Challenges - Revision history

76.200.167.170: /* Other Challenges */

2011-02-06T04:33:08Z

Other Challenges

← Older revision		Revision as of 04:33, 6 February 2011
Line 71:		Line 71:
	It is unclear how Pharos would identify and ban fabricated human rights videos if most individuals submitting videos do so with little to no identifying information attached on the video to help the Pharos content team determine what is credible content and what is not. Without an effective procedure to identify and remove fabricated videos, Pharos might instigate needless political unrest or erode its own credibility, undermining activists’ and viewers’ trust in its ability to disseminate accurate information.		It is unclear how Pharos would identify and ban fabricated human rights videos if most individuals submitting videos do so with little to no identifying information attached on the video to help the Pharos content team determine what is credible content and what is not. Without an effective procedure to identify and remove fabricated videos, Pharos might instigate needless political unrest or erode its own credibility, undermining activists’ and viewers’ trust in its ability to disseminate accurate information.

	Another area of concern is ease of use by the end users. To be successful, Pharos would ideally make video upload easier than currently available tools do. ~~One of the methods of video upload discussed by~~ the ~~team would require accessing a VPN or Pharos~~-~~specific Tor network.<ref>''See'' [[Central Idea]].</ref> These methods of uploading videos~~ to ~~Pharos might be prohibitively complicated~~ for ~~the average human rights activist.~~		Another area of concern is ease of use by the end users. To be successful, Pharos would ideally make video upload easier than currently available tools do. It is unclear whether the finished end-to-end system would solve most usability and data security problems for human rights activists.<ref>''See'' [[Technical Capabilities]].</ref>

	~~Finally, it is disputable just how secure the direct channels between~~ human rights activists ~~and the centralized Pharos organization can be, from a technical standpoint~~.<ref>''See'' [[Technical Capabilities]].</ref>

	==Unintended Consequences==		==Unintended Consequences==

171.66.108.143: minor surface edits

2011-02-06T00:26:47Z

minor surface edits

Show changes

Lfong18: /* Costs and Funding */

2011-02-05T21:01:16Z

Costs and Funding

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:01, 5 February 2011
Line 36:		Line 36:
	Most governments would fear the destabilizing effects of videos posted by their citizens or the geopolitical consequences of funding such an effort. Most venture capitalists and other profit-seeking investors would not be interested in funding Pharos because Pharos will not generate profit.		Most governments would fear the destabilizing effects of videos posted by their citizens or the geopolitical consequences of funding such an effort. Most venture capitalists and other profit-seeking investors would not be interested in funding Pharos because Pharos will not generate profit.

	Philanthropists would be the most promising source of funding. Many philanthropists would be attracted to the broad goals of Pharos. Some, however, may object to the organization’s definition of acceptable content or who sits on Pharos's Board of Directors. <ref>''See'' [[#Governance and Defining Acceptable Content\|Governance and Defining Acceptable Content]].</ref> For example, an American philanthropist that generally supports ending human rights abuses may object if Pharos decides to host video content exposing American troops’ firing on Iraqi or Afghani civilians because of the video’s potential to further deepen anti-American sentiment in the Middle East.		Philanthropists would be the most promising source of funding. Many philanthropists would be attracted to the broad goals of Pharos. Some, however, may object to the organization’s definition of acceptable content or who sits on Pharos's Board of Directors.<ref>''See'' [[#Governance and Defining Acceptable Content\|Governance and Defining Acceptable Content]].</ref> For example, an American philanthropist that generally supports ending human rights abuses may object if Pharos decides to host video content exposing American troops’ firing on Iraqi or Afghani civilians because of the video’s potential to further deepen anti-American sentiment in the Middle East.

