GROUP TWO - Revision history

BerkmanSysop: UTurn to 1297036800

2020-08-13T10:46:39Z

UTurn to 1297036800

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:46, 13 August 2020
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	Our solution will ultimately benefit both children and adults. We seek to provide better protection for children, when still minors, from any damaging content that either they or others post about them. Looking forward, we seek to protect adults from earlier "youthful indiscretions" or "hijinks" and other damaging records from when they were minors, analogous to juvenile record sealing and expungement.		Our solution will ultimately benefit both children and adults. We seek to provide better protection for children, when still minors, from any damaging content that either they or others post about them. Looking forward, we seek to protect adults from earlier "youthful indiscretions" or "hijinks" and other damaging records from when they were minors, analogous to juvenile record sealing and expungement.

	~~Nawxky Author~~, ~~keep doing~~ in the ~~same way~~..!		==Importance of Online Identity and Reputation==

			As the first generation to grow up entirely in the digital age reaches adulthood, what has already been identified as a difficult problem could have serious and damaging consequences. Already vast amounts of personal content have been digitally captured for perpetuity, and more content is added every day. As one New York Times article aptly observed, the Internet effectively takes away second chances so that "the worst thing you've done is often the first thing everyone knows about you." [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html] Others have noted that "[t]he Internet erases inhibitions" which tends to make people, especially young people, more likely to act out or behave badly online. [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/us/05bully.html?hp] In addition, the viral dynamics of the Internet and search engines -- which are able to quickly rank information based in part on popularity -- may amplify reputation damage. Moreover, as major advances in facial-recognition technology continue to develop, there will be a stark challenge to "our expectation of anonymity in public." [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html]

			Minors are particularly vulnerable to these advances because they are the least able to fully comprehend the ramifications of online behavior, and are unlikely to exercise the maturity and restraint that we expect of adults (even if such restraint is not always exercised in practice). Congress has already recognized the importance of protecting children in this regard by passing several pieces of legislation, the most relevant of which is the [http://www.coppa.org Children's Online Privacy Protection Act] (COPPA). One failing of COPPA, however, is that protection ends at age thirteen. While young children may be the least cognitively advanced, it is older children and adolescents who are more likely to have sensitive and damaging content posted about them on the internet (e.g. photos of the youth drinking or smoking with friends, or sexually charged material). More importantly, COPPA has proven ineffective even at shielding the age group it is designed to protect: studies show that as many as 37% of children aged 10-12 have Facebook accounts, and there are approximately 4.4 million Facebook users under age thirteen in the United States despite the fact that Facebook's policy is in compliance with COPPA standards. [http://internet-safety.yoursphere.com/2010/11/facebook-ignores-coppa-yoursphere-law-enforcement-team-member-speaks-out.html]

			The lack of effective protection for minors, coupled with the staggering numbers of minors who post private content on the Internet, begs for a solution. This youthful web-based content also raises serious implications for these people's lives going forward; a recent Microsoft study reports that 75% of US recruiters and human-resource professionals report that their companies require them to do online research about candidates, and many use a range of sites when scrutinizing applicants. [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html] While these reputational problems similarly exist for those who posted content as adults, the problem of online identity and reputation is particularly compelling in the case of minors.

	==The Recent Scholarship and Other Proposed Solutions==		==The Recent Scholarship and Other Proposed Solutions==

213.74.80.44: Nawxky Author, keep doing in the same way..!

2012-02-18T11:09:28Z

Nawxky Author, keep doing in the same way..!

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:09, 18 February 2012
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	Our solution will ultimately benefit both children and adults. We seek to provide better protection for children, when still minors, from any damaging content that either they or others post about them. Looking forward, we seek to protect adults from earlier "youthful indiscretions" or "hijinks" and other damaging records from when they were minors, analogous to juvenile record sealing and expungement.		Our solution will ultimately benefit both children and adults. We seek to provide better protection for children, when still minors, from any damaging content that either they or others post about them. Looking forward, we seek to protect adults from earlier "youthful indiscretions" or "hijinks" and other damaging records from when they were minors, analogous to juvenile record sealing and expungement.

	~~==Importance of Online Identity and Reputation==~~		Nawxky Author, keep doing in the same way..!

