Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DoD Software: Difference between revisions
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==Full Citation== | ==Full Citation== | ||
Def. Science Board Task Force, Dep't of Def. ''Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DOD Software'' (2007). [http://www.cyber.st.dhs.gov/docs/Defense%20Science%20Board%20Task%20Force%20-%20Report%20on%20Mission%20Impact%20of%20Foreign%20Influence%20on%20DoD%20Software%20(2007).pdf ''Web'' | Def. Science Board Task Force, Dep't of Def., ''Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DOD Software'' (2007). [http://www.cyber.st.dhs.gov/docs/Defense%20Science%20Board%20Task%20Force%20-%20Report%20on%20Mission%20Impact%20of%20Foreign%20Influence%20on%20DoD%20Software%20(2007).pdf ''Web''] | ||
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Special:Bibliography?f=wikibiblio.bib&title=Special:Bibliography&view=detailed&action=&keyword=DoD:2007 ''BibTeX''] | |||
==Categorization== | ==Categorization== | ||
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==Key Words== | ==Key Words== | ||
Revision as of 11:26, 24 June 2010
Full Title of Reference
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DoD Software
Full Citation
Def. Science Board Task Force, Dep't of Def., Mission Impact of Foreign Influence on DOD Software (2007). Web
Categorization
Overview: Government Reports
Key Words
Synopsis
The Department of Defense faces a difficult quandary in its software purchases in applying intelligent risk management, trading off the attractive economics of COTS and of custom code written off-shore against the risks of encountering malware that could seriously jeopardize future defense missions. The current systems designs, assurance methodologies, acquisition procedures, and knowledge of adversarial capabilities and intentions are inadequate to the magnitude of the threat.