The Impact of Incentives on Notice and Take-down

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The Impact of Incentives on Notice and Take-down

Full Citation

Tyler Moore, Richard Clayton 2009: The Impact of Incentives on Notice and Take-down. 10. in: Managing Information Risk and the Economics of Security. Springer US., 199-223. Web

BibTeX

Categorization

Issues: Economics of Cybersecurity

Key Words

See the article itself for any key words as a starting point

Synopsis

We consider a number of notice and take-down regimes for Internet content. These differ in the incentives for removal, the legal framework for compelling action, and the speed at which material is removed. By measuring how quickly various types of content are removed, we determine that the requester’s incentives outweigh all other factors, from the penalties available, to the methods used to obstruct take-down.

Additional Notes and Highlights

* Outline key points of interest

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