A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security - Revision history

WikiSysop: /* Additional Notes and Highlights */

2010-08-19T20:46:36Z

Additional Notes and Highlights

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	==Additional Notes and Highlights==		==Additional Notes and Highlights==
			Expertise required: Logic - Low/Moderate

	Outline:		Outline:
	Introduction		Introduction

WikiSysop at 20:44, 19 August 2010

2010-08-19T20:44:50Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:44, 19 August 2010
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	[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=531782 ''SSRN'']		[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=531782 ''SSRN'']

	[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/?title=Special:Bibliography&view=&~~startkey~~=~~Swire~~:2004~~&f=wikibiblio.bib~~ ''BibTeX'']		[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Special:Bibliography?f=wikibiblio.bib&title=Special:Bibliography&view=&action=&keyword=swire:2004 ''BibTeX'']

	==Categorization==		==Categorization==

WikiSysop: /* Full Citation */

2010-08-19T20:43:39Z

Full Citation

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	Peter P. Swire, ''A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What is Different About Computer and Network Security? '' (Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, Vol. 2, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 17, 2004).		Peter P. Swire, ''A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What is Different About Computer and Network Security? '' (Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, Vol. 2, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 17, 2004).
	[http://www.rootsecure.net/content/downloads/pdf/disclosure_helps_security.pdf ''Web'']		[http://www.rootsecure.net/content/downloads/pdf/disclosure_helps_security.pdf ''Web'']

	[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=531782 ''SSRN'']		[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=531782 ''SSRN'']

Felix: /* Relaxing the Open Source Assumptions – Computer and Network Security in the Real World */

2010-06-29T20:03:40Z

Relaxing the Open Source Assumptions – Computer and Network Security in the Real World

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:03, 29 June 2010
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	is likely to be more or less effective at promoting security.		is likely to be more or less effective at promoting security.

			In summary, the author concludes that disclosure will tend to help the attackers but not the defenders in a military setting, where there is strong authentication of defenders and an established hierarchy to implement better defenses. Disclosure provides greater benefit to defenders when there are numerous third-party users, no effective way to communicate only to friendly defenders, and no hierarchical way to ensure that defenses are put into place.

	==Additional Notes and Highlights==		==Additional Notes and Highlights==

Felix: /* Key Words */

2010-06-29T19:50:54Z

Key Words

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	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Hacker \| Hacker]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Hacker \| Hacker]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Software_Vulnerability \| Software Vulnerability]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Software_Vulnerability \| Software Vulnerability]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Transparency \| Transparency]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Transparency \| Transparency]]


	==Synopsis==		==Synopsis==

Felix at 19:50, 29 June 2010

2010-06-29T19:50:34Z

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	==Key Words==		==Key Words==
			[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Communications_Privacy_Law \| Communications Privacy Law]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Disclosure_Policy \| Disclosure Policy]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Disclosure_Policy \| Disclosure Policy]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Hacker \| Hacker]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Hacker \| Hacker]],
	~~[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Communications_Privacy_Law \| Communications Privacy Law]],~~
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Software_Vulnerability \| Software Vulnerability]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Software_Vulnerability \| Software Vulnerability]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Transparency \| Transparency]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Transparency \| Transparency]],

Felix at 19:50, 29 June 2010

2010-06-29T19:50:01Z

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	==Categorization==		==Categorization==

	Issues: [[Information Sharing/Disclosure]]		*Issues: [[Incentives]]; [[Information Sharing/Disclosure]]
			*Approaches: [[Regulation/Liability]]

	==Key Words==		==Key Words==
	~~security~~, ~~free software~~, ~~secrecy~~
			[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Disclosure_Policy \| Disclosure Policy]],
			[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Hacker \| Hacker]],
			[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Communications_Privacy_Law \| Communications Privacy Law]],
			[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Software_Vulnerability \| Software Vulnerability]],
			[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Transparency \| Transparency]],


