The End Is Nigh: The Varied Responses Of African States To AIDS

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AIDS has been devastating to Africa. Nearly two-thirds of the forty million people infected with HIV or suffering from AIDS live in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, AIDS has not affected the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa equally. State HIV/AIDS prevalence rates range from 35.8 percent to .1 percent. What is the cause of the current variation in the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate across Africa? Some Sub-Saharan Africa states adopted HIV/AIDS prevention policies early and created effective national efforts to stabilize the HIV/AIDS rate at a low level. Other states took longer to adopt such policies but eventually initiated prevention efforts. Another group of states have simply failed to implement effective policies regarding HIV/AIDS prevention. Lastly, prevention programs largely driven by civil society groups have emerged in some countries with little cooperation from their government.

Why have some African states been able to surmount the challenges involved in supply a public good (HIV/AIDS prevention) and others have failed to do so? I argue that the key factors determining a state’s response to AIDS are the infrastructural power of the state, the level of inequity within the society and the amount of societal cohesion and social capital. It is the historical construction and reproduction of the political, economic, medical and social institutions of the state that determine the level of these factors. Understanding the causes of the variance in state responses to AIDS is vital to the effort of reducing the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate throughout Sub-Saharan.

Introduction

In the mid-1980s, a previously unrecognized pathogen began cutting a devastating swath through global society. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome)\(^1\) and the World Health Organization estimated that in the year 2003, over 40 million people throughout

\(^1\) Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) attacks and destroys the cells of an individual’s immune system. Once HIV has reduced the CD4+ T-cell count to approximately 200 per cubic millimeter of blood, an individual becomes susceptible to opportunistic illnesses. In industrialized countries, a clinical diagnosis of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) is then made.\(^1\) In many less developed countries, the limited medical testing available has led to a clinical diagnosis of AIDS that is based upon various combinations of illnesses, such as weight loss, chronic diarrhea, tuberculosis, Kaposi’s sarcoma, and other opportunistic infections.\(^1\)
the world were infected with HIV or suffering from AIDS.\textsuperscript{2} Approximately 26.6 million of those people live in Sub-Saharan Africa. AIDS has reduced life expectancy in Sub-Saharan Africa from 62 years to 47 years. Over 1.7 million children have been orphaned. The coming generations in Africa will face a greater expenditure of family income on health care, reduce the enrollment of children in school and for an area of the world that already has insufficient food supplies, face great difficulties in producing adequate food supplies because of the loss of agricultural workers. Lastly, African states will expend greater and greater sums on the care of AIDS patients. These are funds that must then be subtracted from other areas, such as education and economic development.\textsuperscript{3}

The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have not been equally affected by (AIDS). The prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS among the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa ranges from a high of 38.2\% to a low of .1\%.\textsuperscript{4} However, all African countries started with a low HIV/AIDS prevalence rate. What is the cause of the variation in the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate across Sub-Saharan Africa? This variation can be ascribed to the responses of each state to the onset of the AIDS epidemic. Some states adopted HIV/AIDS prevention policies early and created effective national efforts to stabilize the HIV/AIDS rate at a low level. Others took longer to adopt such policies but where later able to initiate policies to reduce the rate of new infections. Some states have simply failed to implement effective policies regarding HIV/AIDS prevention. Understanding the cause of the variation in responses of states to AIDS is vital to the effort of reducing the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. The question is why

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some African states have been able to surmount the challenges involved in supply a public good (HIV/AIDS prevention) and others have failed to do so?

Senegal is a nation that had an effective and early responded to HIV/AIDS. In 2001, Senegal had a HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of .8%, among the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa. I contend that this low rate was no accident of demographics or statistics. I will argue that the Senegalese government and civil society possessed both the capacity and the political/societal will to respond effectively to the threat of HIV/AIDS. This case study of Senegal, utilizing historical institutionalism’s methods, will show how a high level of infrastructural capacity, social cohesion and social capital generated by the interaction of the mechanisms of the state and civil society combined to produce the collective good of effective HIV/AIDS prevention within an African context.

The Value of a Case Study

The study of a small number of cases (including a single case) has often been criticized for failing to provide generally applicable conclusions, on the one hand, and for not eliminating alternative theories on the other. A statistical study could highlight the correlations between social, economic and political factors within countries. However, the political factors that affect HIV/AIDS prevalence rates have not been incorporated into statistical models. This work needs to be done. Correlation, though, is not causation and while King, Keohane and Verba propose that strong correlations within a statistical

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framework yield causal inferences; I find this route to causality inadequate.\textsuperscript{7} Certainly, an understanding of how Senegal stabilized its HIV/AIDS rate is worth pursuing in and of itself, but the study of a single case also has significant alternative value. A single case study allows for an intensive investigation into the political variables, processes and causal mechanisms that impact the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate.\textsuperscript{8} Additionally, Michael Coppedge argues that small-n case studies allow researchers to move between levels of analysis when multi-level causation might be occurring.\textsuperscript{9} It has certainly been the history of comparative politics that small-n studies have been an important tool in inductively developing theories.

**A Theoretical Framework**

Political scientists have made little effort to explain the variation in the responses of African States to HIV/AIDS. As the World Bank’s *Confronting AIDS: Public Priorities in a Global Epidemic* indicates “The Policy messages of this report are not startling findings. The call for preventing infections among people most likely to contract and spread the virus is a reiteration of arguments for the control of the sexually transmitted diseases that were already recognized 20 years ago (Brandt 1987).”\textsuperscript{10} The report continues: “If the messages are familiar, why are they not being followed in countries around the world? The answers clearly lie outside the technical discussions …


and fall instead into the domain of political science, a less-developed discipline than either epidemiology or economics, with fewer guiding principles.”

I would strenuously disagree that political science is a “less-developed discipline,” but the World Bank is correct in surmising that the answer to why governments do or do not enact the policies necessary for effective HIV/AIDS prevention invariably lays in the political realm. Preliminary analyses indicated that neither regime type nor gross national product is major factors in determining the response of states to AIDS. Rather, I argue the determining factors are the infrastructural power of the state, the level of inequity within the society, the amount of societal cohesion and social capital. It is the historical construction and the reproduction of the political, economic, medical and social institutions of a state that determine the level of these factors.

