As Edward Purcell explained, "[t]heory, in other words, was to be wholly descriptive, and its purpose a systematic classification of the existent.... That empirical focus, together with the purposive rejection of prescriptive theory, led in practice to a descriptive acceptance of the limits of American society and confirmed the assumption that the structure was basically good. Empiricism itself was not necessarily conservative, but in the context of the cold war and with concepts that were implicitly prescriptive, it led almost inevitably toward a wholesale acceptance of the existent social structure." [Edward A. Purcell, The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism & The Problem of Value (1973), 261]

Lawrence Friedman is more sympathetic in his evaluation of this trend. He argues that "law and society ... scholars try to be systematic about their subject; they try to achieve rigor in method or theory, and they attempt to separate normative from descriptive issues. Typically, their object of study is living law -- the study of how the legal system actually operates. Do judges sentence white collar criminals to shorter or longer terms than burglars? How much do businessmen actually know about the law of contracts, and what difference does it make to them? What is the actual effect of licensing laws on the quality of professional services? The methods are usually those of the social sciences. And the data go beyond the conventional ‘authorities’ -- that is, appellate cases, statutes, treatises of law." [Lawrence M. Friedman, "The Law and Society Movement," 38 Stan. L. Rev. 763, 763-64 (1986)].