	As the first generation to grow up entirely in the digital age reaches adulthood, what has already been identified as a difficult problem could have serious and damaging consequences. Already vast amounts of personal content have been digitally captured for perpetuity, and more content is added every day. As one New York Times article aptly observed, the Internet effectively takes away second chances so that "the worst thing you've done is often the first thing everyone knows about you." [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html] Others have noted that "[t]he Internet erases inhibitions" which tends to make people, especially young people, more likely to act out or behave badly online. [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/us/05bully.html?hp] In addition, the viral dynamics of the Internet and search engines -- which are able to quickly rank information based in part on popularity -- may amplify reputation damage. Moreover, as major advances in facial-recognition technology continue to develop, there will be a stark challenge to "our expectation of anonymity in ~~public." [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html]~~

	~~Minors are particularly vulnerable to these advances because they are~~ the least able to fully comprehend the ramifications of online behavior, and are unlikely to exercise the maturity and restraint that we expect of adults (even if such restraint is not always exercised in practice). Congress has already recognized the importance of protecting children in this regard by passing several pieces of legislation, the most relevant of which is the [http://www.coppa.org Children's Online Privacy Protection Act] (COPPA). One failing of COPPA, however, is that protection ends at age thirteen. While young children may be the least cognitively advanced, it is older children and adolescents who are more likely to have sensitive and damaging content posted about them on the internet (e.g. photos of the youth drinking or smoking with friends, or sexually charged material). More importantly, COPPA has proven ineffective even at shielding the age group it is designed to protect: studies show that as many as 37% of children aged 10-12 have Facebook accounts, and there are approximately 4.4 million Facebook users under age thirteen in the United States despite the fact that Facebook's policy is in compliance with COPPA standards. [http://internet-safety.yoursphere.com/2010/11/facebook-ignores-coppa-yoursphere-law-enforcement-team-member-speaks-out.html]

	The lack of effective protection for minors, coupled with the staggering numbers of minors who post private content on the Internet, begs for a solution. This youthful web-based content also raises serious implications for these people's lives going forward; a recent Microsoft study reports that 75% of US recruiters and human-resource professionals report that their companies require them to do online research about candidates, and many use a range of sites when scrutinizing applicants. [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html] While these reputational problems similarly exist for those who posted content as adults, the problem of online identity and reputation is particularly compelling in the case of minors.

	==The Recent Scholarship and Other Proposed Solutions==		==The Recent Scholarship and Other Proposed Solutions==

ChristineEzzell: /* Relevant Sources for Further Reading */

2010-12-19T16:08:08Z

Relevant Sources for Further Reading

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	:*Proposes a “Respect My Privacy” framework focused on using code to display privacy preferences in order to make users more aware of the restrictions associated with shared data and relying largely on social norms for compliance.		:*Proposes a “Respect My Privacy” framework focused on using code to display privacy preferences in order to make users more aware of the restrictions associated with shared data and relying largely on social norms for compliance.

	*[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1689865" Reputation in a Networked World," by David S. Ardia]		*[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1689865" Reputation in a Networked World," David S. Ardia]
	:*Argues that the focus should be on ensuring the reliability of reputational information rather than on imposing liability and advocates community governance.		:*Argues that the focus should be on ensuring the reliability of reputational information rather than on imposing liability and advocates community governance.

	*[http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/privacy.htm#SpeechOnMattersOfPrivateConcern "Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You", Eugene Volokh]		*[http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/privacy.htm#SpeechOnMattersOfPrivateConcern "Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You", Eugene Volokh]
	:* Finds that "[t]he possible unintended consequences of various justifications for information privacy speech restrictions... are sufficiently troubling" enough to oppose them.		:* Finds that "[t]he possible unintended consequences of various justifications for information privacy speech restrictions... are sufficiently troubling" enough to oppose them.

