Trust in Cyberspace - Revision history

WikiSysop: /* Categorization */

2010-07-23T20:12:06Z

Categorization

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	==Categorization==		==Categorization==
	* ~~Resources~~ by Type: [[Independent Reports]]		* Resource by Type: [[Independent Reports]]
	* Threats and Actors: [[Military Networks (.mil)]]; [[Public Data Networks]]; [[Telephone]]		* Threats and Actors: [[Military Networks (.mil)]]; [[Public Data Networks]]; [[Telephone]]
	* Issues: [[Incentives]]; [[Public-Private Cooperation]]; [[Risk Management and Investment]]		* Issues: [[Incentives]]; [[Public-Private Cooperation]]; [[Risk Management and Investment]]

WikiSysop at 20:08, 23 July 2010

2010-07-23T20:08:00Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:08, 23 July 2010
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	==Categorization==		==Categorization==
			* Resources by Type: [[Independent Reports]]
	* ~~Overview~~: [[Independent Reports]]

	* Threats and Actors: [[Military Networks (.mil)]]; [[Public Data Networks]]; [[Telephone]]		* Threats and Actors: [[Military Networks (.mil)]]; [[Public Data Networks]]; [[Telephone]]

	* Issues: [[Incentives]]; [[Public-Private Cooperation]]; [[Risk Management and Investment]]		* Issues: [[Incentives]]; [[Public-Private Cooperation]]; [[Risk Management and Investment]]

	* Approaches: [[Government Organizations]]		* Approaches: [[Government Organizations]]

WikiSysop: /* Synopsis */

2010-07-13T19:29:30Z

Synopsis

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	To be labeled as trustworthy, a system not only must behave as expected but also must reinforce the belief that it will continue to produce expected behavior and will not be susceptible to subversion. The question of how to achieve assurance has been the target of several research programs sponsored by the Department of Defense and others. Yet currently practiced and proposed approaches for establishing assurance are still imperfect and/or impractical. Testing can demonstrate only that a flaw exists, not that all flaws have been found; deductive and analytical methods are practical only for certain small systems or specific properties. Moreover, all existing assurance methods are predicated on an unrealistic assumption—that system designers and implementers know what it means for a system to be “correct” before and during development. The study committee believes that progress in assurance for the foreseeable future will most likely come from figuring out (1) how to combine multiple approaches and (2) how best to leverage add-on technologies and other approaches to enhance existing imperfect systems. Improved assurance, without any pretense of establishing a certain or a quantifiable level of assurance, should be the aim.		To be labeled as trustworthy, a system not only must behave as expected but also must reinforce the belief that it will continue to produce expected behavior and will not be susceptible to subversion. The question of how to achieve assurance has been the target of several research programs sponsored by the Department of Defense and others. Yet currently practiced and proposed approaches for establishing assurance are still imperfect and/or impractical. Testing can demonstrate only that a flaw exists, not that all flaws have been found; deductive and analytical methods are practical only for certain small systems or specific properties. Moreover, all existing assurance methods are predicated on an unrealistic assumption—that system designers and implementers know what it means for a system to be “correct” before and during development. The study committee believes that progress in assurance for the foreseeable future will most likely come from figuring out (1) how to combine multiple approaches and (2) how best to leverage add-on technologies and other approaches to enhance existing imperfect systems. Improved assurance, without any pretense of establishing a certain or a quantifiable level of assurance, should be the aim.

	Key Findings ~~are~~:		===Key Findings:===

	* The public telephone network (PTN) is increasingly dependent on software and databases that constitute new points of vulnerability. Business decisions are also creating new points of vulnerability. Protective measures need to be developed and implemented.		* The public telephone network (PTN) is increasingly dependent on software and databases that constitute new points of vulnerability. Business decisions are also creating new points of vulnerability. Protective measures need to be developed and implemented.

WikiSysop: /* Key Words */

2010-07-13T19:29:08Z

Key Words

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	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#DDoS_Attack \| Denial of Service Attack]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#DDoS_Attack \| Denial of Service Attack]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Interdependencies \| Interdependencies]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Interdependencies \| Interdependencies]],
			[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Research_&_Development \| Research & Development]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Risk_Modeling \| Risk Modeling]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Risk_Modeling \| Risk Modeling]],
	~~[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Research_&_Development \| Research & Development]],~~
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#SCADA_Systems \| SCADA Systems]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#SCADA_Systems \| SCADA Systems]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Software_Vulnerability \| Software Vulnerability]]		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Software_Vulnerability \| Software Vulnerability]]

