Diagnostic Kits/Paper: Difference between revisions

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====  Licensing ====  
====  Licensing ====  
* Licensing Approaches
* Licensing Approaches
# Licenses
Van Overwalle has defining four licensing approaches ([http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/commonsbasedresearch/Diagnostic_Kits/Models_for_facilitating_access_to_patents_on_genetic_inventions Geertrui Van Overwalle et al., 2005])
          o Free access to the genetic sequences but royalty payments for the commercial test kits
          o Licensing to laboratories at a rate that makes the commercial test kit more economical
          o Exclusively licensing to a limited number of laboratories
          o Biological Innovation for Open Society license that makes improvements to the patent shared as a way to facilitate cooperative invention.
    * Licensing Behavior
          o The likelihood of granting a license for patented DNA sequenceswas was found to be similar for firms and nonprofits but nonprofits were far more likely to grant exclusive licenses. This use of exclusive licensing demands further study to find out if the use of these licenses is justified or merely a default practice with little substantive justification. (Henry, M. et al. 2002)
          o Changes in patent ownership and licensing complexities can have measurable effect on the development and performance of genetic testing. (Merz, J.F. et al., 2002)
          o A study found that for profit and non-profit entities approach patent and licenses differently: (Henry, M.R. et. al., 2003)
                + Patenting Behavior
                      # For profits more often file patent applications for all new technologies and then deciding what to pursue based on commercial interest.
                      # Non-profits were more selective about when to apply for a patent.
                + Licensing Behavior
                      # For both entities, licensing was most often used as a method of commercialization. Licensing for research was very infrequent.
                      # One important difference found was that nonprofits were more than twice as likely to license exclusively as compared to for-profit companies.
* Compulsory Licensing
* Compulsory Licensing
* Licensing Behavior
* Licensing Behavior

Revision as of 14:18, 3 December 2009

Are patents clogging the pipeline: The effects of intellectual property on commercialization and access to genetic diagnostics
(A Summary Paper of our Research to date)
By Carolina Rossini, Andrew Clearwater, and Mackenzie Cowell

Last Draft: December 3, 2009

Introduction

Description of the GDx Market

Defining Genetic Diagnostics

from Educational_Materials#Field_Definition

Brief History of GDx and Related Technology

  • chemical patents at turn of century (see Palombi's work)

Overview of IP Landscape

from Overview_of_Economics_of_Intellectual_Property_in_Kits see overview]

Patent Protection

Bayh-Dole

Licensing

When IP Does and Does Not Work Effectively

Our Research Questions

Our Methodology

Literature Review

Forces affecting the GDx Industry

Revolutionary technical advances

Regulatory process

payer system (public & private insurance)

Intellectual Property

Case Law

Proposed Alternative Protection Schemes

  • Patent Pools
  • Patent Clearing Houses

Licensing

  • Licensing Approaches



  1. Licenses

Van Overwalle has defining four licensing approaches (Geertrui Van Overwalle et al., 2005)

         o Free access to the genetic sequences but royalty payments for the commercial test kits
         o Licensing to laboratories at a rate that makes the commercial test kit more economical
         o Exclusively licensing to a limited number of laboratories
         o Biological Innovation for Open Society license that makes improvements to the patent shared as a way to facilitate cooperative invention. 
   * Licensing Behavior
         o The likelihood of granting a license for patented DNA sequenceswas was found to be similar for firms and nonprofits but nonprofits were far more likely to grant exclusive licenses. This use of exclusive licensing demands further study to find out if the use of these licenses is justified or merely a default practice with little substantive justification. (Henry, M. et al. 2002)
         o Changes in patent ownership and licensing complexities can have measurable effect on the development and performance of genetic testing. (Merz, J.F. et al., 2002)
         o A study found that for profit and non-profit entities approach patent and licenses differently: (Henry, M.R. et. al., 2003)
               + Patenting Behavior
                     # For profits more often file patent applications for all new technologies and then deciding what to pursue based on commercial interest.
                     # Non-profits were more selective about when to apply for a patent. 
               + Licensing Behavior
                     # For both entities, licensing was most often used as a method of commercialization. Licensing for research was very infrequent.
                     # One important difference found was that nonprofits were more than twice as likely to license exclusively as compared to for-profit companies. 






  • Compulsory Licensing
  • Licensing Behavior

Existing and Evolving GDx Models

Commercialization of Basic Research

  • Licensing of research to existing GDx company
  • Licensing of research to new GDx start-up
  • Usage of research in public domain by existing GDx company? (multiplex kits?)

Paths to Market

  • ASRs
  • Kits
  • DTC

Discussion

Why is there a lack of empirical evidence about patents as a barrier to innovation?

Conclusions

Possible Solutions

Bibliography