View source for Impact of Software Vulnerability Announcements on the Market Value of Software Vendors - An Empirical Investigation

==Impact of Software Vulnerability Announcements on the Market Value of Software Vendors==

==Impact of Software Vulnerability Announcements on the Market Value of Software Vendors - An Empirical Investigation==


Rahul Telang, Sunil Wattal, ''Impact of Software Vulnerability Announcements on the Market Value of Software Vendors'' (2007).  [http://infosecon.net/workshop/pdf/telang_wattal.pdf  ''Web''] 


[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/?title=Special:Bibliography&action=viewsource&startkey=Telang_Wattal:2007&f=wikibiblio.bib ''BibTeX'']

==Categorization==

Issues: [[Disclosure]]; [[Information Sharing]]

==Key Words== 

[[information security]], [[software vulnerability]], [[quality]], [[disclosure policy]]

==Synopsis==

Researchers in the area of information security have mainly been concerned with tools, techniques and policies that firms can use to protect themselves against security breaches. However, information security is as much about security software as it is about secure software. Software is not secure when it has defects or flaws which can be exploited by hackers to cause attacks such as unauthorized intrusion or denial of service attacks. Any public announcement about a software defect is termed as ‘vulnerability disclosure’. In this paper, we use the event study methodology to examine the role that financial markets play in determining the impact of vulnerability disclosures on software vendors. We collect data from leading national newspapers and industry sources by searching for reports on published software vulnerabilities. Our main result is that vulnerability disclosures do lead to a negative and significant change in market value for a software vendor. On average, a vendor loses around 0.6 % value in stock price when a vulnerability is reported. This is equivalent to a loss in market capitalization values of $0.86 billion per vulnerability announcement. To provide further insight, we use the information content of the disclosure announcement to classify vulnerabilities into various types. This is the first study to measure vendors ’ incentive to develop secure software and also provides many interesting implications for software vendors as well as policy makers.

==Additional Notes and Highlights==