	===Governance and Defining Acceptable Content===		===Governance and Defining Acceptable Content===

Lfong18: /* Governance and Defining Acceptable Content */

2011-02-05T20:59:53Z

Governance and Defining Acceptable Content

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:59, 5 February 2011
Line 43:		Line 43:
	Extremist groups might submit videos to Pharos that are intended to terrorize a population. Determining whether it is appropriate to disseminate a video showing the capture or the killing of a civilian would be difficult. When the video of journalist Daniel Pearl’s beheading circulated on the Internet, many video hosting services decided to continue hosting the video even though some individuals, including Senator Joe Lieberman, asked for YouTube to remove graphic and violent videos that seemed to further the end of terrorists.<ref>''See'' J. Lieberman and S. Collins, ''Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the homegrown Terrorist Threat''. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 8 2008), http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/IslamistReport.pdf.</ref> Like Lieberman, some philanthropists might object to content that is distributed to further the end of a terrorist or extremist organization.<ref>''See, e.g.'', Peter Finn, ''Khalid Sheik Mohammed Killed U.S. Journalist Daniel Pearl, Report Finds'', WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/20/AR2011012000057.html (David Pearl’s killer said that the video of the beheading was made to serve Al Qaeda propaganda objectives).</ref> YouTube’s Community Guidelines advises uploaders not to post content that contains “graphic or gratuitous violence”<ref>http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines</ref> and yet YouTube decided that the right of the public to know what had happened to Daniel Pearl trumped other concerns.		Extremist groups might submit videos to Pharos that are intended to terrorize a population. Determining whether it is appropriate to disseminate a video showing the capture or the killing of a civilian would be difficult. When the video of journalist Daniel Pearl’s beheading circulated on the Internet, many video hosting services decided to continue hosting the video even though some individuals, including Senator Joe Lieberman, asked for YouTube to remove graphic and violent videos that seemed to further the end of terrorists.<ref>''See'' J. Lieberman and S. Collins, ''Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the homegrown Terrorist Threat''. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 8 2008), http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/IslamistReport.pdf.</ref> Like Lieberman, some philanthropists might object to content that is distributed to further the end of a terrorist or extremist organization.<ref>''See, e.g.'', Peter Finn, ''Khalid Sheik Mohammed Killed U.S. Journalist Daniel Pearl, Report Finds'', WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/20/AR2011012000057.html (David Pearl’s killer said that the video of the beheading was made to serve Al Qaeda propaganda objectives).</ref> YouTube’s Community Guidelines advises uploaders not to post content that contains “graphic or gratuitous violence”<ref>http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines</ref> and yet YouTube decided that the right of the public to know what had happened to Daniel Pearl trumped other concerns.

	In a similar situation, what position would Pharos take? The killing of individuals for a political purpose falls squarely within the definition of a human rights violation in international treaties and soft-law principles. But should the board remove ~~the~~ video to refuse satisfying the whims of a terrorist organization? Or should a larger interest in human rights or in circulating the truth trump other considerations? What positions would the former political leaders on the Pharos board take and how would those views influence Pharos’s decision?		In a similar situation, what position would Pharos take? The killing of individuals for a political purpose falls squarely within the definition of a human rights violation in international treaties and soft-law principles. But should the board remove a video to refuse satisfying the whims of a terrorist organization? Or should a larger interest in human rights or in circulating the truth trump other considerations? What positions would the former political leaders on the Pharos board take and how would those views influence Pharos’s decision?

	Defining the scope of acceptable content presents a particularly thorny problem for Pharos’s advisory board even though Pharos could skirt some issues by abiding by a policy that is as inclusive and as politically neutral as possible.		Defining the scope of acceptable content presents a particularly thorny problem for Pharos’s advisory board even though Pharos could skirt some issues by abiding by a policy that is as inclusive and as politically neutral as possible.