Stopping the spread of AIDS is simple; only a change in the behavior of individuals is required. Conversely, the difficulty in stopping the spread of AIDS is changing human behavior. A government with strong infrastructural power has the institutions and the legitimacy necessary to penetrate society and collaborate with civil society groups to produce its desired outcomes. It is a state that has developed the institutional and cultural mechanisms needed to implement its policies. Further, it is a state that is able to draw upon international resources effectively in its battle against AIDS.

The three other factors I have identified as important to the state’s response to HIV/AIDS are societal cohesion, social capital and social inequity. Clearly, a fragmented and conflicted society with little trust hampers efforts to delivery the HIV/AIDS

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prevention message. Additionally, a society with gross inequities has great difficult
allocating resources for the benefit of those at the lower economic levels. Societal
cohesion and social capital do not simply manifest themselves as if Athena springing
forth fully formed from the head of Zeus. Once again we must look to the institutions of
the states, both formal and informal, to explain the presence or absences of these societal
variables.

The variation in HIV/AIDS prevalence rates can be and has been explained by
examination of variables within each state such as migration, urbanization, the healthcare
system, land distribution and gender relations within the state. I contend, however, that
these variables are the results of capacities and policies of state. To truly understand the
responses of African states to HIV/AIDS, one must investigate first the how – why some
states have an ability to implement and successfully develop AIDS prevention programs
and secondly, the why, the reason the state finds the development and implementation of
such programs in its interest. In a perfect world the two questions would stand alone,
however, the why and the how of HIV/AIDS prevention are entwined in an examination
of the infrastructural power of the state and the social capital within the society.

**Infrastructural power**

In the 1980s it was suggested that the State should be put back into the equation
as an analytical concept particularly in regards to its autonomy from civil society. Theda
Skocpol has argued that in times of economic crises the State needs enough autonomy
from society to distance itself from society’s demands and enact economic resuscitation.
Skocpol indicates that the amount of autonomy held by different States varies widely.\textsuperscript{12} Evans followed with the concept of embedded autonomy, which examined the success of the newly industrialized countries of East Asia and proclaimed that the State was able to successfully orchestrate the development of these countries because of their autonomy from both owners and workers. These periods of theorizing on State autonomy was followed by further theorization that African nation-states were weak and unable to achieve this autonomy and thus were overwhelmed by societal forces. However, if we follow Michael Mann’s lead we see state autonomy in a somewhat different light.

Mann, in seeking to understand the autonomous power of the states identifies two forms of state power. Despotic power is “… the range of actions which the [state] elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups.”\textsuperscript{13} Infrastructural power is … “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.”\textsuperscript{14} Mann notes the infrastructural power of the state develops from the same capabilities and strategies utilized by civil society to order social relations and develop the ability for collective social mobilization. These include ‘relatively highly-developed’ techniques of centralized and specialization of state activities, communication and transport of people and resources, literacy and it byproducts of codification of laws and stable transmissions of messages and coinage and weight and measures allowing a guarantee of value by the


\textsuperscript{13} Mann, Michael. “The autonomous power of the state: Its origins, mechanisms and results.” Archives Europeennes De Sociology XXV (1984), 184 – 213. 188.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid. 189.
state. Mann’s state with high infrastructural power is a state with both an intensive and extensive bureaucratic apparatus. This leads Mann to the following conclusion:

“First in the whole history of the development of the infrastructure of power there is virtually no technique which belongs necessarily to the state, or conversely to civil society. Second, there is some kind of oscillation between the role of the two in social development.”

The significant difference between the state and civil society is the territorial reach of the state. And it is organizational coordination across the territory of the state that generates a significant portion of the state’s autonomy. According to Mann, “[t]erritorial-centralization provides the state with a potentially independent basis of power mobilization being necessary to social development and uniquely in the possession of the state itself.” It also leaves the state in the unique position of generate HIV/AIDS prevention in a manner that civil society simply cannot do. This is one of the most wrenching discoveries to come from Catherine Campbell’s study of a quite ambitious project set-up in one town in South Africa; success in implementing HIV/AIDS prevention programs can be achieved in on the local level but without the active participation of the state government the ability to transmit the program over an extensive territorial area is simply not possible.

Drawing upon Mann’s notion of infrastructural power we can also agree with Catherine Boone that not all states seek state autonomy. In the case of Senegal, the political class continues to extract wealth from the nation’s agricultural base. The State’s relationship with the Marabouts allows for the extraction of surplus from the peasantry,
while the state simultaneously seeks to exercise hegemony over society. The cost of this hegemony, however, was the providing of a space for the civil society of Senegal to organize, form institutions and increase its own infrastructural power.

Robert Fatton points out that in many African states we are not address weak states at all, but, rather, a state that is quite successful in achieving its objectives—maintenance of the status quo, including its ability to extract wealth from subaltern classes—while the politically dominant class retains its position at the top of society.\textsuperscript{18} The predatory states of Africa can be seen as states with high levels of despotic power, but lack in infrastructural power and the ability to penetrate society. Generally, predatory states are states with high levels of natural resources. Otherwise, the state has to contend with the attempts (and in agrarian societies, frequent successes) of the populations to exit from its control.

Mann is clear that the power of the state is tied up with its relation with civil society. This leads to two important points about the State and its response to AIDS. States with high levels of infrastructural power have a greater capacity to response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Additional, civil societies with high infrastructural ability are better situated both to provide services and organizations for HIV/AIDS prevention in society but also to push for a governmental response.

One caveat here is that regime labels do not matter, the state’s penetration into and relations with civil society does. Some states labeled as democracies will have extremely low levels of infrastructural power while some authoritarian states with have very high levels. Additionally, the level of infrastructural power found in the civil societies of differing regimes types also varies significantly. During the period in which

it was a one party state, the organizational life of Senegal’s civil society was quite active
and quite varied.

