Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan argue, for example, that "the legal reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, designed to increase the regularity of detection and punishment, can be viewed as a natural evolution of regulatory enforcement, ‘selected’ by political environment that sought more security from social harms." Bardach and Kagan suggest, however, that enforcement depends on the enforcement official. Hence, "[i]f the political environment sought to select the fittest enforcement strategy ... it might favor the evolution of a still more sophisticated type of enforcement official, one who would retain strong, modern enforcement tools but would use them more flexibly and selectively, what [they] call the ‘good inspector.’" Lest they are misunderstood, Bardach and Kagan stress that "good inspection does not depend merely on the personal characteristics and skills of the inspector, however important these may be. Good inspection can flourish only in an organizational and political environment that cultivates it, or at least permits it. It is the regulatory agency, and not merely the individual enforcement official, that must foster flexible enforcement and try to foster cooperation through consultation and tough bargaining." [Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness (1982)].