ChristineEzzell: /* Implications for Adults */

2010-12-19T16:04:01Z

Implications for Adults

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	A challenging situation is raised by adults who post material about themselves from when they were minors. Should this material be protected? Theoretically, it's more difficult to justify protecting this material on moral grounds (as society holds adults more responsible than youths for their actions), but on a practical level it may be necessary to extend protections to any material about minors -- regardless of when it is posted. This is largely because content can get copied and reposted on many other sites so that it can be hard to follow the trail of content to find when, where and by whom it was originally posted. To the extent that discovering the original posting information of content could lead to lengthy or complicated factual investigations, it goes against the simplified aim of the notice-and-takedown system.		A challenging situation is raised by adults who post material about themselves from when they were minors. Should this material be protected? Theoretically, it's more difficult to justify protecting this material on moral grounds (as society holds adults more responsible than youths for their actions), but on a practical level it may be necessary to extend protections to any material about minors -- regardless of when it is posted. This is largely because content can get copied and reposted on many other sites so that it can be hard to follow the trail of content to find when, where and by whom it was originally posted. To the extent that discovering the original posting information of content could lead to lengthy or complicated factual investigations, it goes against the simplified aim of the notice-and-takedown system.

	Given the potential liabilities of posting material about minors, it's possible that this law would have a chilling effect: discouraging adults and institutions from posting any materials about minors. For example, school systems may be reluctant to post class photos -- out of concern that alumni may issue notice and take-down requests to remove themselves from group pictures, forcing the school to either remove or digitally alter the photos. For a single group picture, one can imagine a steady stream of such requests over years and decades, so that the school is forced to progressively remove faces until only a few children remain. Given hundreds of class photos, the task could become daunting. Alternately, it would be far easier (and less expensive) for the school to prohibit the posting of all photography, which could have a detrimental effect on the students and historical records. These potential concerns are contemplated by MOIPA's objection limitation, and it is highly unlikely that banal photographs such as class photos from school would warrant an actual takedown of the material. It is so unlikely that most people would probably recognize this fact and not send a notice in the first place.		Given the potential liabilities of posting material about minors, it's possible that this law would have a chilling effect: discouraging adults and institutions from posting any materials about minors. For example, school systems may be reluctant to post class photos -- out of concern that alumni may issue notice and take-down requests to remove themselves from group pictures, forcing the school to either remove or digitally alter the photos. For a single group picture, one can imagine a steady stream of such requests over years and decades, so that the school is forced to progressively remove faces until only a few children remain. Given hundreds of class photos, the task could become daunting. Alternately, it would be far easier (and less expensive) for the school to prohibit the posting of all photography, which could have a detrimental effect on the students and historical records. These potential concerns are contemplated by MOIPA's objection limitation, however, and it is highly unlikely that banal photographs such as class photos from school would warrant an actual takedown of the material. It is so unlikely that most people would probably recognize this fact and not send a notice in the first place.

	Another implication for adults is that parents and guardians might seek to invoke the law on behalf of their children. For example, in the school photo scenario above, one can imagine a mother who does not like the depiction of her 5-year-old son and is empowered to take action against school. Or, more broadly, an over-protective parent requests that photos from birthday parties be removed from a friend's Facebook site. Although it is hoped that before resorting to MOIPA parents would first simply ask the friend to remove the offending photo, as would probably occur absent the law. MOIPA is intended as a resort for those with a real reputational grievance; it is not intended to -- nor is it likely to -- replace social norms. Nevertheless, any negative impact of such a parental response is again tempered by the objective reasonableness limitation in the law. School photos and ordinary birthday party photos would be very unlikely to satisfy all of the takedown requirements.		Another implication for adults is that parents and guardians might seek to invoke the law on behalf of their children. For example, in the school photo scenario above, one can imagine a mother who does not like the depiction of her 5-year-old son and is empowered to take action against school. Or, more broadly, an over-protective parent requests that photos from birthday parties be removed from a friend's Facebook site. Although it is hoped that before resorting to MOIPA parents would first simply ask the friend to remove the offending photo, as would probably occur absent the law. MOIPA is intended as a resort for those with a real reputational grievance; it is not intended to -- nor is it likely to -- replace social norms. Nevertheless, any negative impact of such a parental response is again tempered by the objective reasonableness limitation in the law. School photos and ordinary birthday party photos would be very unlikely to satisfy all of the takedown requirements.