WikiSysop: /* Key Words */

2010-07-13T16:06:08Z

Key Words

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	==Key Words==		==Key Words==
			[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Computer_Network_Attack \| Computer Network Attack]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#COTS_Software \| COTS Software]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#COTS_Software \| COTS Software]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Cyber_Security_as_an_Externality \| Cyber Security as an Externality]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Cyber_Security_as_an_Externality \| Cyber Security as an Externality]],
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	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#DDoS_Attack \| Denial of Service Attack]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#DDoS_Attack \| Denial of Service Attack]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Interdependencies \| Interdependencies]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Interdependencies \| Interdependencies]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#~~Computer_Network_Attack~~ \| ~~Computer Network Attack~~]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Risk_Modeling \| Risk Modeling]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Software_Vulnerability \| Software Vulnerability]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Research_&_Development \| Research & Development]],
			[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#SCADA_Systems \| SCADA Systems]],
			[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Software_Vulnerability \| Software Vulnerability]]

	==Synopsis==		==Synopsis==

WikiSysop: /* Categorization */

2010-07-13T16:04:20Z

Categorization

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	* Overview: [[Independent Reports]]		* Overview: [[Independent Reports]]

	* Threats and Actors: ~~[[Telephone]];~~ [[Military Networks (.mil)]]; [[Public Data Networks]]		* Threats and Actors: [[Military Networks (.mil)]]; [[Public Data Networks]]; [[Telephone]]

	* Issues: [[Incentives]]; [[Public-Private Cooperation]]; [[Risk Management and Investment]]		* Issues: [[Incentives]]; [[Public-Private Cooperation]]; [[Risk Management and Investment]]

WikiSysop: /* Synopsis */

2010-07-13T16:03:54Z

Synopsis

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	* Obstacles exist to more widespread deployment of key management technology and there has been little experience with public-key infrastructures, especially large-scale ones.		* Obstacles exist to more widespread deployment of key management technology and there has been little experience with public-key infrastructures, especially large-scale ones.

	* Because NISs are distributed systems, network access control mechanisms play a central role in the security of NISs. Virtual private networks and firewalls have proven to be promising technologies and deserve greater attention in the future.

	* Because NISs are distributed systems, network access control mechanisms play a central role in the security of NISs. Virtual private networks and firewalls have proven to be promising technologies and deserve greater attention in the future.		* Because NISs are distributed systems, network access control mechanisms play a central role in the security of NISs. Virtual private networks and firewalls have proven to be promising technologies and deserve greater attention in the future.

WikiSysop: /* Synopsis */

2010-07-13T16:03:25Z

Synopsis

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	* The National Security Agency’s (NSA) organization must increase its efforts devoted to outreach and recruitment and retention issues.		* The National Security Agency’s (NSA) organization must increase its efforts devoted to outreach and recruitment and retention issues.

	* Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is generally effective in its interactions with the research community, but DARPA needs to increase its focus on information		* Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is generally effective in its interactions with the research community, but DARPA needs to increase its focus on information security and NIS trustworthiness research, especially with regard to long-term research efforts.
	security and NIS trustworthiness research, especially with regard to long-term research efforts.

	* An increase in expenditures for research in information security and NIS trustworthiness is warranted.		* An increase in expenditures for research in information security and NIS trustworthiness is warranted.

WikiSysop: /* Synopsis */

2010-07-13T16:03:09Z

Synopsis

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	* Formal methods are being used with success in commercial and industrial settings for hardware development and requirements analysis and with some success for software development. Increased support for both fundamental research and demonstration exercises is warranted.		* Formal methods are being used with success in commercial and industrial settings for hardware development and requirements analysis and with some success for software development. Increased support for both fundamental research and demonstration exercises is warranted.

	* Security research during the past few decades has been based on formal policy models that focus on protecting information from unauthorized access by specifying which users should have access to data or other system objects. It is time to challenge this paradigm of “absolute security” and move toward a model built on three axioms of insecurity: insecurity exists;		* Security research during the past few decades has been based on formal policy models that focus on protecting information from unauthorized access by specifying which users should have access to data or other system objects. It is time to challenge this paradigm of “absolute security” and move toward a model built on three axioms of insecurity: insecurity exists; insecurity cannot be destroyed; and insecurity can be moved around.
	insecurity cannot be destroyed; and insecurity can be moved around.

	* Cryptographic authentication and the use of hardware tokens are promising avenues for implementing authentication.		* Cryptographic authentication and the use of hardware tokens are promising avenues for implementing authentication.

WikiSysop: /* Synopsis */

2010-07-13T16:02:49Z

Synopsis

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:02, 13 July 2010
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	* Formal methods are being used with success in commercial and industrial settings for hardware development and requirements analysis and with some success for software development. Increased support for both fundamental research and demonstration exercises is warranted.		* Formal methods are being used with success in commercial and industrial settings for hardware development and requirements analysis and with some success for software development. Increased support for both fundamental research and demonstration exercises is warranted.