**Social capital**

Robert Putnam defines social capital as the “…features of social organizations, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.”\(^1\) However, Putnam provides little explanation of how this social capital is reproduced over time. Putnam fails to take into considerations the institutions of civil society that also generate (or have an adverse effect) on the generation of social capital. The concept of civil society is hotly debated in political science. For some, it is a realm between the public and private spheres of life where citizens can contest the state's hegemony and restrict its activities. For others, it is the base from which society constructs the state to organize and maintain political authority. Thomas Callaghy nicely expresses the prevailing concepts of Civil Society:

Two basic definitions seem to exist in the discussion of civil society in Africa. The first relates to autonomous societal groups that interact with the state but delimit and constraint its actions; here associational life is seen as the core of civil society. The second less common definition deals with the emergence of norms about the nature and limits of state power, including its role in the economy, and about the creation of the public sphere and the political rules that govern its functioning.\(^2\)

In much of the theorizing, civil society is presented as a virtuous entity, capable of reining in the excess of the state. As Thomas Callaghy and Robert Fatton point out, civil society is not inherently benevolent.\(^3\) Not all civil societies in Africa (or elements of

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civil society) will facilitate the implementation of the HIV/AIDS preventions. However, drawing again from Michael Mann, civil societies with high levels of infrastructural have the ability to call for and participate in the implementation of HIV/AIDS prevention programs. Further, civil society organizations have the ability to generate high levels of social capital and use this social capital to spread the HIV/AIDS prevention message throughout the network of their organizations. This is the case in Senegal.

The Case of Senegal: AN Early and Effective Response

A Successful Program of HIV/AIDS prevention

Has Senegal been effective in implementing its HIV/AIDS prevention program? A low HIV/AIDS prevalence rate cannot be used to determine the level of societal and governmental action in the prevention of HIV/AIDS transmissions. That would be a tautological explanation. It cannot be concluded that Senegal has a low HIV/AIDS prevalence rate; therefore, the government must have implemented an effective strategy for AIDS prevention. However, a variety of other indicators attest to the effectiveness of Senegal’s prevention program.

In 1985, Senegalese researchers identified HIV-2 as the strain of human immunodeficiency virus most prevalent in Senegal.\(^\text{22,23}\) The lower transmission rate and


slower pace of progression from HIV-2 to AIDS afforded the Senegalese State and Civil Society additional time in which to organize and implement a HIV/AIDS prevention program. In any event, the State acted promptly. The Programme National de Lutte Contre le SIDA (PNLS) was formed in 1986. The UNAIDS report, Acting early to prevent AIDS: The Case of Senegal, presents persuasive evidence attesting to the fact that Senegalese public health and social services efforts have been successful in stabilizing the nation’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate at a low level. The report particularly notes:

- By 1992, sex education was part of the curriculum in Senegal, both at the primary and secondary levels.
- By 1995, 200 non-governmental organizations were active in the field of AIDS prevention in Senegal. Over twice that number of community groups were also engaged in AIDS prevention programs.
- Condom sales in the country rose from 800,000 in 1988 to 7,000,000 in 1997.
- The infection rate for sexually transmitted diseases declined in both commercial sex workers and pregnant women. This development was noted as particularly important, since the presence of a STD increases the efficiency of HIV transmission between sexual partners. The decline in STDs for Senegal is also indicative of the successful adoption of safe sex practices among the population.
- Senegal’s HIV/AIDS incidence rates have remained stable over time. Between 1985 and 1995 the rate of new HIV infections in Dakar, for example, held constant at 1.1 per 100 sex workers, suggesting no significant rise in the infection rate over that period.\(^24\)

Senegal has also been extremely successfully in availing itself of external funds for HIV/AIDS prevention. Other nations (Germany, Canada, France, the United States and the European Union), international organizations (including the World Health Organization and the United Nations Joint Programme on AIDS) and other outside sources have contributed significant sums to the Senegalese HIV/AIDS prevention effort.

The United States, the largest donor to HIV/AIDS prevention programs in Senegal, had contributed an estimated 20.5 million dollars to governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations and community groups by the end of the year 2002.\textsuperscript{25}

The United States Agency for International Development’s AIDSCAP program, administered by Family Health International, strengthened the operations of 58 organizations in Senegal during the period August 1993 to October 1997 and distributed over 900,000 free condoms over the same period. The organizations funded by AIDSCAP addressed a myriad of social service missions when originally created, but all now view HIV/AIDS prevention as one of the most important services needed by their constituencies.

A sample of the organizations receiving funding from AIDSCAPS demonstrates the range of their missions. JAMRA is an Islamic social services agency. Programme National de Lutte Contre le SIDA (PNLS) is the national program spearheading AIDS prevention efforts in Senegal. The Society for Women and AIDS in Africa (SWAA), a continent-wide women’s organization, administers significant resources towards education and support services for women. African Consultants International (ACI), a consulting service, has adopted HIV/AIDS prevention as its main corporate objective and provided a significant amount of the training to organizations funded under AIDSCAP. Radio Ziguinchor and Radio Kaolack were part of the media’s attempt to increase the public’s awareness of prevention efforts in Senegal. The Association des Postes de Santé Privés Catholiques, a private Catholic group, provides medical services.

In addition, AIDSCAP provided funding to various organizations that promoted the commercial activities of women, improved the lives of market women, provided

services to commercial sex workers, instructed university students in HIV/AIDS prevention, as well as organizations involved in rural development. This coordination of AIDSCAP funding to support non-governmental efforts across a wide variety of fronts and constituencies indicates that Senegalese Civil Society possesses both the political space to organize and the capacity to respond to this ongoing health crisis effectively.

**Explaining the Success of the Prevention Program: The Development of Infrastructural Power in the State and Civil Society**

Having shown that Senegal had and has an effective response to HIV/AIDS the question becomes why was the government of Senegal willing to develop and HIV/AIDS prevention policy and effective in policy development and implementation? As previously discussed, the high infrastructural power of the state also matched by the ability of society to make collective request of the state. In Senegal, the impetus for policy development arose from the interaction and collaboration between medical personnel and activists in civil society and members of the bureaucratic state. The political, economic, societal and medical institutions resident in the country lowered the cost to the state of producing an effective response to AIDS. Many of the Senegalese institutions that have contributed to that nation’s low HIV/AIDS prevalence rate trace their existence to Senegal’s colonial period.