Lfong18: /* Other Challenges */

2011-02-05T20:57:36Z

Other Challenges

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:57, 5 February 2011
Line 71:		Line 71:
	It is unclear how Pharos would identify and ban fabricated human rights videos if most individuals submitting videos do so with little to no identifying information attached on the video to help the Pharos content team determine what is credible content and what is not. Without an effective procedure to identify and remove fabricated videos, Pharos might instigate needless political unrest or erode its own credibility, undermining activists’ and viewers’ trust in its ability to disseminate accurate information.		It is unclear how Pharos would identify and ban fabricated human rights videos if most individuals submitting videos do so with little to no identifying information attached on the video to help the Pharos content team determine what is credible content and what is not. Without an effective procedure to identify and remove fabricated videos, Pharos might instigate needless political unrest or erode its own credibility, undermining activists’ and viewers’ trust in its ability to disseminate accurate information.

	Another area of concern is ease of use by the end users. To be successful, Pharos would ideally make video upload easier than currently available tools do. One of the methods of video upload discussed by the team would require accessing a VPN or Pharos-specific Tor network.<ref>''See'' [[Central Idea]].</ref> These methods of uploading videos to Pharos might be prohibitively complicated for the average human rights activist.		Another area of concern is ease of use by the end users. To be successful, Pharos would ideally make video upload easier than currently available tools do. One of the methods of video upload discussed by the team would require accessing a VPN or Pharos-specific Tor network.<ref>''See'' [[Central Idea]].</ref> These methods of uploading videos to Pharos might be prohibitively complicated for the average human rights activist.

	Finally, it is disputable just how secure the direct channels between human rights activists and the centralized Pharos organization can be, from a technical standpoint.<ref>''See'' [[Technical Capabilities]].</ref>		Finally, it is disputable just how secure the direct channels between human rights activists and the centralized Pharos organization can be, from a technical standpoint.<ref>''See'' [[Technical Capabilities]].</ref>

Lfong18: /* Foundational Considerations: Defining the Problem */

2011-02-05T20:53:12Z

Foundational Considerations: Defining the Problem

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:53, 5 February 2011
Line 18:		Line 18:
	*'''For-profit services''', such as YouTube, '''are particularly susceptible to government requests for takedown'''; as a result, human rights videos are not either being posted to these for-profit hosting sites or being taken down.		*'''For-profit services''', such as YouTube, '''are particularly susceptible to government requests for takedown'''; as a result, human rights videos are not either being posted to these for-profit hosting sites or being taken down.

	Some of the problems above can be addressed without the creation of a new organization and the design of a new technological system. For example, in order to address human rights activists’ lack of technical expertise, some researchers have run technology training sessions.<ref>''See generally'', http://irevolution.wordpress.com/ (detailing Patrick Meier’s insight on deploying crisis mapping technologies to further civil resistance against repressive regimes).</ref> Patrick Meier, a researcher studying the use of technologies in civil resistance against repressive regimes, has led technology training sessions to teach individuals how to use technologies like Ushahidi, a tool that uses crowdsourced information to map the emergence of natural disasters and government abuses against citizens.<ref> http://ushahidi.com/about-us; ''see also'' http://jan30sudan.crowdmap.com/ (mapping civil resistance by Sudanese citizens against the government and indicating times and places where protesters have been killed).</ref>		Some of the problems above can be addressed without the creation of a new organization and the design of a new technological system. For example, in order to address human rights activists’ lack of technical expertise, some researchers have run technology training sessions.<ref>''See generally'', http://irevolution.wordpress.com/ (detailing Patrick Meier’s insight on deploying crisis mapping technologies to further civil resistance against repressive regimes).</ref> Patrick Meier, a researcher studying the use of technologies in civil resistance against repressive regimes, has led technology training sessions to teach individuals how to use existing technologies like Ushahidi, a tool that uses crowdsourced information to map the emergence of natural disasters and government abuses against citizens.<ref> http://ushahidi.com/about-us; ''see also'' http://jan30sudan.crowdmap.com/ (mapping civil resistance by Sudanese citizens against the government and indicating times and places where protesters have been killed).</ref>

