Diagnostic Kits/Paper: Difference between revisions
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* Licensing Approaches | * Licensing Approaches | ||
Van Overwalle | Van Overwalle defines four licensing approaches ([http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/commonsbasedresearch/Diagnostic_Kits/Models_for_facilitating_access_to_patents_on_genetic_inventions Geertrui Van Overwalle et al., 2005]) First, access to the genetic sequences is free but commercial test kits require a royalty. Second, license the commercial test kit to labs at a price that makes access to the genetic sequences more expensive. Third, exclusively licensing to laboratories in a way that limits access. Lastly, there are open licenses which allow improvements to the patent to be shared as a way to facilitating cooperative invention (ie. Biological Innovation for Open Society). | ||
* Licensing Behavior | * Licensing Behavior |
Revision as of 13:31, 3 December 2009
Are patents clogging the pipeline: The effects of intellectual property on commercialization and access to genetic diagnostics
(A Summary Paper of our Research to date)
By Carolina Rossini, Andrew Clearwater, and Mackenzie Cowell
Last Draft: December 3, 2009
Introduction
Description of the GDx Market
Defining Genetic Diagnostics
Brief History of GDx and Related Technology
- chemical patents at turn of century (see Palombi's work)
Overview of IP Landscape
- from Overview_of_Economics_of_Intellectual_Property_in_Kits see overview]
Patent Protection
Bayh-Dole
Licensing
When IP Does and Does Not Work Effectively
Our Research Questions
Our Methodology
Literature Review
Forces affecting the GDx Industry
Revolutionary technical advances
Regulatory process
payer system (public & private insurance)
Intellectual Property
Case Law
Proposed Alternative Protection Schemes
- Patent Pools
- Patent Clearing Houses
Licensing
- Licensing Approaches
Van Overwalle defines four licensing approaches (Geertrui Van Overwalle et al., 2005) First, access to the genetic sequences is free but commercial test kits require a royalty. Second, license the commercial test kit to labs at a price that makes access to the genetic sequences more expensive. Third, exclusively licensing to laboratories in a way that limits access. Lastly, there are open licenses which allow improvements to the patent to be shared as a way to facilitating cooperative invention (ie. Biological Innovation for Open Society).
* Licensing Behavior o The likelihood of granting a license for patented DNA sequenceswas was found to be similar for firms and nonprofits but nonprofits were far more likely to grant exclusive licenses. This use of exclusive licensing demands further study to find out if the use of these licenses is justified or merely a default practice with little substantive justification. (Henry, M. et al. 2002) o Changes in patent ownership and licensing complexities can have measurable effect on the development and performance of genetic testing. (Merz, J.F. et al., 2002) o A study found that for profit and non-profit entities approach patent and licenses differently: (Henry, M.R. et. al., 2003) + Patenting Behavior # For profits more often file patent applications for all new technologies and then deciding what to pursue based on commercial interest. # Non-profits were more selective about when to apply for a patent. + Licensing Behavior # For both entities, licensing was most often used as a method of commercialization. Licensing for research was very infrequent. # One important difference found was that nonprofits were more than twice as likely to license exclusively as compared to for-profit companies.
- Compulsory Licensing
- Licensing Behavior
Existing and Evolving GDx Models
Commercialization of Basic Research
- Licensing of research to existing GDx company
- Licensing of research to new GDx start-up
- Usage of research in public domain by existing GDx company? (multiplex kits?)
Paths to Market
- ASRs
- Kits
- DTC