The end of colonialism marked a critical juncture for the states of Africa. The nature of colonial rule, the response of those subjected to that rule, and the conditions and terms under which decolonization occurred are embedded in the foundations upon which the newly emerged states now rest. The state of Senegal arose with institutions created by colonial authorities and indigenous institutions developed in response to colonialism. In response to the slave trade and then to colonialism, the Marabouts, the leaders of
Senegal’s Islamic Brotherhoods, rallied resistance, becoming a formidable social force within the Senegalese countryside. During the same period, the French established medical institutions in Senegal to service their soldiers, particularly to treat sexually transmitted diseases. Institutions were also created to maintain the health of the indigenous population that supplied the manpower needs of French agricultural and industrial concerns.

The colonial period saw the reorganization of societal relations within the state by the interplay between French administrative objectives and the reaction to those efforts by the Islamic hierarchy in Senegal. Political, economic, social and medical institutions were established for specific historical purposes, but their final form was determined by the interaction of Senegalese civil society, primarily the Marabouts, with both the colonial and post-independence State. What follows is an examination of the development of those institutions and the infrastructural power of the state and civil society of Senegal.

**Political Institutions**

The pre-colonial territory that would later become the state of Senegal comprised chiefdoms and political units headed by royal lineages. The French began their trading presence in the area in the 1500s and, by 1659 the port of Saint-Louis was the major French trading post on the western coast of Africa. In 1677, the Island of Gorée, captured from the Dutch, joined Saint-Louis as France’s entrepôt to West Africa.

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27 Gellar. 6.
Slaves, captured in warfare among the political factions of West Africa, were the major export traffic through these ports.

Until the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, the French relationship with the pre-colonial entities of Senegal centered on the coastal trade. Following the Conference, the French sought colonial conquest. Defeating the Wolof army in 1886, the French gained significant control over the territory of Senegal. The French, however, were not well suited to the conditions of the Sahel and were unsuccessful at establishing large-scale agriculture in the interior of Senegal. Senegal avoided becoming a settler colony. Instead, the peasantry under the guidance of the Marabouts would cultivate the interior of Senegal. After the abolishment of slavery in 1789, the French commercial class in Senegal turned its attention to the export of groundnuts, a crop that grew well in the soil and climatic conditions of the Sahel. Senegal had first entered the nexus of the world market through slavery; it would consolidate its presence there through the production of peanuts for the French market.

The French were effective at extracting surplus wealth from the peasant population and creating institutions that promoted what Catherine Boone terms merchant capitalism. The assimilationist policies of French colonizers and their mission civilisatrice, however, led to the creation of limited democratically orientated political structures especially within the urban coastal areas of Senegal.

By 1887, the cities of Saint-Louis, Gorée, the port city of Rufisque and, after its separation from Gorée, Dakar formed the four self-governing communes of French Senegal. The number of settlements and the number of soldiers in the coastal areas of

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28 Ibid. 9.
Senegal increased significantly. The result for Senegal was a metis (mulatto) population that would become the coastal elite class in Senegalese society. Those Africans living within these major trading centers could avail themselves of the rights and privileges of French citizenship. Senegal’s first President, Leopold Sedar Senghor strengthened and expanded that structure, creating a bureaucracy capable of devising and effectively implementing an HIV/AIDS prevention policy. State centralization and a limited but capable bureaucracy are Senegal’s legacies from the French colonial era.

However, the four communes contained less than 5% of the population of Senegal. Assimilationist policies were not extended to the majority of Senegalese population residing in the interior of the country. A small segment of the population of Senegal had voting rights within the French republic and access to education in both Senegal and France. At the same time, the majority of the population in the interior of the country resided in administrative districts ruled by French commandants, held the status of “sujets,” remained liable to forced labor and possessed limited rights of free movement. Leopold Sedar Senghor, would tap into this element of society to achieve his political ambitions, usurping power from the coastal elites and tying the future governments of Senegal to the support of the peasant population.

In 1902, Dakar became the capital of the French West African Federation and was transformed into the most advanced administrative and social services apparatus in French Black Africa. From 1902 to 1965, the Ecole Nationale de France D’Outre

(National School of Overseas France) in Paris trained African bureaucrats for postings in Senegal and other parts of francophone Africa. After independence, President Senghor created the Centre de Formation et de Perfectionnement Administratif in 1965 to ensure that Senegal would continue to maintain a highly trained bureaucracy. The Ecole Nationale d’Administration et Magistrature provided the instruction for the top tier of government. The University of Dakar was founded in 1957 and had been preceded by the Institute of Black African Studies in 1938 and the Institute of Advanced Studies in 1950.

In this manner, French assimilationist policies created the foundation of the governmental system in Senegal that would later respond to the crisis of AIDS. Villalón describes the bureaucratic formation of the State in Senegal – and it is a State with considerable capacity to implement its bureaucratic directives – as follows:

One effect of this system of staffing the state is the formation of a bureaucratic elite that views administration as a technical skill for which it is uniquely suited. Their common training, dependence for appointments on the office of the presidency, and regular rotation among positions all serve to imbue this staff with certain unifying characteristics. The result of the shared period of socialization in the urban, secular, and westernized political culture is an administrative solidarity among functionaries which, although it is not necessarily determinative of political behavior, nevertheless provides an important measure of cohesion to the state as an institution distinct from its predominantly rural and religious African Society. Moreover, as direct representatives of the executive branch of the central government, regional state officials are tied directly to a centralized pyramidal structure in which all significant administrative decisions are made at the apex in Dakar.

During the colonial period, Senegal supplied bureaucrats for posting throughout French West Africa. After independence, these bureaucrats were repatriated to Senegal. The result was that Senegal did not have too few bureaucrats, but too many.

