Introduction - Revision history

BerkmanSysop: missed final span closing

2013-01-27T04:15:29Z

missed final span closing

← Older revision		Revision as of 04:15, 27 January 2013
Line 95:		Line 95:
	Madhavi Sunder, iP (forthcoming, Yale University Press)		Madhavi Sunder, iP (forthcoming, Yale University Press)

	[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/User%20Innovation%203.2.pdf <span style="color:green;">William Fisher, "The Implications for Law of User Innovation,"~~((.link_green))~~] forthcoming Minnesota Law Review (2010)		[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/User%20Innovation%203.2.pdf <span style="color:green;">William Fisher, "The Implications for Law of User Innovation,"</span>] forthcoming Minnesota Law Review (2010)

	== Contributors ==		== Contributors ==

BerkmanSysop: updated link color

2013-01-27T04:13:36Z

updated link color

← Older revision		Revision as of 04:13, 27 January 2013
Line 63:		Line 63:
	====Overviews====		====Overviews====

	[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf William Fisher, "Theories of Intellectual Property,"~~((.link_green))~~] in Stephen Munzer, ed., New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press, 2001) ([http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheorychinese.pdf Chinese translation], by Haifeng Huang, in Chinese Intellectual Property Review 1 (2002): 1.)		[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf <span style="color:green;">William Fisher, "Theories of Intellectual Property,"</span>] in Stephen Munzer, ed., New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press, 2001) ([http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheorychinese.pdf Chinese translation], by Haifeng Huang, in Chinese Intellectual Property Review 1 (2002): 1.)

	[http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/SiteCollectionDocuments/faculty/shiffrin-intellectual%20property.pdf Seanna Shiffrin, Intellectual Property,~~((.link_red))~~] in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (edited by Robert Goodin, Philip Pettit, and Thomas Pogge, Blackwell, 2007).		[http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/SiteCollectionDocuments/faculty/shiffrin-intellectual%20property.pdf <span style="color:red;">Seanna Shiffrin, Intellectual Property,</span>] in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (edited by Robert Goodin, Philip Pettit, and Thomas Pogge, Blackwell, 2007).

	====Fairness Theory====		====Fairness Theory====

	[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1323408 Robert Merges, "Locke for the Masses: Property Rights and the Products of Collective Creativity (2009)~~((.link_green))~~]		[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1323408 <span style="color:green;">Robert Merges, "Locke for the Masses: Property Rights and the Products of Collective Creativity (2009)</link>]

	[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=916110 Alfred C. Yen, "Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession,"~~((.link_green))~~] Ohio State Law Journal 51 (1990): 517		[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=916110 <span style="color:green;">Alfred C. Yen, "Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession,"</span>] Ohio State Law Journal 51 (1990): 517

	====Welfare Theory====		====Welfare Theory====

	[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=741424 Peter Menell and Suzanne Scotchmer, "Intellectual Property,"~~((.link_green))~~] chapter in Handbook of Law and Economics, edited by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2007) (with S. Scotchmer)		[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=741424 <span style="color:green;">Peter Menell and Suzanne Scotchmer, "Intellectual Property,"</span>] chapter in Handbook of Law and Economics, edited by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2007) (with S. Scotchmer)

	[http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/LANECI.html William Landes and Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law] (Harvard University Press 2003)		[http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/LANECI.html William Landes and Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law] (Harvard University Press 2003)

	[https://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?57+Duke+L.+J.+1693 Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights"~~((.link_green))~~] (2003)		[https://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?57+Duke+L.+J.+1693 <span style="color:green;">Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights"</span>] (2003)

	[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=226404 Steven Shavell and Tanguy Van Ypersele, "Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights"] (1999)		[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=226404 Steven Shavell and Tanguy Van Ypersele, "Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights"] (1999)
Line 91:		Line 91:
	====Cultural Theory====		====Cultural Theory====

	[http://www.history.ox.ac.uk/ecohist/readings/ip/netanel.htm Neil Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,"~~((.link_green))~~] 106 Yale Law Journal 283 (1996)		[http://www.history.ox.ac.uk/ecohist/readings/ip/netanel.htm <span style="color:green;">Neil Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,"</span>] 106 Yale Law Journal 283 (1996)

	Madhavi Sunder, iP (forthcoming, Yale University Press)		Madhavi Sunder, iP (forthcoming, Yale University Press)