	If existing technologies are not being leveraged to the extent possible by human rights activists because they do not know of these tools’ existence, training sessions or branding efforts may similarly be used to inform human rights activists of the tools at their disposal. Low-cost video editing software that strips metatags from the video and enables face blurring could provide a similarly narrow solution to address the problem of government efforts to identify and jail dissidents who upload or are featured in human rights videos.		If existing technologies are not being leveraged to the extent possible by human rights activists because they do not know of these tools’ existence, training sessions or branding efforts may similarly be used to inform human rights activists of the tools at their disposal. Low-cost video editing software that strips metatags from the video and enables face blurring could provide a similarly narrow solution to address the problem of government efforts to identify and jail dissidents who upload or are featured in human rights videos.

Lfong18: /* Foundational Considerations: Defining the Problem */

2011-02-05T20:52:43Z

Foundational Considerations: Defining the Problem

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:52, 5 February 2011
Line 4:		Line 4:

	The Pharos Project is premised on the idea that in spite of a rise in low-cost video technologies, a dearth of video footage about human rights abuses currently exists<ref> ''Contra'' E-mail from Patrick Meier, Director of Crisis Mapping, Ushahidi and Doctoral Research Fellow, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Harvard University (Feb. 1, 2011, 18:21 PDT) (on file with author) (stating that there is currently no dearth of footage about human rights abuses circulating on the Internet, specifically pointing to the videos on YouTube and Witness.org documenting government-endorsed brutality against civilian protesters in Egypt as Mubarak struggles to stay in power).</ref> and that this is because there is no end-to-end system that allows the upload, sanitation, and hosting of human rights videos. Assuming for the moment that there exists a true dearth of videos about human rights abuses, it is unclear what has stymied the use of video technologies to document and report human rights abuses. It is possible that few human rights videos have been circulated for reasons independent of a lack of a technological system that sanitizes and serves as an end-to-end upload-and-hosting service for human rights videos.		The Pharos Project is premised on the idea that in spite of a rise in low-cost video technologies, a dearth of video footage about human rights abuses currently exists<ref> ''Contra'' E-mail from Patrick Meier, Director of Crisis Mapping, Ushahidi and Doctoral Research Fellow, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Harvard University (Feb. 1, 2011, 18:21 PDT) (on file with author) (stating that there is currently no dearth of footage about human rights abuses circulating on the Internet, specifically pointing to the videos on YouTube and Witness.org documenting government-endorsed brutality against civilian protesters in Egypt as Mubarak struggles to stay in power).</ref> and that this is because there is no end-to-end system that allows the upload, sanitation, and hosting of human rights videos. Assuming for the moment that there exists a true dearth of videos about human rights abuses, it is unclear what has stymied the use of video technologies to document and report human rights abuses. It is possible that few human rights videos have been circulated for reasons independent of a lack of a technological system that sanitizes and serves as an end-to-end upload-and-hosting service for human rights videos.


	For example, Internet penetration in Africa remains low—one 2010 study estimates that only about 10.9 percent of the population in the continent has Internet access.<ref>Internet World Stats, ''Usage and Population Statistics'', http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm; http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/ict/index.html; http://www.oafrica.com/statistics/internet-penetration-vs-human-development-index-2010/ </ref> The lack of Internet access could explain why human rights activists make limited use of video technologies to upload human rights content onto the web. Social norms may also drive whether and how technologies are used to further human rights. It is generally unlawful to record evidence of human rights abuses in countries that practice censorship and citizens in those countries may hew to the rule of law even if there is a real need and desire to report these abuses. In the latter instance, social practices surrounding technology use--not the lack of technology--might be the primary obstacle to the creation and dissemination of human rights videos.		For example, Internet penetration in Africa remains low—one 2010 study estimates that only about 10.9 percent of the population in the continent has Internet access.<ref>Internet World Stats, ''Usage and Population Statistics'', http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm; http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/ict/index.html; http://www.oafrica.com/statistics/internet-penetration-vs-human-development-index-2010/ </ref> The lack of Internet access could explain why human rights activists make limited use of video technologies to upload human rights content onto the web. Social norms may also drive whether and how technologies are used to further human rights. It is generally unlawful to record evidence of human rights abuses in countries that practice censorship and citizens in those countries may hew to the rule of law even if there is a real need and desire to report these abuses. In the latter instance, social practices surrounding technology use--not the lack of technology--might be the primary obstacle to the creation and dissemination of human rights videos.


