The scholars known as the "Legal Realists" in particular criticized legal reasoning that implied that analogies, once discovered, decided cases; instead, they argued for contextual analysis of the policies and consequences implicit in alternative responses to practical problems. See, e.g., Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 1, (1949)(viewing as mere pretense any efforts to reconstruct analogical reasoning into the producting of rules that can be applied deductively). The Legal Realists differed from Posner, however, who called for the development of an explicit, strong theory for making policy judgments (microeconomics being his theory of choice). For a basic discussion of Legal Realism, see Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law : 1870-1960, 169-212 (1992). For opinions reflecting the realist approach, see the dissent in "International News Services v. Associated Press, 248 US 215 (1918)."