33 Villalón. 84-85.
34 Ibid. 85.
The French were willing to support and contribute to the development of
democratic institutions within the urban areas of Senegal. These institutions (as with the
administrative structures of the British raj in India) would survive and thrive as Senegal
moved into the era of post-independence. Senegal emerged from the colonial period,
then, with a political elite that was experienced in democratic processes that had been
institutionalized under the French administration. President Senghor had served as the
Senegalese Deputy in the French National Assembly and was well versed in the arts of
realpolitik.

This institutional headstart by no means meant that Senegal entered the
community of nations as a full-fledged democracy. President Senghor worked quickly to
structure Senegal as a one-party state. However, he consistently faced resistance from
other political organizations, many of which were successors to organizations originating
during the colonial period. While opposition leaders were harassed and jailed and
mysterious deaths occasionally occurred, Senegal never descended to the point of
massive political violence and military/governmental repression.36 Similar to the Cote
d’Ivoire, French troops remained based in Senegal after the arrival of independence and
Senghor, on occasion, made use of these troops to put down popular unrest. The
Senegalese army has also been called upon for pacification of public strife. By and large,
though, while the army has held a privileged status in the State, it has generally avoided
direct political involvement.37

36 Of course, we cannot overlook those who lost their lives in political struggles in Senegal, nor should we
minimize the cost people have paid in the democratic movements in Senegal.
37 Diop, Momar Coumba. “Introduction - From ‘Socialism’ to ‘Liberalism’: The Phases of State
Diouf regimes was mild in comparison to that seen in most other African states in the immediate aftermath of decolonization.

French direct rule also allowed Senegal to avoid the legacy of ethnic cleavages that were the products and instruments of indirect rule in other African states. The French colonial administrators attempted to use traditional chiefs for rural administration. French support of the chiefs was a means of resisting the growing popular support of Islam leaders and continued Islamization of the population. Over time, the rural population that had only recently seen the demise of the limitations of the caste system shifted its support from the chiefs to the Marabouts. In areas were large numbers of Islamic conversions had already occurred, the French had little choice, due to their limited manpower, but to reach an accommodation with the Marabouts. The French had attempted to repress and defeat the Marabouts in their early colonization of Senegal, but eventually accommodation between the French colonial authorities and the Marabouts was achieved. The French resorted to utilizing the Marabouts as the means of incorporating the peasantry into the State or, following Catherine Boone, incorporating the peasantry into the merchant capitalism of Senegal.

As Gellar clarifies:

Toward the end of the first decade of the [20th] century, the French colonial authorities in Senegal reversed their anti-Islamic policies and moved to reach a modus vivendi with Muslim religious leaders willing to preach the acceptance of the authority of the colonial state. Prominent Muslim leaders such as Amadou Bamba [Kaliph of the Mourides], Malick Sy [descendant of Umar Tall, Kaliph of the Tijaniyya], and Seydou Nourou Tall [also a descendant of Umar Tall] realized that they could not drive the French out by military force and thus decided to make their peace with the colonial regime in exchange for a free hand in preaching and organizing their followers within the framework of the Muslim Brotherhoods. During World War I, many prominent Marabouts demonstrated
their loyalty to France by collaborating with the colonial authorities in recruiting African
troops for the war effort.  

The Marabouts acted as mediators, first between the peasantry and the harsh aspects of French rule and later between the peasantry and the urbane African bureaucracy of the centralized State. Patronage from the French and the political center of Senegal allowed the Marabouts to bring benefits to their followers. As peanut production increased, the Marabouts were able to increase the quantity of their land holdings and extend their influence. In an agrarian society, land creates influence and a Marabout’s holding could be made available to his followers. Many of the pre-colonial polities of West Africa were based upon a caste system with slaves as the engine of agricultural production. For the former slaves, the Marabouts’ emphasis on the equality of the members of the Islamic community represented the opportunity to escape aristocratic domination. Slaves became peasants as the Marabouts, particularly those of the Mouride Brotherhood, pushed eastward to settle and cultivate previously pastoral lands. Young men would pledge themselves to work on a Marabout’s land for ten years. In return, at the end of that period, the plot would be divided between the workers with the Marabout retaining only marginal control. Donal Cruise O’Brien notes the efficiency of the Marabouts in bringing about such a social revolution and effectively organizing a new mode of production. During the 20th century, Senegal’s population was transformed. At the outset of the 1900s, less than half of the population was Muslim; over 95% of the population is Muslim today.

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In light of their administrative reliance on the Marabouts, and also the expectation of few converts from Islam, the French felt no need to attempt to impose Christianity upon Senegal. The French limited missionaries to areas of the country in which indigenous religions were still dominant, such as the Casamance. Conversion to Catholicism did offer some rewards through educational opportunities. School run by missionaries provided a French education that created the potential for employment within the colonial bureaucracy and later within the state bureaucracy. President Senghor, born a sujet, had taken advantage of the Catholic educational system to launch himself into the Senegalese bureaucracy, but also retained his close ties to the rural communities.

The Casamance region of Senegal had continued its opposition to the French and in many instances, the population retained their indigenous religions. Generally, the conversions that did occur were to the Qadiriyya Brotherhood as opposed to the MourideBrotherhood that controlled groundnut production. The Casamance is a lush region and rice, not groundnuts, is the main agricultural product. It is also separated from much of the rest of Senegal by the former British colony of The Gambia. Consequently, the Casamance was never fully integrated into the Senegalese State and, with the passage of years, has now come to seek political autonomy through armed insurrection. Not surprisingly, considering the lack of integration and the turmoil caused by warfare, the Casamance region shows one of the higher HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in Senegal.42

41 An interesting phenomenon was the emergence of female prophets among the Diola during the colonial era. See Robert M. Baum. Shrines of the slave trade: Diola religion and society in precolonial Senegambia. New York: Oxford University, 1999.
However progressive the French policies within the coastal cities, the French were not quite prepared to make the 20 million Africans of West Africa full and equal participants in the Republic. In 1946, the distinction between citizens and sujets was revoked and all Senegalese became citizens of the French Union, but not of France.\footnote{Villalón. 81. And, Gellar. 17-19.} Senegal achieved independence in 1960.

