The Impact of Incentives on Notice and Take-down: Difference between revisions
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==The Impact of Incentives on Notice and Take-down | ==Full Title of Reference== | ||
The Impact of Incentives on Notice and Take-down | |||
==Full Citation== | ==Full Citation== | ||
Revision as of 17:24, 22 June 2010
Full Title of Reference
The Impact of Incentives on Notice and Take-down
Full Citation
Tyler Moore and Richard Clayton, The Impact of Incentives on Notice and Take-down in Managing Information Risk and the Economics of Security (M. Eric Johnson ed, 2009). Web
Categorization
Issues: Economics of Cybersecurity
Key Words
See the article itself for any key words as a starting point
Synopsis
We consider a number of notice and take-down regimes for Internet content. These differ in the incentives for removal, the legal framework for compelling action, and the speed at which material is removed. By measuring how quickly various types of content are removed, we determine that the requester’s incentives outweigh all other factors, from the penalties available, to the methods used to obstruct take-down.
Additional Notes and Highlights
* Outline key points of interest