	In addition, some human rights activists might choose not to film and circulate videos documenting human rights abuses because increasing international exposure of a particular type of government abuse may not stop government abuses.<ref>Interview with Jennifer Gibson, former human rights activist for Save the Children (Feb. 3, 2011) (on file with author). ''See, infra'', [[#Unintended Consequences\|Unintended Consequences]].</ref> The “range of human rights abuses” is wide, and human rights advocacy taking the form of “pursuing reform through formal judicial routes or diplomatic channels” might be more effective in a variety of situations.<ref>Gibson, ''supra'', note 3.</ref> The solution offered by Pharos may be ill-suited to addressing first-order issues like network connection and social practices surrounding technology use.		In addition, some human rights activists might choose not to film and circulate videos documenting human rights abuses because increasing international exposure of a particular type of government abuse may not stop government abuses.<ref>Interview with Jennifer Gibson, former human rights activist for Save the Children (Feb. 3, 2011) (on file with author). ''See, infra'', [[#Unintended Consequences\|Unintended Consequences]].</ref> The “range of human rights abuses” is wide, and human rights advocacy taking the form of “pursuing reform through formal judicial routes or diplomatic channels” might be more effective in a variety of situations.<ref>Gibson, ''supra'', note 3.</ref> The solution offered by Pharos may be ill-suited to addressing first-order issues like network connection and social practices surrounding technology use.


	More precision is needed in defining the problems Pharos hopes to solve. In internal discussions, the Pharos team proposed several potential hypotheses, each of which should be critically examined:		More precision is needed in defining the problems Pharos hopes to solve. In internal discussions, the Pharos team proposed several potential hypotheses, each of which should be critically examined:
Line 20:		Line 17:
	*'''Current technologies''' (like Tor) that can be used by human rights activists '''are underleveraged''' because human rights activists do not know about their existence.		*'''Current technologies''' (like Tor) that can be used by human rights activists '''are underleveraged''' because human rights activists do not know about their existence.
	*'''For-profit services''', such as YouTube, '''are particularly susceptible to government requests for takedown'''; as a result, human rights videos are not either being posted to these for-profit hosting sites or being taken down.		*'''For-profit services''', such as YouTube, '''are particularly susceptible to government requests for takedown'''; as a result, human rights videos are not either being posted to these for-profit hosting sites or being taken down.


	Some of the problems above can be addressed without the creation of a new organization and the design of a new technological system. For example, in order to address human rights activists’ lack of technical expertise, some researchers have run technology training sessions.<ref>''See generally'', http://irevolution.wordpress.com/ (detailing Patrick Meier’s insight on deploying crisis mapping technologies to further civil resistance against repressive regimes).</ref> Patrick Meier, a researcher studying the use of technologies in civil resistance against repressive regimes, has led technology training sessions to teach individuals how to use technologies like Ushahidi, a tool that uses crowdsourced information to map the emergence of natural disasters and government abuses against citizens.<ref> http://ushahidi.com/about-us; ''see also'' http://jan30sudan.crowdmap.com/ (mapping civil resistance by Sudanese citizens against the government and indicating times and places where protesters have been killed).</ref>		Some of the problems above can be addressed without the creation of a new organization and the design of a new technological system. For example, in order to address human rights activists’ lack of technical expertise, some researchers have run technology training sessions.<ref>''See generally'', http://irevolution.wordpress.com/ (detailing Patrick Meier’s insight on deploying crisis mapping technologies to further civil resistance against repressive regimes).</ref> Patrick Meier, a researcher studying the use of technologies in civil resistance against repressive regimes, has led technology training sessions to teach individuals how to use technologies like Ushahidi, a tool that uses crowdsourced information to map the emergence of natural disasters and government abuses against citizens.<ref> http://ushahidi.com/about-us; ''see also'' http://jan30sudan.crowdmap.com/ (mapping civil resistance by Sudanese citizens against the government and indicating times and places where protesters have been killed).</ref>