**Economic Institutions**

During the colonial period, the French created economic institutions in Senegal that served French mercantilistic purposes. The Senegalese population, as with the population of most African colonies, were forced into producing cash crops, largely through the imposition of a head tax.\footnote{Villalón. 40.} The French and the large commercial houses controlled by French citizens were able to extract surplus wealth from the indigenous population at both ends of the market exchange system. First, as monopsonic buyer and price setter of Senegal’s largest export, groundnuts, and also as the monopoly provider of basic goods and the inputs need for agriculture. The Mouride Brotherhood was the main conduit for redirecting the peasantry into the production of groundnuts. The Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya Brotherhoods tended to produce a variety of crops and were therefore less dependent on the peanut trade and also less integrated into the State apparatus. With the agrarian population moved into the production of groundnuts rather than staples, the Senegalese became dependent upon imported rice to feed themselves.

The industrialization of Senegal was not in the interest of the French commercial houses and their wealth and political influence were successfully used to oppose industrialization, though Senegal did see the emergence of a French-controlled textile
Following Senegalese independence, the French still controlled much of the nation’s commerce. The major change, however, was that it was the Senegalese state that received monopsonic revenue as the sole buyer and processor of the groundnuts crops and licenser of consumer retailers. However, a significant portion of the surplus extracted by the State was still going to France and also into private Senegalese pockets. France paid a guaranteed price for groundnuts and also supported the West African currency, which was tied to French Franc. Since the majority of the commercial houses involved in exporting agricultural products and the production of textiles were French owned, money paid by France for agricultural products was simply recirculated to France. This circular flow of money was also sustained by the import of most consumer products from France. Consequently, a strong constitutency existed in France for the continuation of its special trade relations with Senegal. And France acted diligently to prevent other nations from encroaching upon the Senegalese market.

Eventually, the Senegalese State would attempt industrialization, but the State’s extraction of wealth from the rural population had to be maintained. That revenue allowed the State to continue funding the patronage system tying the Marabouts to the State and the disciples to the Marabouts. The State provided the Marabouts with land and goods and services, including access to employment for their disciples. Rural land reform would have disrupted the relationship between Marabout and disciples, the relationship that underpinned both the political and economic structure of the State. Therefore, real rural reform was blocked by both the State and the Marabouts. Though the State initiated co-ops and loan agencies for the peasantry, these institutions were soon overwhelmed by and converted to the purposes of the rural notables, particularly the

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Boone. 131-164.
Marabouts. President Senghor broke with and placed under house arrest his Prime Minister, Mamadou Dia when he pushed for reforms that would truly empower the peasantry.46

Sufficient agricultural revenue could also buy the acquiescence of the urban population to the State’s authority. President Senghor had gained office based on the support of the peasantry; consequently, it was essential that he continue to provide services and employment to pacify the urban population. The greatest threat to Senghor was student organizations and trade unionists. The students were more radical than the general population and willing to protest the deterioration of conditions at the University and the lack of employment opportunities, as well as the absence of full democracy in Senegal.

At the same time, Senegal had also undergone enough development to produce a trade union movement, mainly comprising the petit bourgeoisie employed in the lower levels of the State bureaucracy or within the educational system. Trade unions could and did bring parastatal agencies to a halt with strikes. The State’s response was to attempt to co-opt these unions within the state’s corporate structure. This endeavor met with only limited success.47

In the 1970s and early 1980s, facing urban and rural protest due to the deteriorating economy, the Senegalese government went on a spending spree, largely financed by foreign loans and aid, in a desperate attempt to maintain its hegemony. Drought in the 1970s had drastically reduced groundnut production and government revenue from domestic sources. The abysmal prices offered by the government to

46 Ba was supposedly plotting a coup d’etat.
producers led to the smuggling of large quantities of groundnuts to The Gambia for sale and the smuggling of consumer goods from The Gambia into Senegal. The Marabouts supported the peasantry in both their refusal to repay government loans and in their smuggling operations.

Boone explains the Marabouts’ actions as follows:

The strategy of Abdou Lahatte M’Backe (Kaliph of the Mourides) was to ensure that the religious leaders were perceived as defenders of peasant interests, not as collaborators with the state. The option was consistent, as Donal Cruise O’Brien (1984) argued with the marabouts’ role as consummante politicians. Their leverage in dealings with the government rested on their command over the population of the groundnut basin. This authority and legitimacy hinged on the freely accorded devotion of the faithful, and on the marabouts’ ability to offer both spiritual and material sustenance to their followers. If the malaise paysan was a protest movement initiated and propelled forward at the grassroots level, then the Mouride leaders would have disowned the movement at great risk to their own legitimacy and the very basis of political power. As it turned out, Mouride leaders were not prepared to mortgage their own legitimacy in attempts to bolster that of the Dakar political elite.  

Senegal’s State remains based on merchant capitalism. An intermediary, the Marabouts, not the State have control of the primary product groundnuts. The Senegalese State is in a position where it is not state autonomy, but state hegemony that matters. The State has no incentive for capitalist development since such development would only undercut the very foundation of the State. As Catherine Boone states:

The state in Senegal lacked the autonomy required to curb the destructive tendencies inherent in an economic system organized around the “parasitical” or non-productive process of extracting wealth via commercial circuits. It also lacked the autonomy required to create conditions that would facilitate and enforce the need for productive investment on the part of those who appropriated the social surplus. Why did it lack this autonomy? Because there was no social class with the interest, the collective need, or the power to forge a state that was autonomous in these ways. Reproducing existing social relations, the existing mode of domination, and the existing mode of production did not require the state to promote capitalist development - on the contrary, the “reproductive logic” of the social formation and the political order “required” that the state assume a quite different form. Where capital did not enjoy structural hegemony, instrumental control over state power lay in the hands of a ruling stratum driven by other political needs and economic interests.

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49 Ibid. 263.
John Stuart Mill tells us that a state will reflect that state that preceeds it. This has certainly been true of Senegal. From a structural perspective, the Senegalese State never made a clear break with its French colonial past.

