think
along the lines of "one ballot per individual"
written to take forward
(revise the preliminary
document with the notes from today’s meeting and MAC consensus)
- We don’t know what the
SOs are doing, so can’t premise MAC decision on their plans.
- Shouldn’t discriminate
among classes of individuals
- Purpose of at-large
is to have the users represented
- Numbers problem if
we say we don’t care about crossover. The SO members may be numerous,
- For organizations,
consensus that SO members could not be represented in at-large,
whether or not they voted – voting in two different contexts,
- But for individuals,
not such an issue
- Policing difficulties
(organization can ask someone else to cast a vote for it), but
ask for self-identification.
- How many support the
idea that any individual can be be an individual member of the at-large
- (in favor of permitting
crossover for individuals)
- 6 in favor.
- Problem with treating
individuals differently from companies
- Constricting principle:
anyone registering must declare that he is not a member of an
- But an individual
may have several different interests
- The size of the at-large
membership may determine how much effect double-counting has
- At-large is reaching
for a broad-based constituency
- General principle: at-large
as catch all for constituency not represented in SOs.
- How specifically you
need to draw rules against crossover will depend on the way SOs
- Other linked concerns:
quorums, sunrise/sunset provisions.
- Census: if the membership
doesn’t look right after starting, leave room to change the
- Go after large number
Fishkin model – a way to
think about capture
Time Magazine’s "Person
of the Century" contest: best leader, politician, artist.
Winner: Mustafa Kemal Ataturk
– in almost all categories
One constituency managed
to mobilize (though their individual votes were legitimate, everyone
had a chance to vote)
Or – representing not
"just the activists" but what everyone would want if they
Is this a fair return for
those who organized, or a capture of the process?
Fishkin model: poll a randomly
selected sample, after bringing them together to discuss, hear from
Sunrise and sunset provisions
Critical to ensure
that membership gets off to a strong start.
Suggestion: do membership
outreach, take preliminary registrations, analyze that data to see
the demographic makeup. If that’s a broad-based membership, accept
the registrants, if not, leave registration open longer and/or find
another structure for membership
Combine sunrise provision/fees:
start with a zero-fee initial membership.
Don’t leave it for the
board to decide whether or not it likes the membership’s results
Key to market the organization.
include membership promotion in the role of registrars.
Define what is broad enough
base to be satisfactory, before starting registration.
- What happens if the DNSO
has at-large members?
Exclusion of organizational
members of SOs from at-large membership
At-large membership to
represent the users, the individuals who don’t fit into the SO categories
Double voting issue: not
so significant if we have a large membership, so long as affiliations
are made clear.
- At-large individual
membership – no provision to exclude individuals.
- Conrades: no problem
if individual at-large members are involved in SOs
- Duggal: don’t give them
a double benefit.
- Kanchuanasut: individual
has a different interest and motive when acting as individual in
at-large and in SO.
- Could monitor by managing
membership of SOs through ICANN
- Separate voting for
directors from policymaking? Ask them to choose which directors
they vote for
Census. See if many at-large
members are also members of SOs – where the influence is coming from
- Issue if candidates
run in both SO and at-large elections?
information, please contact:
Edelman and Wendy Seltzer
for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School