Diagnostic Kits/The dangers of diagnostic monopolies: Difference between revisions

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*Effect of patents on price
*Effect of patents on price
**tests without a monopoly are priced similarly to tests with a monopoly
**tests without a monopoly are priced similarly to tests with a monopoly
**other pricing factors
***economy of scale
***health plan reimbursement
*Effect of patents as an incentive for test development
**Patents do not appear to be a necessary motivation, academic labs often offer testing soon after publication
**The restriction on the market is exclusive licenses
*Effect of patents on standards of care
**Monopoly rights holders can often set the standard of care (because they are the only tester)
*Effect of exclusive licensing
**‘penumbra effect’
***tests with genes in common lead to one lab having a functional monopoly over the group of diseases that require the common gene or mutation
*There is a growing discussion about whether non-exclusively license should be required for diagnostic patents
*When technologies arise form public funding, the government has the power to "decide coverage and reimbursement for tests" which has been a largely unused power under the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act.

Revision as of 11:38, 2 October 2009

Cook-Deegan, R., Chandrasekharan, S. & Angrist, M., 2009. The dangers of diagnostic monopolies. Nature, 458(7237), 405-406.

  • "few empirical studies to help form an accurate picture of how patents affect clinical genetic testing"
  • eight case studies
    • on access to genetic tests for ten conditions (prepared for Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society)
  • Effect of patents generally
    • not a great harm
    • not a great help
  • Effect of patents on price
    • tests without a monopoly are priced similarly to tests with a monopoly
    • other pricing factors
      • economy of scale
      • health plan reimbursement
  • Effect of patents as an incentive for test development
    • Patents do not appear to be a necessary motivation, academic labs often offer testing soon after publication
    • The restriction on the market is exclusive licenses
  • Effect of patents on standards of care
    • Monopoly rights holders can often set the standard of care (because they are the only tester)
  • Effect of exclusive licensing
    • ‘penumbra effect’
      • tests with genes in common lead to one lab having a functional monopoly over the group of diseases that require the common gene or mutation
  • There is a growing discussion about whether non-exclusively license should be required for diagnostic patents
  • When technologies arise form public funding, the government has the power to "decide coverage and reimbursement for tests" which has been a largely unused power under the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act.