Institutional structure: Difference between revisions
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The scarcity of official coordination between different government agencies raises a number of issues. Agencies may claim overlapping jurisdiction, leading to inefficient staffing and funding decisions (as well as inter-agency tension). At the same time, gaps in coverage between the jurisdictions of various agencies may emerge elsewhere. The inability of agencies effectively to share intelligence about possible threats in new technological contexts contributes to slower and less successful government responses. | The scarcity of official coordination between different government agencies raises a number of issues. Agencies may claim overlapping jurisdiction, leading to inefficient staffing and funding decisions (as well as inter-agency tension). At the same time, gaps in coverage between the jurisdictions of various agencies may emerge elsewhere. The inability of agencies effectively to share intelligence about possible threats in new technological contexts contributes to slower and less successful government responses. | ||
As one example, this New York Times article describes how one hacker, Albert Gonzalez, was able to evade capture by the police for a number of attacks on different commercial websites while he was simultaneously under protection as a Secret Service informant. | As one example, [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/magazine/14Hacker-t.html this New York Times article] describes how one hacker, Albert Gonzalez, was able to evade capture by the police for a number of attacks on different commercial websites while he was simultaneously under protection as a Secret Service informant. | ||
= Centralization vs. Decentralization = | = Centralization vs. Decentralization = | ||
= Top-down vs. Bottom-up Institutional Response = | = Top-down vs. Bottom-up Institutional Response = | ||
Revision as of 18:30, 18 December 2010
Introduction
Status Quo
The government structures for responding to cyber-threats are complex, with a number of agencies sharing authority in occasionally overlapping areas.
CHART
This chart, while by no means an exhaustive survey of government action in the realm of cybercrime and cyberwar, attempts to plot several of the major actors in those areas as well as the main ways in which those actors are linked together.
Actors
Various government and private actors participate in preventing, detecting, and responding to various cyber-threats. Broadly speaking, these actors fall into four different categories:
- Cyber-specific federal agencies (e.g. Cyber Command)
- Defense and investigation agencies (e.g. Department of Defense, FBI, CIA, NSA)
- Independent agencies with relevant concerns and vulnerabilities (e.g. Department of State, Federal Communications Commission)
- Private corporations
Links
- Structural
- Statutory
- Negotiated cooperation
- De facto cooperation
Current Problems
The scarcity of official coordination between different government agencies raises a number of issues. Agencies may claim overlapping jurisdiction, leading to inefficient staffing and funding decisions (as well as inter-agency tension). At the same time, gaps in coverage between the jurisdictions of various agencies may emerge elsewhere. The inability of agencies effectively to share intelligence about possible threats in new technological contexts contributes to slower and less successful government responses.
As one example, this New York Times article describes how one hacker, Albert Gonzalez, was able to evade capture by the police for a number of attacks on different commercial websites while he was simultaneously under protection as a Secret Service informant.