ChristineEzzell: /* Implications for Adults */

2010-12-19T15:57:19Z

Implications for Adults

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	===Implications for Adults===		===Implications for Adults===

	A challenging situation is raised by adults who post material about themselves from when they were minors. Should this material be protected? Theoretically, it's more difficult to justify protecting this material on moral grounds (as society holds adults more responsible than youths for their actions), but on a practical level it may be necessary to extend protections to any material about minors -- regardless of when it is posted.		A challenging situation is raised by adults who post material about themselves from when they were minors. Should this material be protected? Theoretically, it's more difficult to justify protecting this material on moral grounds (as society holds adults more responsible than youths for their actions), but on a practical level it may be necessary to extend protections to any material about minors -- regardless of when it is posted. This is largely because content can get copied and reposted on many other sites so that it can be hard to follow the trail of content to find when, where and by whom it was originally posted. To the extent that discovering the original posting information of content could lead to lengthy or complicated factual investigations, it goes against the simplified aim of the notice-and-takedown system.

	Given the potential liabilities of posting material about minors, it's possible that this law would have a chilling effect: discouraging adults and institutions from posting any materials about minors. For example, school systems may be reluctant to post class photos -- out of concern that alumni may issue notice and take-down requests to remove themselves from group pictures, forcing the school to either remove or digitally alter the photos. For a single group picture, one can imagine a steady stream of such requests over years and decades, so that the school is forced to progressively remove faces until only a few children remain. Given hundreds of class photos, the task could become daunting. Alternately, it would be far easier (and less expensive) for the school to prohibit the posting of all photography, which could ~~arguably~~ have a detrimental effect on the students and historical records.		Given the potential liabilities of posting material about minors, it's possible that this law would have a chilling effect: discouraging adults and institutions from posting any materials about minors. For example, school systems may be reluctant to post class photos -- out of concern that alumni may issue notice and take-down requests to remove themselves from group pictures, forcing the school to either remove or digitally alter the photos. For a single group picture, one can imagine a steady stream of such requests over years and decades, so that the school is forced to progressively remove faces until only a few children remain. Given hundreds of class photos, the task could become daunting. Alternately, it would be far easier (and less expensive) for the school to prohibit the posting of all photography, which could have a detrimental effect on the students and historical records. These potential concerns are contemplated by MOIPA's objection limitation, and it is highly unlikely that banal photographs such as class photos from school would warrant an actual takedown of the material. It is so unlikely that most people would probably recognize this fact and not send a notice in the first place.

	Another implication for adults is that parents and guardians might seek to invoke the law on behalf of their children. For example, in the school photo scenario above, one can imagine a mother who does not like the depiction of her 5-year-old son and is empowered to take action against school. Or, more broadly, an over-protective parent ~~asks~~ that photos from birthday parties be removed from a friend's Facebook site. ~~The involvement of~~ parents ~~in controlling material about their children might alter~~ social norms.		Another implication for adults is that parents and guardians might seek to invoke the law on behalf of their children. For example, in the school photo scenario above, one can imagine a mother who does not like the depiction of her 5-year-old son and is empowered to take action against school. Or, more broadly, an over-protective parent requests that photos from birthday parties be removed from a friend's Facebook site. Although it is hoped that before resorting to MOIPA parents would first simply ask the friend to remove the offending photo, as would probably occur absent the law. MOIPA is intended as a resort for those with a real reputational grievance; it is not intended to -- nor is it likely to -- replace social norms. Nevertheless, any negative impact of such a parental response is again tempered by the objective reasonableness limitation in the law. School photos and ordinary birthday party photos would be very unlikely to satisfy all of the takedown requirements.

	==Relevant Sources for Further Reading==		==Relevant Sources for Further Reading==

ChristineEzzell: /* Effects on Behavior of Minors */

2010-12-19T15:37:12Z

Effects on Behavior of Minors

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	===Effects on Behavior of Minors===		===Effects on Behavior of Minors===

