Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DoD Software: Difference between revisions

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==Full Citation==
==Full Citation==


Defense Science Board Task force Department of Defense (2007): Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DOD Software. U.S. Government. Online Paper.  [http://www.cyber.st.dhs.gov/docs/Defense%20Science%20Board%20Task%20Force%20-%20Report%20on%20Mission%20Impact%20of%20Foreign%20Influence%20on%20DoD%20Software%20(2007).pdf  ''Web'']
Def. Science Board Task Force Dep't of Def. ''Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DOD Software'' (2007).  [http://www.cyber.st.dhs.gov/docs/Defense%20Science%20Board%20Task%20Force%20-%20Report%20on%20Mission%20Impact%20of%20Foreign%20Influence%20on%20DoD%20Software%20(2007).pdf  ''Web'']


[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/?title=Special:Bibliography&view=detailed&startkey=DoD:2007&f=wikibiblio.bib BibTeX]
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/?title=Special:Bibliography&view=detailed&startkey=DoD:2007&f=wikibiblio.bib BibTeX]

Revision as of 15:50, 17 June 2010

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DoD Software

Full Citation

Def. Science Board Task Force Dep't of Def. Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DOD Software (2007). Web

BibTeX


Categorization

Overview: Government Reports

Key Words

Research


Synopsis

The Department of Defense faces a difficult quandary in its software purchases in applying intelligent risk management, trading off the attractive economics of COTS and of custom code written off-shore against the risks of encountering malware that could seriously jeopardize future defense missions. The current systems designs, assurance methodologies, acquisition procedures, and knowledge of adversarial capabilities and intentions are inadequate to the magnitude of the threat.

Additional Notes and Highlights