Cyber Terrorism: Difference between revisions
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown) | |||
Line 11: | Line 11: | ||
==Categorization== | ==Categorization== | ||
* Threats and Actors: [[Hacktivists]]; [[Terrorists]]; [[The Threat and Skeptics]] | * Threats and Actors: [[Hacktivists]]; [[Terrorists]]; [[The Threat and Skeptics]] | ||
* Issues: [[Incentives]]; [[Media Perceptions]]; [[Psychology and Politics | * Issues: [[Incentives]]; [[Media Perceptions]]; [[Psychology and Politics]] | ||
==Key Words== | ==Key Words== | ||
Line 21: | Line 21: | ||
==Synopsis== | ==Synopsis== | ||
This paper examines the incentives of private actors to invest in cybersecurity. Prior analyses have examined investments in security goods, such as locks or safes that have the characteristics of private goods. The analysis in this paper extends this analysis to examine expenditures on security goods, such as information, that have the characteristics of public goods. In contrast to the private goods case, where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case can result in the underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be necessary to facilitate the production of public security goods, and the protection of information produced by the collective organization should be a central feature of such organizations. | |||
While prior analyses have examined the provision of security goods that have the characteristics of private goods, the analysis in this paper examined expenditures on security, such as information, that have the characteristics of public goods. | |||
In contrast to the private goods case, where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case (a category this paper argues cybersecurity belongs to) can result in the underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be necessary to facilitate the production of public security goods, and the protection of information produced by the collective organization should be a central feature of such organizations. | |||
the | |||
==Additional Notes and Highlights== | ==Additional Notes and Highlights== |
Latest revision as of 09:49, 6 August 2012
Full Title of Reference
Cyber Terrorism: A Clear and Present Danger, the Sum of All Fears, Breaking Point or Patriot Games?
Full Citation
Michael Stohl, Cyber Terrorism: A Clear and Present Danger, the Sum of All Fears, Breaking Point or Patriot Games?, 46 J. of Crim., L. & Soc. Change 223 (2006). Purchase
Categorization
- Threats and Actors: Hacktivists; Terrorists; The Threat and Skeptics
- Issues: Incentives; Media Perceptions; Psychology and Politics
Key Words
Cyber Terrorism, Digital Pearl Harbor, Hackers, Hacktivism
Synopsis
This paper examines the incentives of private actors to invest in cybersecurity. Prior analyses have examined investments in security goods, such as locks or safes that have the characteristics of private goods. The analysis in this paper extends this analysis to examine expenditures on security goods, such as information, that have the characteristics of public goods. In contrast to the private goods case, where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case can result in the underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be necessary to facilitate the production of public security goods, and the protection of information produced by the collective organization should be a central feature of such organizations. While prior analyses have examined the provision of security goods that have the characteristics of private goods, the analysis in this paper examined expenditures on security, such as information, that have the characteristics of public goods. In contrast to the private goods case, where individual uncoordinated security expenditures can lead to an overproduction of security, the public goods case (a category this paper argues cybersecurity belongs to) can result in the underproduction of security expenditures, and incentives to free ride. Thus, the formation of collective organizations may be necessary to facilitate the production of public security goods, and the protection of information produced by the collective organization should be a central feature of such organizations.
Additional Notes and Highlights
Expertise Required: None
Video lecture by Michael Stohl: Cyber Terrorism: A Clear and Present Danger, The Sum of All Fears, Breaking Point or Patriot Games? April 12, 2007. AltWeb