The economic institutions generated during the period of colonialism and carried over into the Senegalese state do impact upon Senegal’s AIDS prevention policies. It is no surprise to see the Senegalese state providing social services to the urban population, indeed various studies have pointed to the superiority of healthcare available in the urban areas. Medical care was an important element of the colonization process and remained an important element of state hegemony.

The Marabouts resisted the intrusion of the State into those areas of the country under their influence. One aspect of this was limiting the State’s role in the medical domain, an area where the rural population still seeks the traditional healing of the Marabout. Consequently, both the State and the Marabout act to provide services to the constituencies. This topic will be discussed further as I examine the social and medical institutions within Senegal.

**Social Institutions**

As discussed above, the disruption of traditional society by the French and the Marabouts’ resistance led to an increased Islamization of the State. The Marabouts represented not just a new authority structure, but also the initiation of a new economic and social order. The slave, warrior-slave and artisan castes were transformed into peasants who willingly entered an obligatory relationship with the Marabouts. As

O’Brien indicates, the peasants increased their opportunity set by embracing these relationships with the Marabouts:

The Mouride brotherhood has historically been a vehicle of economic emancipation, and of a relative social advancement, for recruits drawn in large proportions from the most disadvantaged sectors of pre-colonial Wolof society (slaves in particular, also the despised artisanal castes).\(^{51}\)

One of the frequent mistakes made by scholars when approaching the Marabouts is to see only the exploitative nature of relationship. One has to wonder at the willingness of peasants to tie themselves to the Marabouts under such circumstances. O’Brien and Villalón emphasis the reciprocity of the relationship between the Marabouts and their followers. For those facing the destruction of their existing societal organizations, the Islamic Brotherhoods offered a viable and potentially rewarding alternative. The Marabouts were politically astute and quite flexible in their relationships with the peasantry. As O’Brien states “The eminence of the Saints today owes much to the manner in which they have provided organizational focus to a highly effective community responses to the impact of capitalism and world society.”\(^{52}\)

The Brotherhoods offered the potential for economic mobility, albeit limited, and promulgated a doctrine of equality and community among the faithful. The da’iras, community organizations of the Marabouts’ disciples, furnish a minimal social security for the population.

Villalón has focused intensely on the role of the Marabouts within Senegalese society and describes the State and the Marabouts as existing in a dialectic relationship. Each needs the cooperation of the other to maintain its position and, thus, the status quo.


\(^{52}\) Ibid. 81.
This relationship encompasses the competitive nature of the State and the Marabouts regarding the control of Senegal’s rural areas. Such a system of conflict and collaboration has led to a limiting of the State’s presence in areas controlled by the Marabouts through strictures on both educational and health facilities.

The post-independence State continued the French acquiescence in this regard, allowing the Marabouts substantial control of education and healthcare in their regions. And the Marabouts were effective at limiting both the number of State schools and the extent of attendance at the schools, instead providing networks of Islamic schools.53 Likewise, State-sponsored medical facilities tend to be located in urban areas, with rural areas under Maraboutic control having significantly fewer facilities. Westernized medical facilities were viewed as a threat to the Marabouts’ status as sacred healers.54

As discussed previously, the Marabouts established their own AIDS education program. This is certainly one aspect of the Marabouts’ concern for their disciples and their well-being. The disciples expect this concern and guidance from their Marabouts. However, it is not surprising that with the contention between the Marabouts and the State over education and healthcare, which is really a contest for domination of the rural regions, the Marabouts preempted the State from becoming the sole provider of AIDS prevention education.

The Marabouts maintain an obligation of support to their disciples, including land allotment, assistance with employment and the facilitation of the various bureaucratic requirements for transactions in Senegal. In addition, as urbanization increased, those

moving to the city are still able to situate themselves within multiple contexts of family, communal, ethnic and religious networks. Lucy Creevey, in her examination of modernization in Senegal, seemed to indicate that the urban population approached the Marabouts largely for religious guidance. However, she fails to consider that many issues that might be considered as secular in other societies may be seen as having a religious aspect in Senegal.55 Under these circumstances, the wealth of the Marabouts is an indication of their ability to respond effectively to a range of needs, both religious and material, of their disciples.

For Senegal, the system of patronage serves as a safety net for its citizens. O’Brien emphasizes that patronage and nepotism within Senegal is the product of the multiple ties an individual has within the Senegalese society. Political clans represent a variety of overlapping ties throughout society and political success for a candidate represents potential gain for all the members of the clan.56 O’Brien explains the role of clans as follows:

Clans in particular may be seen as the democratic dimension of the Senegalese State, as a means for local notables (and indirectly their followers) to assert claims on the governing elite.57

The expansion and deepening of the interconnectivity within Senegalese political and societal organization is both a product of and a response to colonialism. The State’s attempt to achieve hegemony over society through the extraction and redistribution of resources, along with the emergence of Islamic Brotherhoods based upon charismatic leaders, fortified and maintained this intricate web of patron-client relationships. Villalón

56 O’Brien. 149-185.
57 O’Brien. 151.
has made a strong argument that the Muslim Brotherhoods of Senegal effectively represent the aggregate interest of the population, as associations and interest groups do in other countries. Thereby, they serve to limit and focus the activities of the State.  

We must be aware, however, that the Marabouts and the State are at all times acting to maintain the status quo. Senegal’s colonial legacy is intertwined with the sense of solidarity and the economy of affection in Senegalese society. The outcome is a State that, while certainly exploitative, also attempts to respond to the needs of its society. State services are part of the patronage aimed at newly rising elements of society, such as university students and the urban petit-bourgeoisie. State Services are focused upon the urban population and the upper echelons of Senegalese society. In terms of AIDS, which generally first appears and is concentrated in the urban areas, prevention in the urban areas benefits the entire population. Many of the people infected with AIDS residing in the rural areas contracted the virus during temporary migration to urban areas or other states.