	==Synopsis==		==Synopsis==
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	This Article asks the question: When does disclosure actually help security? The discussion begins with a paradox. Most experts in computer and network security are familiar with the slogan that there is no security through obscurity. The Open Source and encryption view is that revealing the details of a system will actually tend to improve security, notably due to peer review. In sharp contrast, a famous World War II slogan says loose lips sink ships. Most experts in the military and intelligence areas believe that secrecy is a critical tool for maintaining security. Both cannot be right - disclosure cannot both help and hurt security.		This Article asks the question: When does disclosure actually help security? The discussion begins with a paradox. Most experts in computer and network security are familiar with the slogan that there is no security through obscurity. The Open Source and encryption view is that revealing the details of a system will actually tend to improve security, notably due to peer review. In sharp contrast, a famous World War II slogan says loose lips sink ships. Most experts in the military and intelligence areas believe that secrecy is a critical tool for maintaining security. Both cannot be right - disclosure cannot both help and hurt security.

	~~Using a law and economics approach to resolve the paradox,~~ Part I provides a model for deciding when ~~either~~ the Open Source ~~or the~~ military/intelligence viewpoints is likely to be correct. Part II ~~explains~~ why many computer and network security ~~problems appear~~ different from ~~the~~ traditional security problems of the physical world. ~~Part III applies~~ the ~~analytic tools developed earlier~~ in the ~~paper to issues~~ including the ~~following:~~ the ~~enlargement~~ of the ~~public domain~~ in ~~a world~~ of ~~search engines~~; the ~~relationship between~~ disclosure ~~and deterrence;~~ the ~~importance~~ of not ~~disclosing passwords or~~ the ~~combination~~ to ~~a safe~~.		===A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security===
			Part I of the article provides a basic model for deciding when the Open Source and military/intelligence viewpoints are likely to be correct. Insights come from a 2x2 matrix. The first variable is the extent to which disclosure is likely to help the attackers, by tipping off a vulnerability the attackers would otherwise not have seen. The second variable is the extent to which the disclosure is likely to improve the defense. Disclosure might help the defense, notably, by teaching defenders how to fix a vulnerability and by alerting more defenders to the problem. The 2x2 matrix shows the interplay of the help-the-attacker effect and help-the-defender effect, identifying four basic paradigms for the effects of disclosure on security: the Open Source paradigm; the Military/Intelligence paradigm; the Information Sharing paradigm; and the Public Domain.

			===The Key Reasons Computer and Network Security May Vary From Other Security Problems===
			Part II provides an explanation of why many computer and network security issues are different from military and other traditional security problems of the physical world. The discussion focuses on the nature of the “first-time attack” or the degree of what the paper calls “uniqueness” in the defense. Many defensive tricks, including secrecy, are more effective the first time there is an attack on a physical base or computer system. Secrecy is far less effective, however, if the attackers can probe the defenses repeatedly and learn from those probes. It turns out that many of the key areas of computer security involve circumstances where there can be repeated, low-cost attacks. For instance, firewalls, mass-market software, and encryption algorithms all can be attacked repeatedly by hackers. Under such circumstances, a strategy of secrecy – of “security through obscurity” – is less likely to be effective than for the military case.

			===Relaxing the Open Source Assumptions – Computer and Network Security in the Real World===
			Part III relaxes the assumptions of the model presented in Part I. The Open Source approach makes three assumptions: (1) disclosure will offer little or no help to attackers; (2) disclosure will tend to upgrade the design of defenses; and (3) disclosure will spread effective defenses to third parties. In practice, secrecy will often be of greater use than the Open Source advocates have stated, because one or more of the three assumptions will not hold. Part III explains some of the major categories of situations where secrecy
			is likely to be more or less effective at promoting security.


