Difference between revisions of "Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Industry"

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==Full Citation==
 
==Full Citation==
  
Richard A. Epstein and Thomas P. Brown, ''Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Industry'', 75 (1) U. Chi. L. Rev. 203-223 (2008).  [http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/issues/archive/v75/75_1/EpsteinArticle.pdf  ''Web'']
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Richard A. Epstein and Thomas P. Brown, ''Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Industry'', 75 U.Chi. L. Rev. 203 (2008).  [http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/issues/archive/v75/75_1/EpsteinArticle.pdf  ''Web'']
  
 
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Special:Bibliography?f=wikibiblio.bib&title=Special:Bibliography&view=detailed&action=&keyword=Epstein_Brown:2008 BibTeX]
 
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Special:Bibliography?f=wikibiblio.bib&title=Special:Bibliography&view=detailed&action=&keyword=Epstein_Brown:2008 BibTeX]
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==Synopsis and Key Themes==
 
==Synopsis and Key Themes==
  
The payment card industry has of late received an enormous level  
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The payment card industry has of late received an enormous level of critical academic scrutiny. The two issues that have dominated the  
of critical academic scrutiny. The two issues that have dominated the  
+
literature are antitrust and consumer protection. The former deals with the various ways in which credit card companies structure themselves and their possible exposure to charges of monopolization. The latter deals with various forms of legislation that ask whether, and if so how, state regulation should mandate disclosure on the one hand  
literature are antitrust and consumer protection. The former deals  
+
and limit the substantive terms of consumer contracts on the other. From our classical liberal perspective, we think that these two jump  
with the various ways in which credit card companies structure them-
+
ing-off points are odd places to begin the inquiry, given the high level of competition that exists everywhere in the credit card industry, both  
selves and their possible exposure to charges of monopolization. The  
+
from established players and from new entrants.' Using a payment card (as opposed to some other form of payment) rests on voluntary  
latter deals with various forms of legislation that ask whether, and if  
+
decisions by consumers and merchants, as well as the banks with which they interact. Although it is theoretically possible to imagine  
so how, state regulation should mandate disclosure on the one hand  
+
government intervention improving on the outcome that these multiple parties are able to achieve through contract, in practice, a litany of  
and limit the substantive terms of consumer contracts on the other.  
+
political pressures and regulatory glitches make it highly unlikely that those results could be achieved.  
From our classical liberal perspective, we think that these two jump-
 
ing-off points are odd places to begin the inquiry, given the high level  
 
of competition that exists everywhere in the credit card industry, both  
 
from established players and from new entrants.' Using a payment  
 
card (as opposed to some other form of payment) rests on voluntary  
 
decisions by consumers and merchants, as well as the banks with  
 
which they interact. Although it is theoretically possible to imagine  
 
government intervention improving on the outcome that these multi-
 
ple parties are able to achieve through contract, in practice, a litany of  
 
political pressures and regulatory glitches make it highly unlikely that  
 
those results could be achieved.  
 
  
  
 
==Additional Notes and Highlights==
 
==Additional Notes and Highlights==

Revision as of 19:27, 21 June 2010

Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Industry

Full Citation

Richard A. Epstein and Thomas P. Brown, Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Industry, 75 U.Chi. L. Rev. 203 (2008). Web

BibTeX

Categorization

Key Words

Crimeware, Hacker, Organized Crime,Malware,Cyber Crime,Credit Card Fraud

Synopsis and Key Themes

The payment card industry has of late received an enormous level of critical academic scrutiny. The two issues that have dominated the literature are antitrust and consumer protection. The former deals with the various ways in which credit card companies structure themselves and their possible exposure to charges of monopolization. The latter deals with various forms of legislation that ask whether, and if so how, state regulation should mandate disclosure on the one hand and limit the substantive terms of consumer contracts on the other. From our classical liberal perspective, we think that these two jump ing-off points are odd places to begin the inquiry, given the high level of competition that exists everywhere in the credit card industry, both from established players and from new entrants.' Using a payment card (as opposed to some other form of payment) rests on voluntary decisions by consumers and merchants, as well as the banks with which they interact. Although it is theoretically possible to imagine government intervention improving on the outcome that these multiple parties are able to achieve through contract, in practice, a litany of political pressures and regulatory glitches make it highly unlikely that those results could be achieved.


Additional Notes and Highlights