Difference between revisions of "Cyber Terrorism"

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==Synopsis==
 
==Synopsis==
  
Over the past two decades there has developed a voluminous literature on the  
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This paper examines the incentives of private actors to invest in cybersecurity. Prior analyses have examined investments in security goods, such as locks or safes that have the characteristics of private goods. The analysis in this paper extends this analysis to examine expenditures on security goods, such as information, that have the characteristics of public goods. In contrast to the private goods case, where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case can result in the underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be necessary to facilitate the production of public security goods, and the protection of information produced by the collective organization should be a central feature of such organizations.
problem of cyber terrorism. The themes developed by those writing on cyber terrorism
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While prior analyses have examined the provision of security goods that have the characteristics of private goods, the analysis in this paper examined expenditures on security, such as information, that have the characteristics of public goods.
appear to spring from the titles of Tom Clancy’s fiction, such as Clear and Present
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In contrast to the private goods case, where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case (a category this paper argues cybersecurity belongs to) can result in the underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be necessary to facilitate the production of public security goods, and the protection of information produced by the collective organization should be a central feature of such organizations.
Danger, The Sum of All Fears and Breaking Point, or somewhat more cynically, Patriot
 
Games. This essay examines both the gap between the presumed threat and the known
 
cyber terror behaviors and the continuing literature which suggests an attack is imminent. It
 
suggests that at least part of the explanation lies both in the continuing failure to distinguish
 
between what Denning (Activism, hacktivism, and cyber terrorism: The internet as a tool
 
for influencing foreign policy, 1999) referred to as hactivism and cyberterrorism and also
 
the failure to distinguish between the use of digital means for organizational purposes
 
(information, communication, command and control) and the use of digital communications
 
to actually commit acts of terror.  
 
  
 
==Additional Notes and Highlights==
 
==Additional Notes and Highlights==

Latest revision as of 09:49, 6 August 2012

Full Title of Reference

Cyber Terrorism: A Clear and Present Danger, the Sum of All Fears, Breaking Point or Patriot Games?

Full Citation

Michael Stohl, Cyber Terrorism: A Clear and Present Danger, the Sum of All Fears, Breaking Point or Patriot Games?, 46 J. of Crim., L. & Soc. Change 223 (2006). Purchase

BibTeX

Categorization

Key Words

Cyber Terrorism, Digital Pearl Harbor, Hackers, Hacktivism

Synopsis

This paper examines the incentives of private actors to invest in cybersecurity. Prior analyses have examined investments in security goods, such as locks or safes that have the characteristics of private goods. The analysis in this paper extends this analysis to examine expenditures on security goods, such as information, that have the characteristics of public goods. In contrast to the private goods case, where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case can result in the underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be necessary to facilitate the production of public security goods, and the protection of information produced by the collective organization should be a central feature of such organizations. While prior analyses have examined the provision of security goods that have the characteristics of private goods, the analysis in this paper examined expenditures on security, such as information, that have the characteristics of public goods. In contrast to the private goods case, where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case (a category this paper argues cybersecurity belongs to) can result in the underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be necessary to facilitate the production of public security goods, and the protection of information produced by the collective organization should be a central feature of such organizations.

Additional Notes and Highlights

Expertise Required: None

Video lecture by Michael Stohl: Cyber Terrorism: A Clear and Present Danger, The Sum of All Fears, Breaking Point or Patriot Games? April 12, 2007. AltWeb