Impact of Software Vulnerability Announcements on the Market Value of Software Vendors - An Empirical Investigation: Difference between revisions
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==Full Citation== | ==Full Citation== | ||
Rahul Telang, Sunil Wattal, ''Impact of Software Vulnerability Announcements on the Market Value of Software Vendors'' | Rahul Telang, Sunil Wattal, ''Impact of Software Vulnerability Announcements on the Market Value of Software Vendors - An Empirical Investigation'', 33 IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 8 (2007). [http://infosecon.net/workshop/pdf/telang_wattal.pdf ''Web''] | ||
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Special:Bibliography?f=wikibiblio.bib&title=Special%3ABibliography&view=detailed&action=&keyword=Telang_Wattal%3A2007 ''BibTeX''] | [http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/Special:Bibliography?f=wikibiblio.bib&title=Special%3ABibliography&view=detailed&action=&keyword=Telang_Wattal%3A2007 ''BibTeX''] | ||
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==Categorization== | ==Categorization== | ||
Issues: [[Information Sharing/Disclosure]] | * Issues: [[Incentives]]; [[Information Sharing/Disclosure]]; [[Metrics]] | ||
* Approaches: [[Regulation/Liability]] | |||
==Key Words== | ==Key Words== | ||
[[ | [[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Communications_Privacy_Law | Communications Privacy Law]], | ||
[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Computer_Emergency_Response_Team | Computer Emergency Response Team]], | |||
[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Disclosure_Policy | Disclosure Policy]], | |||
[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Hacker | Hacker]], | |||
[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Software_Vulnerability | Software Vulnerability]], | |||
[[Keyword_Index_and_Glossary_of_Core_Ideas#Transparency | Transparency]] | |||
==Synopsis== | ==Synopsis== | ||
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==Additional Notes and Highlights== | ==Additional Notes and Highlights== | ||
Outline: | |||
1. Introduction | |||
2. Hypotheses | |||
3. Data Description & Methodology | |||
3.1 Vulnerability Disclosure Process | |||
3.2 Data | |||
3.3 Methodology | |||
The Market Model | |||
The Market Adjusted Model | |||
Results | |||
Market Capitalization | |||
4. Effect of Vulnerability Characteristics | |||
Ongoing Research | |||
5. Conclusions and Discussion | |||
Comparison with prior event studies | |||
Implications for Software Quality and Disclosure Policy |
Latest revision as of 16:17, 29 June 2010
Full Title of Reference
Impact of Software Vulnerability Announcements on the Market Value of Software Vendors - An Empirical Investigation
Full Citation
Rahul Telang, Sunil Wattal, Impact of Software Vulnerability Announcements on the Market Value of Software Vendors - An Empirical Investigation, 33 IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 8 (2007). Web
Categorization
- Issues: Incentives; Information Sharing/Disclosure; Metrics
- Approaches: Regulation/Liability
Key Words
Communications Privacy Law, Computer Emergency Response Team, Disclosure Policy, Hacker, Software Vulnerability, Transparency
Synopsis
Researchers in the area of information security have mainly been concerned with tools, techniques and policies that firms can use to protect themselves against security breaches. However, information security is as much about security software as it is about secure software. Software is not secure when it has defects or flaws which can be exploited by hackers to cause attacks such as unauthorized intrusion or denial of service attacks. Any public announcement about a software defect is termed as ‘vulnerability disclosure’. In this paper, we use the event study methodology to examine the role that financial markets play in determining the impact of vulnerability disclosures on software vendors. We collect data from leading national newspapers and industry sources by searching for reports on published software vulnerabilities. Our main result is that vulnerability disclosures do lead to a negative and significant change in market value for a software vendor. On average, a vendor loses around 0.6 % value in stock price when a vulnerability is reported. This is equivalent to a loss in market capitalization values of $0.86 billion per vulnerability announcement. To provide further insight, we use the information content of the disclosure announcement to classify vulnerabilities into various types. This is the first study to measure vendors ’ incentive to develop secure software and also provides many interesting implications for software vendors as well as policy makers.
Additional Notes and Highlights
Outline:
1. Introduction 2. Hypotheses 3. Data Description & Methodology 3.1 Vulnerability Disclosure Process 3.2 Data 3.3 Methodology The Market Model The Market Adjusted Model Results Market Capitalization 4. Effect of Vulnerability Characteristics Ongoing Research 5. Conclusions and Discussion Comparison with prior event studies Implications for Software Quality and Disclosure Policy