An Economic Analysis of the Private and Social Costs of the Provision of Cybersecurity and other Public Security Goods: Difference between revisions
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[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/?title=Special:Bibliography&view=&startkey=Kobayashi:2005&f=wikibiblio.bib ''BibTeX''] | [http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/?title=Special:Bibliography&view=&startkey=Kobayashi:2005&f=wikibiblio.bib ''BibTeX''] | ||
==Categorization== | ==Categorization== | ||
Issues: [[ | Issues: [[Risk Management and Investment]], [[Incentives]], [[Public-Private Cooperation]] | ||
==Key Words== | ==Key Words== | ||
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Outreach_and_Collaboration Outreach and Collaboration], [http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Risk_Modeling Risk Modeling] | |||
==Synopsis== | ==Synopsis== | ||
This paper examines the incentives of private actors to invest in cybersecurity. Prior analyses have examined investments in security goods, such as locks or safes that have the characteristics of private goods. The analysis in this paper extends this analysis to examine expenditures on security goods, such as information, that have the characteristics of public goods. In contrast to the private goods case, where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case can result in the underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be necessary to facilitate the production of public security goods, and the protection of information produced by the collective organization should be a central feature of such organizations. | |||
==Additional Notes and Highlights== | ==Additional Notes and Highlights== | ||
Outline: | |||
1. Introduction | |||
2. The Private Production of Private Security Goods | |||
3. Public Security Goods | |||
4. The Private Production of Cybersecurity Goods | |||
5. Conclusion | |||
Revision as of 10:08, 16 June 2010
Full Title of Reference
An Economic Analysis of the Private and Social Costs of the Provision of Cybersecurity and other Public Security Goods
Full Citation
Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of the Private and Social Costs of the Provision of Cybersecurity and other Public Security Goods, 14 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. (2005) Web
Categorization
Issues: Risk Management and Investment, Incentives, Public-Private Cooperation
Key Words
Outreach and Collaboration, Risk Modeling
Synopsis
This paper examines the incentives of private actors to invest in cybersecurity. Prior analyses have examined investments in security goods, such as locks or safes that have the characteristics of private goods. The analysis in this paper extends this analysis to examine expenditures on security goods, such as information, that have the characteristics of public goods. In contrast to the private goods case, where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case can result in the underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be necessary to facilitate the production of public security goods, and the protection of information produced by the collective organization should be a central feature of such organizations.
Additional Notes and Highlights
Outline:
1. Introduction 2. The Private Production of Private Security Goods 3. Public Security Goods 4. The Private Production of Cybersecurity Goods 5. Conclusion