	[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/User%20Innovation%203.2.pdf William Fisher, "The Implications for Law of User Innovation,"((.link_green))] forthcoming Minnesota Law Review (2010)		[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/User%20Innovation%203.2.pdf <span style="color:green;">William Fisher, "The Implications for Law of User Innovation,"((.link_green))] forthcoming Minnesota Law Review (2010)

	== Contributors ==		== Contributors ==

Ecrowley at 22:22, 9 January 2012

2012-01-09T22:22:36Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:22, 9 January 2012
Line 27:		Line 27:
	Novels and other intellectual creations fall into a small but important category of products that economists refer to as “public goods.” The defining characteristics of public goods are that they are “nonrivalrous” (meaning that they can be enjoyed by an unlimited number of people) and “nonexcludable” (meaning that once they are made available to one consumer, it is very difficult to prevent other consumers from gaining access to them). These characteristics make public goods socially valuable, but they also create a danger: Potential producers of them will not produce them because they fear that they will be unable to earn any money. For example, a potential novelist may decide not to write a novel, because she anticipates that, once the first copy is sold, other publishers will make millions of additional copies and sell them for pennies, preventing the novelist from earning any money. Confronted with this hazard, the novelist may decide to become a banker, and the world will be forever deprived of the benefits of the novels she might have written. To maximize social welfare, the government must somehow create an incentive for the novelist to write novels. There are many ways that the government might do so, but one technique is to grant the novelist exclusive rights to reproduce and sell her novels. Protected against competition, she can charge enough money for her books to enable her to earn a living – and keep writing. That, in brief, is what copyright law does.		Novels and other intellectual creations fall into a small but important category of products that economists refer to as “public goods.” The defining characteristics of public goods are that they are “nonrivalrous” (meaning that they can be enjoyed by an unlimited number of people) and “nonexcludable” (meaning that once they are made available to one consumer, it is very difficult to prevent other consumers from gaining access to them). These characteristics make public goods socially valuable, but they also create a danger: Potential producers of them will not produce them because they fear that they will be unable to earn any money. For example, a potential novelist may decide not to write a novel, because she anticipates that, once the first copy is sold, other publishers will make millions of additional copies and sell them for pennies, preventing the novelist from earning any money. Confronted with this hazard, the novelist may decide to become a banker, and the world will be forever deprived of the benefits of the novels she might have written. To maximize social welfare, the government must somehow create an incentive for the novelist to write novels. There are many ways that the government might do so, but one technique is to grant the novelist exclusive rights to reproduce and sell her novels. Protected against competition, she can charge enough money for her books to enable her to earn a living – and keep writing. That, in brief, is what copyright law does.

	Seen from this perspective, copyright law has important social benefits, but also ~~has~~ a social cost. The reason is that, by empowering the novelist to raise the price of her books well above the low level that would have been generated through free competition, copyright law prevents readers who cannot afford the higher price from obtaining and reading the novel. The result is to reduce the welfare of those consumers and thus reduce, to some extent, total social welfare. The implication of this insight is that copyright protection should only be extended to types of intellectual products that would not be produced in the absence of the financial incentives that the copyright system provides.		Seen from this perspective, copyright law has important social benefits but also a social cost. The reason is that, by empowering the novelist to raise the price of her books well above the low level that would have been generated through free competition, copyright law prevents readers who cannot afford the higher price from obtaining and reading the novel. The result is to reduce the welfare of those consumers and thus reduce, to some extent, total social welfare. The implication of this insight is that copyright protection should only be extended to types of intellectual products that would not be produced in the absence of the financial incentives that the copyright system provides.

	If we applied this guideline conscientiously, which types of works would we include? It’s hard to say, because creators’ motives vary. But roughly speaking, we should be especially willing to extend copyright protection to kinds of products that are costly to produce, easy to copy, and benefit many people other than the immediate consumers. Movies and computer software might be examples. By contrast, we should at least hesitate before granting copyright protection to kinds of products that are inexpensive to produce or whose creators are especially sensitive to nonmonetary incentives (such as the desire for fame or the hope of being awarded tenure in a university) that do not depend on copyright law.		If we applied this guideline conscientiously, which types of works would we include? It’s hard to say, because creators’ motives vary. But roughly speaking, we should be especially willing to extend copyright protection to kinds of products that are costly to produce, easy to copy, and benefit many people other than the immediate consumers. Movies and computer software might be examples. By contrast, we should at least hesitate before granting copyright protection to kinds of products that are inexpensive to produce or whose creators are especially sensitive to nonmonetary incentives (such as the desire for fame or the hope of being awarded tenure in a university) that do not depend on copyright law.