	If existing technologies are not being leveraged to the extent possible by human rights activists because they do not know of these tools’ existence, training sessions or branding efforts may similarly be used to inform human rights activists of the tools at their disposal. Low-cost video editing software that strips metatags from the video and enables face blurring could provide a similarly narrow solution to address the problem of government efforts to identify and jail dissidents who upload or are featured in human rights videos.		If existing technologies are not being leveraged to the extent possible by human rights activists because they do not know of these tools’ existence, training sessions or branding efforts may similarly be used to inform human rights activists of the tools at their disposal. Low-cost video editing software that strips metatags from the video and enables face blurring could provide a similarly narrow solution to address the problem of government efforts to identify and jail dissidents who upload or are featured in human rights videos.


	Going forward, more information providing support for the hypotheses debated within the team is needed to determine if a new technological system is needed, and if so, what features of such a technological system would most aid the dissemination of human rights media.		Going forward, more information providing support for the hypotheses debated within the team is needed to determine if a new technological system is needed, and if so, what features of such a technological system would most aid the dissemination of human rights media.

Lfong18: /* Costs and Funding */

2011-02-05T20:52:17Z

Costs and Funding

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:52, 5 February 2011
Line 37:		Line 37:

	The costs of running a non-profit organization like Pharos would be significant. Resources would be needed to train a sophisticated technology team to keep the Pharos’s servers secure. Regular staff would be needed to blur faces and remove metatags and other identifiable information from the videos. Educating human rights organizations about Pharos and branding and disseminating information about Pharos would also be expensive because it would require visiting many different NGOs around the world.		The costs of running a non-profit organization like Pharos would be significant. Resources would be needed to train a sophisticated technology team to keep the Pharos’s servers secure. Regular staff would be needed to blur faces and remove metatags and other identifiable information from the videos. Educating human rights organizations about Pharos and branding and disseminating information about Pharos would also be expensive because it would require visiting many different NGOs around the world.


	Finding sources of funding might be problematic because of the highly political nature of Pharos’s mission. Each of the potential sources of funding—governments, venture capitalists, and philanthropists—might have concerns that limit their willingness to donate.		Finding sources of funding might be problematic because of the highly political nature of Pharos’s mission. Each of the potential sources of funding—governments, venture capitalists, and philanthropists—might have concerns that limit their willingness to donate.


	Most governments would fear the destabilizing effects of videos posted by their citizens or the geopolitical consequences of funding such an effort. Most venture capitalists and other profit-seeking investors would not be interested in funding Pharos because Pharos will not generate profit.		Most governments would fear the destabilizing effects of videos posted by their citizens or the geopolitical consequences of funding such an effort. Most venture capitalists and other profit-seeking investors would not be interested in funding Pharos because Pharos will not generate profit.


	Philanthropists would be the most promising source of funding. Many philanthropists would be attracted to the broad goals of Pharos. Some, however, may object to the organization’s definition of acceptable content or who sits on Pharos's Board of Directors. <ref>''See'' [[#Governance and Defining Acceptable Content\|Governance and Defining Acceptable Content]].</ref> For example, an American philanthropist that generally supports ending human rights abuses may object if Pharos decides to host video content exposing American troops’ firing on Iraqi or Afghani civilians because of the video’s potential to further deepen anti-American sentiment in the Middle East.		Philanthropists would be the most promising source of funding. Many philanthropists would be attracted to the broad goals of Pharos. Some, however, may object to the organization’s definition of acceptable content or who sits on Pharos's Board of Directors. <ref>''See'' [[#Governance and Defining Acceptable Content\|Governance and Defining Acceptable Content]].</ref> For example, an American philanthropist that generally supports ending human rights abuses may object if Pharos decides to host video content exposing American troops’ firing on Iraqi or Afghani civilians because of the video’s potential to further deepen anti-American sentiment in the Middle East.

