Nelson Goodman wrote on a similar point that: "A [deductive] rule is amended if it yields an inference we are unwilling to accept; an inference is rejected if it violates a rule we are unwilling to amend." Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, p.64 (4th ed. 1983); Douglas Hofstadter, supra, at 207-208 (under pressure, an original rule slips and shows its fluidity; making analogies requires this possibility of fluid concepts); Joseph Raz, a legal philosopher, highlights the ways in which judges rewrite rules in a new case by distinguishing a precedent and in so doing they modify "a rule to avoid its application to a case to which it does apply as it stands;" yet the rewritten rule must still be able to fit the settled case while avoiding th enew case. Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, p.186 (1979).