BerkmanSysop: /* Welfare Theory */ Typo (Josephy -> Joseph E.) ~~~~

2010-03-19T14:42:28Z

Welfare Theory: Typo (Josephy -> Joseph E.) ~~~~

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:42, 19 March 2010
Line 79:		Line 79:
	[http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/LANECI.html William Landes and Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law] (Harvard University Press 2003)		[http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/LANECI.html William Landes and Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law] (Harvard University Press 2003)

	[https://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?57+Duke+L.+J.+1693 ~~Josephy~~ Stiglitz, "Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights"((.link_green))] (2003)		[https://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?57+Duke+L.+J.+1693 Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights"((.link_green))] (2003)

	[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=226404 Steven Shavell and Tanguy Van Ypersele, "Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights"] (1999)		[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=226404 Steven Shavell and Tanguy Van Ypersele, "Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights"] (1999)

Tfisher: /* Cultural Theory */

2010-03-01T04:59:45Z

Cultural Theory

← Older revision		Revision as of 04:59, 1 March 2010
Line 91:		Line 91:
	====Cultural Theory====		====Cultural Theory====

	[http://www.history.ox.ac.uk/ecohist/readings/ip/netanel.htm Neil Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,"] 106 Yale Law Journal 283 (1996)		[http://www.history.ox.ac.uk/ecohist/readings/ip/netanel.htm Neil Netanel, "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,"((.link_green))] 106 Yale Law Journal 283 (1996)

	Madhavi Sunder, iP (forthcoming, Yale University Press)		Madhavi Sunder, iP (forthcoming, Yale University Press)

	[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/User%20Innovation%203.2.pdf William Fisher, "The Implications for Law of User Innovation,"] forthcoming Minnesota Law Review (2010)		[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/User%20Innovation%203.2.pdf William Fisher, "The Implications for Law of User Innovation,"((.link_green))] forthcoming Minnesota Law Review (2010)

	== Contributors ==		== Contributors ==

Tfisher: /* Welfare Theory */

2010-03-01T04:59:21Z

Welfare Theory

← Older revision		Revision as of 04:59, 1 March 2010
Line 75:		Line 75:
	====Welfare Theory====		====Welfare Theory====

	[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=741424 Peter Menell and Suzanne Scotchmer, "Intellectual Property,"] chapter in Handbook of Law and Economics, edited by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2007) (with S. Scotchmer)		[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=741424 Peter Menell and Suzanne Scotchmer, "Intellectual Property,"((.link_green))] chapter in Handbook of Law and Economics, edited by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (2007) (with S. Scotchmer)

	[http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/LANECI.html William Landes and Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law] (Harvard University Press 2003)		[http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/LANECI.html William Landes and Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law] (Harvard University Press 2003)

	[https://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?57+Duke+L.+J.+1693 Josephy Stiglitz, "Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights"] (2003)		[https://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?57+Duke+L.+J.+1693 Josephy Stiglitz, "Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights"((.link_green))] (2003)

	[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=226404 Steven Shavell and Tanguy Van Ypersele, "Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights"] (1999)		[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=226404 Steven Shavell and Tanguy Van Ypersele, "Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights"] (1999)

Tfisher: /* Fairness Theory */

2010-03-01T04:58:59Z

Fairness Theory

← Older revision		Revision as of 04:58, 1 March 2010
Line 69:		Line 69:
	====Fairness Theory====		====Fairness Theory====

	[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1323408 Robert Merges, "Locke for the Masses: Property Rights and the Products of Collective Creativity (2009)]		[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1323408 Robert Merges, "Locke for the Masses: Property Rights and the Products of Collective Creativity (2009)((.link_green))]

	[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=916110 Alfred C. Yen, "Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession,"] Ohio State Law Journal 51 (1990): 517		[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=916110 Alfred C. Yen, "Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession,"((.link_green))] Ohio State Law Journal 51 (1990): 517

	====Welfare Theory====		====Welfare Theory====

Tfisher: /* Overviews */

2010-03-01T04:58:39Z

Overviews

← Older revision		Revision as of 04:58, 1 March 2010
Line 63:		Line 63:
	====Overviews====		====Overviews====

	[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf William Fisher, "Theories of Intellectual Property,"] in Stephen Munzer, ed., New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press, 2001) ([http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheorychinese.pdf Chinese translation], by Haifeng Huang, in Chinese Intellectual Property Review 1 (2002): 1.)		[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf William Fisher, "Theories of Intellectual Property,"((.link_green))] in Stephen Munzer, ed., New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press, 2001) ([http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheorychinese.pdf Chinese translation], by Haifeng Huang, in Chinese Intellectual Property Review 1 (2002): 1.)