Lfong18: /* Governance and Defining Acceptable Content */

2011-02-05T20:50:57Z

Governance and Defining Acceptable Content

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:50, 5 February 2011
Line 52:		Line 52:
	Extremist groups might submit videos to Pharos that are intended to terrorize a population. Determining whether it is appropriate to disseminate a video showing the capture or the killing of a civilian would be difficult. When the video of journalist Daniel Pearl’s beheading circulated on the Internet, many video hosting services decided to continue hosting the video even though some individuals, including Senator Joe Lieberman, asked for YouTube to remove graphic and violent videos that seemed to further the end of terrorists.<ref>''See'' J. Lieberman and S. Collins, ''Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the homegrown Terrorist Threat''. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 8 2008), http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/IslamistReport.pdf.</ref> Like Lieberman, some philanthropists might object to content that is distributed to further the end of a terrorist or extremist organization.<ref>''See, e.g.'', Peter Finn, ''Khalid Sheik Mohammed Killed U.S. Journalist Daniel Pearl, Report Finds'', WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/20/AR2011012000057.html (David Pearl’s killer said that the video of the beheading was made to serve Al Qaeda propaganda objectives).</ref> YouTube’s Community Guidelines advises uploaders not to post content that contains “graphic or gratuitous violence”<ref>http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines</ref> and yet YouTube decided that the right of the public to know what had happened to Daniel Pearl trumped other concerns.		Extremist groups might submit videos to Pharos that are intended to terrorize a population. Determining whether it is appropriate to disseminate a video showing the capture or the killing of a civilian would be difficult. When the video of journalist Daniel Pearl’s beheading circulated on the Internet, many video hosting services decided to continue hosting the video even though some individuals, including Senator Joe Lieberman, asked for YouTube to remove graphic and violent videos that seemed to further the end of terrorists.<ref>''See'' J. Lieberman and S. Collins, ''Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the homegrown Terrorist Threat''. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 8 2008), http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/IslamistReport.pdf.</ref> Like Lieberman, some philanthropists might object to content that is distributed to further the end of a terrorist or extremist organization.<ref>''See, e.g.'', Peter Finn, ''Khalid Sheik Mohammed Killed U.S. Journalist Daniel Pearl, Report Finds'', WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/20/AR2011012000057.html (David Pearl’s killer said that the video of the beheading was made to serve Al Qaeda propaganda objectives).</ref> YouTube’s Community Guidelines advises uploaders not to post content that contains “graphic or gratuitous violence”<ref>http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines</ref> and yet YouTube decided that the right of the public to know what had happened to Daniel Pearl trumped other concerns.

	In a similar situation, what position would Pharos take? The killing of individuals for a political purpose falls squarely within the definition of a human rights violation in international treaties and soft-law ~~norms~~. But should the board remove the video to refuse satisfying the whims of a terrorist organization? Or should a larger interest in human rights or in circulating the truth trump other considerations? What positions would the former political leaders on the Pharos board take and how would those views influence Pharos’s decision?		In a similar situation, what position would Pharos take? The killing of individuals for a political purpose falls squarely within the definition of a human rights violation in international treaties and soft-law principles. But should the board remove the video to refuse satisfying the whims of a terrorist organization? Or should a larger interest in human rights or in circulating the truth trump other considerations? What positions would the former political leaders on the Pharos board take and how would those views influence Pharos’s decision?