In their role as protectors and healers, the Marabouts have followed their established method of interaction with the State in HIV/AIDS prevention. They have initiated their own alternative program of education and prevention, yet maintained a collaborative connection with the State. On March 29 and 30th, 1996, a major conference was held that brought together all the major Islamic leaders in Senegal. This was no small feat. Much is said in the international literature regarding the need to integrate traditional medicine, where 70% of the population seeks treatment, with western medicine in AIDS prevention. Senegal appears to have achieved this synergy.

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58 Villalón. 200-232.
Medical Institutions

In 1918, the French established a medical school for Africans in Dakar.\textsuperscript{60} Its opening coincided with a period in which France was suffering from a devastating drain on its domestic manpower brought on by the carnage of the First World War. Just as two forces, the French and the Islamic Brotherhoods transformed the pre-colonial polities of Africa, so too was the existing medical system changed. The introduction of western medical institutions was an important element of colonialism. The first medical facilities were established to treat the soldiers consolidating French control over Senegal.\textsuperscript{61} Today, the Senegalese military has produced an international renowned doctor and professor, Souleymane MBoup, who heads Senegal’s AIDS prevention effort, was involved in the discovery of HIV-2 and systematical trains doctors for dispersal throughout West Africa.

The French realized the potential for unchecked diseases to decimate the indigenous population (and spread to its soldiers and merchants) and set about creation medical institutions for the indigenous population.\textsuperscript{62} World War I heightened the French’s concern with the health of the indigenous population. The poor health of young Africans became apparent during the massive recruitment of African troops at the beginning of the war. Furthermore, the high demographic cost of the conflict

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exacerbated the urgent need for manpower to develop the colonies and prompted an active campaign for the development of so-called “colonial reservoirs.”

The fact that the French colonizers had little incentive to convert the population to Christianity, but a significant incentive to support the Marabouts, had an impact on their approach to STDs. As Charles Becker explains:

In francophone West Africa, for instance, the Christian missionary lobby had a lesser impact on sexual matters in countries that were heavily involved in Islamic culture. The church-state separation that occurred in French political life at the beginning of the twentieth century (1904) soon applied in the colonial administration’s context with deeply anti-clerical components.

The Marabouts emerged as an important medical force in the rural areas. As Keita explains:

The adaptation of indigenous and Islamic medical techniques and personnel were subject to the political and economic and geographical constraints of a colonial market economy. The result was the dualization of the health care apparatus and health care delivery and the emergence of a clear class division between western trained and traditional health care practitioners.

The presence of STDs such as gonorrhea and syphilis increase the likelihood of HIV transmission. Senegal’s system of STDs treatment and surveillance helped to stabilize its low HIV/AIDS prevalence rate. The French set up the original facilities and procedures for the monitoring of sexual-transmitted diseases. Their retention and strengthening by the Senegalese State allowed early detection of the presence of HIV/AIDS in the population and indeed the discovery of a new strain of the HIV virus, HIV-2. Surveillance is one of the most important components of containing a

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64 Ibid. 77.

communicable disease and Senegal has been successful in implementing HIV/AIDS surveillance. Medical surveillance is also an indication of the State’s ability to monitor its citizenry. The Prefect in each commune represents the power of the State and so do the clinics, medical huts and hospitals.

This history of treating and monitoring sexually transmitted diseases since 1870 has had significant societal impact. Senegalese society is more prone to see STDs as a public health issue leading to less societal conflict over HIV/AIDS education or the promotion of condom use.

**Conclusion**

I have examined the various institutions within Senegal and their contribution to the stabilized low HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. These institutions both produce and are the repositories of the infrastructural power of the Senegalese state and civil society. Many of the Senegalese institutions that have contributed to that nation’s low HIV/AIDS prevalence rate trace their existence to Senegal’s colonial period. That period saw the reorganization of societal relations within the state by the interplay between French administrative objectives and the reaction to those efforts by the Islamic hierarchy in Senegal. Political, economic, social and medical institutions were established for specific historical purposes, but their final form was determined by the interaction of civil society, primarily the Marabouts, with both the colonial and post-independence state. It is important to examine the institutional history of Senegal in order to understand the capacity of the state and civil society to respond to crises such as that presented by HIV/AIDS. At the same time, we must also examine how these institutions were
produced, reproduced and how their structures reflect the aims and objectives of civil society and the state.

The Marabouts restructured the agricultural life of Senegal, partly at the behest of the French colonial administration and, just as importantly, for their own benefit and to their own purposes. In so doing, they established for themselves a continuing role as the mediators between the state and the peasantry. Today, the ambiguity of the relationship between the State and the Marabouts persists. For its part, the State would certainly prefer to be able to control the peasantry without the intercession of the Marabouts. Yet, it is unable and, to some extent, perhaps unwilling to do so, in light of the potential threats to the position of the political elites that might arise during any such social reorganization.

Certainly, the form Islam has taken in Senegal has been particularly beneficial in its HIV/AIDS prevention efforts. It is a moderate and pluralistic form, with religious leaders who have shown themselves very adaptable to the requirements of the nation’s HIV/AIDS prevention effort. The Marabouts’ reciprocal obligations with their disciples necessitate the promotion of the disciples’ welfare. The Marabouts’ obligation to the community of the faithful and their role as healers of not just the ill, but of society itself has led to their participation in HIV/AIDS prevention. The Marabouts have woven Senegalese society together and responded to various societal crises in the past. That being said, they have also successfully ensured that the Senegalese agricultural system works to their benefit. A further impetus for the creation of effective HIV/AIDS prevention programs has been the competition between the Marabouts and State in the medical realm. The communitarian aspects of Senegalese Islam, along with the
multiplicity of affective and patronage ties within the nation, has helped create an atmosphere of concern for the social welfare of others within Senegalese society and a high level of social capital.

The establishment of the four communes left the Senegalese urban elites with both the ability to organize into competing factions and a tradition of the political arena, rather than the battlefield, as the appropriate venue for conflict resolution. The educational legacy of both the colonial and post-independence period has provided the Senegalese with a highly educated and influential pool of citizens able to focus on the implementation of HIV/AIDS prevention. Senegal exists today as a state with considerable infrastructural power and the capacity and willingness to effectively respond to the AIDS epidemic.