The Market Consequences of Cybersecurity: Difference between revisions
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==Key Words== | ==Key Words== | ||
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Internet_Service_Providers | [http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Internet_Service_Providers Internet Service Providers], [http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Malware Malware], | ||
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Social_Engineering Social Engineering] | |||
==Synopsis== | ==Synopsis== | ||
Latest revision as of 13:24, 18 June 2010
Full Title of Reference
The Market Consequences of Cybersecurity: Defining Externalities and Ways to Address Them
Full Citation
OECD, The Market Consequences of Cybersecurity: Defining Externalities and Ways to Address Them, in Computer Viruses and Other Malicious Software (OECD, 2009). Purchase
Categorization
Issues: Economics of Cybersecurity; Incentives
Key Words
Internet Service Providers, Malware, Social Engineering
Synopsis
This chapter asks the following questions: Are participants in the information and communication markets responding adequately to malware, or are improvements possible? Pointing to a variety of reports that show increases in malicious attack trends, one might conclude that markets are not responding adequately. The analysis revealed a more nuanced picture.
Additional Notes and Highlights
Outline:
Three major categories of externalities
Category 1: No externalities; market participants absorb all the costs of their security decisions.
Category 2: Externalities are created, but they are borne by agents that can manage them.
The ISP example
The case of online financial services
Category 3: Externalities are borne fully by other market participants or by society at large.
The case of lax security by end users
Distributional and efficiency effects
Survey results on the costs of malware
Key findings