The Economics of Information Security: Difference between revisions
No edit summary |
No edit summary |
||
| Line 3: | Line 3: | ||
==Full Citation== | ==Full Citation== | ||
Ross Anderson and Tyler Moore, ''The Economics of Information Security,'' 314 Sci. 610 (2006). [http://people.seas.harvard.edu/~tmoore/science-econ.pdf ''Web''] | Ross Anderson and Tyler Moore, ''The Economics of Information Security,'' 314 Sci. 610 (2006). [http://people.seas.harvard.edu/~tmoore/science-econ.pdf ''Web''] [http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.89.3331&rep=rep1&type=pdf ''AltWeb''] | ||
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/?title=Special:Bibliography&view=detailed&startkey=Anderson_Moore:2006&f=wikibiblio.bib ''BibTeX''] | [http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cybersecurity/?title=Special:Bibliography&view=detailed&startkey=Anderson_Moore:2006&f=wikibiblio.bib ''BibTeX''] | ||
Revision as of 12:31, 28 May 2010
The Economics of Information Security
Full Citation
Ross Anderson and Tyler Moore, The Economics of Information Security, 314 Sci. 610 (2006). Web AltWeb
Categorization
Issues: Economics of Cybersecurity
Key Words
See the article itself for any key words as a starting point
Synopsis
The economics of information security has recently become a thriving and fast-moving discipline. As distributed systems are assembled from machines belonging to principals with divergent interests, we find that incentives are becoming as important as technical design in achieving dependability. The new field provides valuable insights not just into "security" topics (such as bugs, spam, phishing, and law enforcement strategy) but into more general areas such as the design of peer-to-peer systems, the optimal balance of effort by programmers and testers, why privacy gets eroded, and the politics of digital rights management.
Additional Notes and Highlights
* Outline key points of interest