	To insure that MOIPA has a net social benefit, it will be important to educate minors about best practices for posting and removing content now and in years to come. One may assume that if minors are well-educated about MOIPA, they will be less prone to posting "risky" material -- especially about other minors -- out of concern that they may eventually ~~be subject to legal action and~~ need to remove it years or even ~~decades later~~. Yet it's also possible that new protections afforded to minors' content may have the opposite, unintended consequence: lowering inhibitions and promoting even more risky behavior online. Given their ability to retract photos and text later, teenagers may assume they have a temporary "free pass" to post whatever they wish. Perhaps the deciding factor will be the eventual ease or difficulty of managing material about minors. Youths may be least inhibited if a commercial content management service (yet to be invented) allows posters to easily search dates and friends' names and remove hundreds of offending images with a few clicks.		To insure that MOIPA has a net social benefit, it will be important to educate minors about best practices for posting and removing content now and in years to come. One may assume that if minors have seen and heard about the reputational damage inflicted on those who post material with reckless abandon and are well-educated about the MOIPA response, they will be less prone to posting "risky" material -- especially about other minors -- out of concern that they may eventually need to remove it years later and could even be subject to legal action if they do not. Yet it's also possible that new protections afforded to minors' content may have the opposite, unintended consequence: lowering inhibitions and promoting even more risky behavior online. Given their ability to retract photos and text later, teenagers may assume they have a temporary "free pass" to post whatever they wish. Perhaps the deciding factor will be the eventual ease or difficulty of managing material about minors. Youths may be least inhibited if a commercial content management service (yet to be invented) allows posters to easily search dates and friends' names and remove hundreds of offending images with a few clicks. Absent such a service, minors should be educated about the needless effort that will be required of them if they share large volumes of risky or unfavorable content about themselves with the intention of tracking it down and trying to have it removed later. Moreover, the objective limitation is such that they are not guaranteed to have the material removed even if desired. Overall, many lay people (as with most laws) will probably be largely unaware of or disinterested in MOIPA unless they have serious reputational issues linked to content about them on the internet. Even among those who are fully aware of their rights under MOIPA, most will probably be unwilling to exert the effort to locate instances of such content and initiate a takedown, in part because much of the content about minors will not be so damaging as to induce them to utilize (or to qualify for) MOIPA's benefits.

	===Implications for Adults===		===Implications for Adults===

ChristineEzzell: /* Impact for Content Intermediaries */

2010-12-19T15:15:27Z

Impact for Content Intermediaries

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	===Impact for Content Intermediaries===		===Impact for Content Intermediaries===

	MOIPA would have a significant impact on content intermediaries, such as search engines and social networking sites, who are significant aggregators of content posted by or about youths. A central question is who is responsible for what? Does an intermediary like Facebook have the same degree of liability as its third-party partners who create apps and make use of Facebook data? There will be advantages and disadvantages, including:		MOIPA would have a significant impact on content intermediaries, such as search engines and social networking sites, who are significant aggregators of content posted by or about youths. A central question is who is responsible for what? Does an intermediary like Facebook have the same degree of liability as its third-party partners who create apps and make use of Facebook data? There will be advantages and disadvantages of MOIPA on content intermediaries, including:

	'''Advantages:'''		'''Advantages:'''
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	:*Differentiate liability of main intermediaries and third-party app makers?		:*Differentiate liability of main intermediaries and third-party app makers?

	As we consider the effects on intermediaries, meta-data tags for material about minors might have an unintended consequence: encouraging new marketplaces for such material. For example, it may be relatively easy to design an aggregator that could compile photographs of minors then sell this material to third parties for whatever purposes. One application would be a company that compiles photos, then contacts the featured people and requests payment for scrubbing the photos from the Internet (issuing and managing notice and takedown requests). A more ethically dubious version of this would be a service to spot embarrassing photos (perhaps a crowd-sourced GWAP-style game to enlist taggers of the most humiliating material) and request payment for scrubbing them. These situations are purely hypothetical, yet such unintended consequences should be factored into the design and implementation of MOIPA.		As we consider the effects on intermediaries, meta-data tags for material about minors might have an unintended consequence: encouraging new marketplaces for such material. For example, it may be relatively easy to design an aggregator that could compile photographs of minors then sell this material to third parties for whatever purposes. One application would be a company that compiles photos, then contacts the featured people and requests payment for scrubbing the photos from the Internet (issuing and managing notice and takedown requests). A more ethically dubious version of this would be a service to spot embarrassing photos (perhaps a crowd-sourced GWAP-style game to enlist taggers of the most humiliating material) and request payment for scrubbing them. These situations are purely hypothetical, yet such unintended consequences should be factored into the design and implementation of MOIPA. By allowing for the personal legal right to be exercised without any fee (or costly judicial proceeding), and attempting to simplify the notice-and-takedown system to a brief online form, we have aimed to address these concerns, but still recognize that no system is without its imperfections.