	==Additional Notes and Highlights==		==Additional Notes and Highlights==
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	Introduction		Introduction
	I. A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security		I. A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security
	A. Case A: The Open Source Paradigm 6		A. Case A: The Open Source Paradigm
	B. Case B: The Military Paradigm 9		B. Case B: The Military Paradigm
	C. Case C: The Information Sharing Paradigm		C. Case C: The Information Sharing Paradigm
	D. Case D: The Public Domain		D. Case D: The Public Domain
	E. The 2x2 Matrix for When Disclosure Improves Security		E. The 2x2 Matrix for When Disclosure Improves Security
	II. The Key Reasons Computer and Network Security May Vary From Other Security Problems		II. The Key Reasons Computer and Network Security May Vary From Other Security Problems
	A. Hiddenness and the First-Time Attack 17		A. Hiddenness and the First-Time Attack
	B. Uniqueness of the Defense		B. Uniqueness of the Defense
	C. Why Low Uniqueness May Be Common for Computer and Network Security		C. Why Low Uniqueness May Be Common for Computer and Network Security
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	2. Mass-market Software and Computer Games		2. Mass-market Software and Computer Games
	3. Encryption		3. Encryption
	III. Relaxing the Open Source Assumptions – Computer and Network Security in the Real World 20		III. Relaxing the Open Source Assumptions – Computer and Network Security in the Real World
	A. The Assumption that Disclosure Will Not Help the Attackers		A. The Assumption that Disclosure Will Not Help the Attackers
	1. The Enlargement of the Public Domain in a World of Search Engines		1. The Enlargement of the Public Domain in a World of Search Engines

Felix: /* Additional Notes and Highlights */

2010-06-29T18:46:26Z

Additional Notes and Highlights

@@ Line 26: / Line 26: @@
 ==Additional Notes and Highlights==
+Outline:
-'' * Outline key points of interest
+  Introduction

Felix at 18:27, 29 June 2010

2010-06-29T18:27:11Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:27, 29 June 2010
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	Peter P. Swire, ''A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What is Different About Computer and Network Security? '' (Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, Vol. 2, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 17, 2004).		Peter P. Swire, ''A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What is Different About Computer and Network Security? '' (Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, Vol. 2, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 17, 2004).
	[http://www.rootsecure.net/content/downloads/pdf/disclosure_helps_security.pdf ''Web'']		[http://www.rootsecure.net/content/downloads/pdf/disclosure_helps_security.pdf ''Web'']

	[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=531782 ''SSRN'']		[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=531782 ''SSRN'']

WikiSysop at 21:29, 22 June 2010

2010-06-22T21:29:44Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:29, 22 June 2010
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	Peter P. Swire, ''A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What is Different About Computer and Network Security? '' (Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, Vol. 2, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 17, 2004).		Peter P. Swire, ''A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What is Different About Computer and Network Security? '' (Journal on Telecommunications and High Technology Law, Vol. 2, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 17, 2004).

	[http://www.rootsecure.net/content/downloads/pdf/disclosure_helps_security.pdf ''Web'']		[http://www.rootsecure.net/content/downloads/pdf/disclosure_helps_security.pdf ''Web'']
			[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=531782 ''SSRN'']

	[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/?title=Special:Bibliography&view=&startkey=Swire:2004&f=wikibiblio.bib ''BibTeX'']		[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/?title=Special:Bibliography&view=&startkey=Swire:2004&f=wikibiblio.bib ''BibTeX'']

	~~[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=531782 ''SSRN'']~~

	==Categorization==		==Categorization==

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:50, 29 June 2010
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	==Key Words==		==Key Words==
			[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Communications_Privacy_Law \| Communications Privacy Law]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Disclosure_Policy \| Disclosure Policy]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Disclosure_Policy \| Disclosure Policy]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Hacker \| Hacker]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Hacker \| Hacker]],
	~~[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Communications_Privacy_Law \| Communications Privacy Law]],~~
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Software_Vulnerability \| Software Vulnerability]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Software_Vulnerability \| Software Vulnerability]],
	[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Transparency \| Transparency]],		[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Transparency \| Transparency]],