	* Security research during the past few decades has been based on formal policy models that focus on protecting information from unauthorized access by specifying which users should		* Security research during the past few decades has been based on formal policy models that focus on protecting information from unauthorized access by specifying which users should have access to data or other system objects. It is time to challenge this paradigm of “absolute security” and move toward a model built on three axioms of insecurity: insecurity exists;
	have access to data or other system objects. It is time to challenge this paradigm of “absolute security” and move toward a model built on three axioms of insecurity: insecurity exists;
	insecurity cannot be destroyed; and insecurity can be moved around.		insecurity cannot be destroyed; and insecurity can be moved around.

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	* Obstacles exist to more widespread deployment of key management technology and there has been little experience with public-key infrastructures, especially large-scale ones.		* Obstacles exist to more widespread deployment of key management technology and there has been little experience with public-key infrastructures, especially large-scale ones.

	* Because NISs are distributed systems, network access control mechanisms play a central role in the security of NISs. Virtual private networks and firewalls have proven to be promising		* Because NISs are distributed systems, network access control mechanisms play a central role in the security of NISs. Virtual private networks and firewalls have proven to be promising technologies and deserve greater attention in the future.
	technologies and deserve greater attention in the future.

	* Because NISs are distributed systems, network access control mechanisms play a central role in the security of NISs. Virtual private networks and firewalls have proven to be promising		* Because NISs are distributed systems, network access control mechanisms play a central role in the security of NISs. Virtual private networks and firewalls have proven to be promising technologies and deserve greater attention in the future.
	technologies and deserve greater attention in the future.

	* In its necessary efforts to pursue partnerships, the federal government also needs to work to develop trust in its relationships with the private sector, with some emphasis on U.S.-based firms.		* In its necessary efforts to pursue partnerships, the federal government also needs to work to develop trust in its relationships with the private sector, with some emphasis on U.S.-based firms.
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	* An increase in expenditures for research in information security and NIS trustworthiness is warranted.		* An increase in expenditures for research in information security and NIS trustworthiness is warranted.





	* Defending against denial-of-service attacks is often critical for the security of an NIS, because availability is often an important system property. Research in this area is urgently needed to identify general schemes for defending against such attacks.

	* Improved trustworthiness may be achieved by the careful organization of untrustworthy components. There are a number of promising ideas, but few have been vigorously pursued.
	~~“Trustworthiness from untrustworthy components” is a research area that deserves greater attention.~~

	* Imperfect information creates a disincentive to invest in trustworthiness for both consumers and producers, leading to a market failure. Initiatives to mitigate this problem are needed.

	* Consumer and producer costs for trustworthiness are difficult to assess. An improved understanding, better models, and more and accurate data are needed.

	* As a truly multidimensional concept, trustworthiness is dependent on all of its dimensions. However, in some sense, the problems of security are more challenging and therefore deserve
	~~special attention.~~

	* Export control and key-escrow policy concerns inhibit the widespread deployment of cryptography, but there are other important inhibitory factors that deserve increased attention and
	~~action.~~

	*

	==Additional Notes and Highlights==		==Additional Notes and Highlights==

	Expertise Required: Technology - Moderate		Expertise Required: Technology - Moderate

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:29, 13 July 2010
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	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#DDoS_Attack \| Denial of Service Attack]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#DDoS_Attack \| Denial of Service Attack]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Interdependencies \| Interdependencies]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Interdependencies \| Interdependencies]],
			[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Research_&_Development \| Research & Development]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Risk_Modeling \| Risk Modeling]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Risk_Modeling \| Risk Modeling]],
	~~[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Research_&_Development \| Research & Development]],~~
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#SCADA_Systems \| SCADA Systems]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#SCADA_Systems \| SCADA Systems]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Software_Vulnerability \| Software Vulnerability]]		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Software_Vulnerability \| Software Vulnerability]]

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:06, 13 July 2010
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	==Key Words==		==Key Words==
			[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Computer_Network_Attack \| Computer Network Attack]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#COTS_Software \| COTS Software]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#COTS_Software \| COTS Software]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Cyber_Security_as_an_Externality \| Cyber Security as an Externality]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Cyber_Security_as_an_Externality \| Cyber Security as an Externality]],
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	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#DDoS_Attack \| Denial of Service Attack]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#DDoS_Attack \| Denial of Service Attack]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Interdependencies \| Interdependencies]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Interdependencies \| Interdependencies]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#~~Computer_Network_Attack~~ \| ~~Computer Network Attack~~]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Risk_Modeling \| Risk Modeling]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Software_Vulnerability \| Software Vulnerability]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Research_&_Development \| Research & Development]],
			[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#SCADA_Systems \| SCADA Systems]],
			[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Software_Vulnerability \| Software Vulnerability]]

	==Synopsis==		==Synopsis==