	===Effects on Behavior of Minors===		===Effects on Behavior of Minors===

ChristineEzzell: /* Notice and Takedown */

2010-12-19T15:09:17Z

Notice and Takedown

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:09, 19 December 2010
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	The notice-and-takedown system should not require payment to utilize (unlike the DMCA) -- the right to control should be available to all. Otherwise, MOIPA could result in a social imbalance where the most well-off have the most "clean" records, or are more likely to engage in "youthful indiscretions" knowing they can make corrections later. The cost of cleansing a reputation is one of the primary concerns with market-based solutions, such as Reputation Defender.		The notice-and-takedown system should not require payment to utilize (unlike the DMCA) -- the right to control should be available to all. Otherwise, MOIPA could result in a social imbalance where the most well-off have the most "clean" records, or are more likely to engage in "youthful indiscretions" knowing they can make corrections later. The cost of cleansing a reputation is one of the primary concerns with market-based solutions, such as Reputation Defender.

	In general, takedown notices could be sent to whatever contact information is provided for a given website or ~~Content Intermediary~~. To properly implement an efficient and effective system, it might be prudent to require sites to list a MOIPA-designated agent (similar to a DMCA-designated agent; in fact, such an agent could serve both functions) for sending takedown notices.		In general, takedown notices could be sent to whatever contact information is provided for a given website, content intermediary, or search engine. To properly implement an efficient and effective system, it might be prudent to require sites to list a MOIPA-designated agent (similar to a DMCA-designated agent; in fact, such an agent could serve both functions) for sending takedown notices.

	===Impact for Content Intermediaries===		===Impact for Content Intermediaries===

ChristineEzzell: /* Notice and Takedown */

2010-12-19T15:08:10Z

Notice and Takedown

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:08, 19 December 2010
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	The notice-and-takedown system should not require payment to utilize (unlike the DMCA) -- the right to control should be available to all. Otherwise, MOIPA could result in a social imbalance where the most well-off have the most "clean" records, or are more likely to engage in "youthful indiscretions" knowing they can make corrections later. The cost of cleansing a reputation is one of the primary concerns with market-based solutions, such as Reputation Defender.		The notice-and-takedown system should not require payment to utilize (unlike the DMCA) -- the right to control should be available to all. Otherwise, MOIPA could result in a social imbalance where the most well-off have the most "clean" records, or are more likely to engage in "youthful indiscretions" knowing they can make corrections later. The cost of cleansing a reputation is one of the primary concerns with market-based solutions, such as Reputation Defender.

	In general, takedown notices could be sent to whatever contact information is provided for a given website or Content Intermediary. To properly implement an efficient and effective system, it might be prudent to require sites to list a MOIPA-designated agent (similar to a DMCA-designated agent; in fact, it could ~~be the same person~~) for sending takedown notices.		In general, takedown notices could be sent to whatever contact information is provided for a given website or Content Intermediary. To properly implement an efficient and effective system, it might be prudent to require sites to list a MOIPA-designated agent (similar to a DMCA-designated agent; in fact, such an agent could serve both functions) for sending takedown notices.

	===Impact for Content Intermediaries===		===Impact for Content Intermediaries===

ChristineEzzell: /* Notice and Takedown */

2010-12-19T15:07:28Z

Notice and Takedown

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:07, 19 December 2010
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	The notice-and-takedown system should not require payment to utilize (unlike the DMCA) -- the right to control should be available to all. Otherwise, MOIPA could result in a social imbalance where the most well-off have the most "clean" records, or are more likely to engage in "youthful indiscretions" knowing they can make corrections later. The cost of cleansing a reputation is one of the primary concerns with market-based solutions, such as Reputation Defender.		The notice-and-takedown system should not require payment to utilize (unlike the DMCA) -- the right to control should be available to all. Otherwise, MOIPA could result in a social imbalance where the most well-off have the most "clean" records, or are more likely to engage in "youthful indiscretions" knowing they can make corrections later. The cost of cleansing a reputation is one of the primary concerns with market-based solutions, such as Reputation Defender.

			In general, takedown notices could be sent to whatever contact information is provided for a given website or Content Intermediary. To properly implement an efficient and effective system, it might be prudent to require sites to list a MOIPA-designated agent (similar to a DMCA-designated agent; in fact, it could be the same person) for sending takedown notices.

	===Impact for Content Intermediaries===		===Impact for Content Intermediaries===