	[http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/SiteCollectionDocuments/faculty/shiffrin-intellectual%20property.pdf Seanna Shiffrin, Intellectual Property,((.link_red))] in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (edited by Robert Goodin, Philip Pettit, and Thomas Pogge, Blackwell, 2007).		[http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/SiteCollectionDocuments/faculty/shiffrin-intellectual%20property.pdf Seanna Shiffrin, Intellectual Property,((.link_red))] in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (edited by Robert Goodin, Philip Pettit, and Thomas Pogge, Blackwell, 2007).

Tfisher: /* Overviews */

2010-02-27T01:02:53Z

Overviews

← Older revision		Revision as of 01:02, 27 February 2010
Line 65:		Line 65:
	[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf William Fisher, "Theories of Intellectual Property,"] in Stephen Munzer, ed., New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press, 2001) ([http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheorychinese.pdf Chinese translation], by Haifeng Huang, in Chinese Intellectual Property Review 1 (2002): 1.)		[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf William Fisher, "Theories of Intellectual Property,"] in Stephen Munzer, ed., New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press, 2001) ([http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheorychinese.pdf Chinese translation], by Haifeng Huang, in Chinese Intellectual Property Review 1 (2002): 1.)

	[http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/SiteCollectionDocuments/faculty/shiffrin-intellectual%20property.pdf Seanna Shiffrin, Intellectual Property,] in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (edited by Robert Goodin, Philip Pettit, and Thomas Pogge, Blackwell, 2007).		[http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/SiteCollectionDocuments/faculty/shiffrin-intellectual%20property.pdf Seanna Shiffrin, Intellectual Property,((.link_red))] in A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (edited by Robert Goodin, Philip Pettit, and Thomas Pogge, Blackwell, 2007).

	====Fairness Theory====		====Fairness Theory====

Tfisher: /* Additional Resources */

2010-02-27T01:02:04Z

Additional Resources

← Older revision		Revision as of 01:02, 27 February 2010
Line 57:		Line 57:
	Properly shaped, copyright law can help foster a culture that enables most people to live lives of this sort. For example, it can help promote a rich artistic tradition, support a strong educational system open to everyone, encourage people to modify the cultural goods they consume, and (last but not least) increase access to knowledge through a strong and universally accessible library system. Poorly constructed, copyright law can impair all of these values -- curb artistic innovation, frustrate the efforts of teachers to design and deliver pedagogically sound materials, discourage user modifications of cultural goods, and make the operation of libraries more costly and difficult. A great deal thus depends upon how copyright law is formulated and applied.		Properly shaped, copyright law can help foster a culture that enables most people to live lives of this sort. For example, it can help promote a rich artistic tradition, support a strong educational system open to everyone, encourage people to modify the cultural goods they consume, and (last but not least) increase access to knowledge through a strong and universally accessible library system. Poorly constructed, copyright law can impair all of these values -- curb artistic innovation, frustrate the efforts of teachers to design and deliver pedagogically sound materials, discourage user modifications of cultural goods, and make the operation of libraries more costly and difficult. A great deal thus depends upon how copyright law is formulated and applied.

	===Additional Resources===		==Additional Resources==

	The literature on copyright theory is vast, but unfortunately relatively little of it is available online. The following is a reasonably representative set of materials. Many more sources can be found in the footnotes to these articles.		The literature on copyright theory is vast, but unfortunately relatively little of it is available online. The following is a reasonably representative set of materials. Many more sources can be found in the footnotes to these articles.
Line 96:		Line 96:

	[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/User%20Innovation%203.2.pdf William Fisher, "The Implications for Law of User Innovation,"] forthcoming Minnesota Law Review (2010)		[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/User%20Innovation%203.2.pdf William Fisher, "The Implications for Law of User Innovation,"] forthcoming Minnesota Law Review (2010)



	== Contributors ==		== Contributors ==