	Defining the scope of acceptable content presents a particularly thorny problem for Pharos’s advisory board even though Pharos could skirt some issues by abiding by a policy that is as inclusive and as politically neutral as possible.		Defining the scope of acceptable content presents a particularly thorny problem for Pharos’s advisory board even though Pharos could skirt some issues by abiding by a policy that is as inclusive and as politically neutral as possible.

Lfong18: /* Governance and Defining Acceptable Content */

2011-02-05T20:48:19Z

Governance and Defining Acceptable Content

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:48, 5 February 2011
Line 52:		Line 52:
	Extremist groups might submit videos to Pharos that are intended to terrorize a population. Determining whether it is appropriate to disseminate a video showing the capture or the killing of a civilian would be difficult. When the video of journalist Daniel Pearl’s beheading circulated on the Internet, many video hosting services decided to continue hosting the video even though some individuals, including Senator Joe Lieberman, asked for YouTube to remove graphic and violent videos that seemed to further the end of terrorists.<ref>''See'' J. Lieberman and S. Collins, ''Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the homegrown Terrorist Threat''. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 8 2008), http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/IslamistReport.pdf.</ref> Like Lieberman, some philanthropists might object to content that is distributed to further the end of a terrorist or extremist organization.<ref>''See, e.g.'', Peter Finn, ''Khalid Sheik Mohammed Killed U.S. Journalist Daniel Pearl, Report Finds'', WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/20/AR2011012000057.html (David Pearl’s killer said that the video of the beheading was made to serve Al Qaeda propaganda objectives).</ref> YouTube’s Community Guidelines advises uploaders not to post content that contains “graphic or gratuitous violence”<ref>http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines</ref> and yet YouTube decided that the right of the public to know what had happened to Daniel Pearl trumped other concerns.		Extremist groups might submit videos to Pharos that are intended to terrorize a population. Determining whether it is appropriate to disseminate a video showing the capture or the killing of a civilian would be difficult. When the video of journalist Daniel Pearl’s beheading circulated on the Internet, many video hosting services decided to continue hosting the video even though some individuals, including Senator Joe Lieberman, asked for YouTube to remove graphic and violent videos that seemed to further the end of terrorists.<ref>''See'' J. Lieberman and S. Collins, ''Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the homegrown Terrorist Threat''. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Mar. 8 2008), http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/IslamistReport.pdf.</ref> Like Lieberman, some philanthropists might object to content that is distributed to further the end of a terrorist or extremist organization.<ref>''See, e.g.'', Peter Finn, ''Khalid Sheik Mohammed Killed U.S. Journalist Daniel Pearl, Report Finds'', WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/20/AR2011012000057.html (David Pearl’s killer said that the video of the beheading was made to serve Al Qaeda propaganda objectives).</ref> YouTube’s Community Guidelines advises uploaders not to post content that contains “graphic or gratuitous violence”<ref>http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines</ref> and yet YouTube decided that the right of the public to know what had happened to Daniel Pearl trumped other concerns.

	In a similar situation, what position would Pharos take? ~~Should~~ the board remove the video to refuse satisfying the whims of a terrorist organization? Or should a larger interest in human rights or in circulating the truth trump other considerations? What positions would the former political leaders on the Pharos board take and how would those views influence Pharos’s decision?		In a similar situation, what position would Pharos take? The killing of individuals for a political purpose falls squarely within the definition of a human rights violation in international treaties and soft-law norms. But should the board remove the video to refuse satisfying the whims of a terrorist organization? Or should a larger interest in human rights or in circulating the truth trump other considerations? What positions would the former political leaders on the Pharos board take and how would those views influence Pharos’s decision?

	Defining the scope of acceptable content presents a particularly thorny problem for Pharos’s advisory board even though Pharos could skirt some issues by abiding by a policy that is as inclusive and as politically neutral as possible.		Defining the scope of acceptable content presents a particularly thorny problem for Pharos’s advisory board even though Pharos could skirt some issues by abiding by a policy that is as inclusive and as politically neutral as possible.