Emerging Threats to Internet Security: Difference between revisions

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==Categorization==
==Categorization==


Issues: [[Government Networks (.gov)]]
* Issues: [[Economics of Cybersecurity]]; [[Cybercrime]]; [[Government Networks (.gov)]]; [[Incentives]]
 
Issues: [[Incentives]]
 
Issues: [[Economics of Cybersecurity]]
 
Issues: [[Cybercrime]]


==Key Words==  
==Key Words==  
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Botnet Botnets]
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Botnet Botnets],
 
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Malware Malware]
 
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Crimeware Crimeware]
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Crimeware Crimeware]
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Malware Malware],
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Social_Engineering Social Engineering]


==Synopsis==
==Synopsis==

Latest revision as of 13:24, 18 June 2010

Full Title of Reference

Emerging Threats to Internet Security: Incentives, Externalities and Policy Implications

Full Citation

Michel van Eeten and Johannes M. Bauer, Emerging Threats to Internet Security: Incentives, Externalities and Policy Implications, (2010) Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 17, No. 4 SSRN

BibTeX

Categorization

Key Words

Botnets, Crimeware Malware, Social Engineering

Synopsis

Somewhere around 10% of all machines connected to the Internet are thought to be infected with malicious software. This has allowed the emergence of so-called ‘botnets’– networks of sometimes millions of infected machines that are remotely controlled by malicious actors. Botnets are mostly used for criminal purposes, but they also enable large-scale failures that might even reach disastrous proportions. We explain the rise of botnets as the outcome of the incentive structures of market players and present new empirical evidence on these incentives. The resulting externalities require some form of voluntary or government-led collective action. Our findings have implications for the controversial debate on the appropriate policy measures, where two perspectives on cybersecurity fight for dominance: national security and law enforcement.

Additional Notes and Highlights