Why Information Security is Hard: Difference between revisions
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[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Botnet Botnet], [http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#DDoS_Attack DDoS Attack], | [http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Botnet Botnet], [http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#DDoS_Attack DDoS Attack], | ||
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Tragedy_of_Commons | [http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Tragedy_of_Commons Tragedy of Commons] | ||
==Synopsis== | ==Synopsis== | ||
Revision as of 10:57, 21 June 2010
Why Information Security is Hard -- An Economic Perspective
Full Citation
Ross Anderson, Why Information Security is Hard -- An Economic Perspective, 17th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'01), IEEE Computer Society, December, 2001. Web AltWeb
Categorization
Issues: Economics of Cybersecurity, Risk Management and Investment, Incentives
Approaches: Regulation/Liability
Key Words
Botnet, DDoS Attack, Tragedy of Commons
Synopsis
According to one common view, information security comes down to technical measures. Given better access control policy models, formal proofs of cryptographic protocols, approved firewalls, better ways of detecting intrusions and malicious code, and better tools for system evaluation and assurance, the problems can be solved. In this note, I put forward a contrary view: information insecurity is at least as much due to perverse incentives. Many of the problems can be explained more clearly and convincingly using the language of microeconomics: network externalities, asymmetric information, moral hazard, adverse selection, liability dumping and the tragedy of the common.
Additional Notes and Highlights
* Outline key points of interest